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IntroductIon
The financial crisis of 2007–08 has revealed both the instability 
of the global financial system and the importance of the state 
as lender, borrower and investor of last resort. The world of 
deregulated privatised finance proved not to be a source of wealth 
for all, but a drain on the public economy, as states poured money 
into the private financial sector. It has also been a destroyer of 
personal economic security as savings were threatened, jobs lost 
and homes repossessed. The crisis in the financial sector, most 
notably in Britain and the United States, but also in Europe and 
many other parts of the world, contrasts with the bombastic 
optimism of the latter part of the twentieth century and the early 
part of the twenty-first century with its glory days of ‘Big Bang’ 
deregulation and the financial sector’s dominance over national 
politics. Far from celebrating the ‘rolling back’ of the ‘nanny’ state, 
the implosion of deregulated finance has directly contradicted the 
neoliberal case that the market and its money system is a self-
regulating process that will only be distorted by state intervention.
The crisis raises many questions about the way the financial 
system operates under late capitalism, in particular the role 
of banks and other financial institutions. The financial system 
is about the flow of money in its many forms through human 
societies and this, in turn, raises questions about the nature of 
money itself. Is money just a mechanism that represents economic 
processes or is it a social mechanism in its own right? Where does 
money come from, how does it operate? Who controls money, and 
how? In this book the case will be made that money is a complex 
phenomenon whose economic functioning relies on social trust 
and public authority. The role of states in attempting to rescue 
the financial sector challenges the idea that money is a purely 
economic phenomenon. The crisis reveals money’s social and 
1
Mellor 01 text   1 23/02/2010   15:07
2  The FuTure oF Money
political base, but also its enormous power and lack of democratic 
control. It is therefore crucially important to understand how 
money operates within the capitalist market system and how 
the institutions that originate and direct its flow are owned and 
controlled. This book does not assume any prior knowledge of 
economics but will be of interest to those within the discipline 
who want to look beyond conventional economic analysis. For 
those seeking more radical approaches, it aims to broaden the 
debates about the crisis in the financial system in order to explore 
possible alternatives by looking at the wider social and political 
context of the financial crisis.
Capitalist market theory sees money as the representation 
and product of a ‘wealth-creating’ economic system. As such, its 
operation should be left as far as possible to market logic. The case 
for the ‘free’ market and the privatisation of the money system is 
that markets are the most efficient way to organise and distribute 
economic goods, including finance. Given the assumption that 
all wealth is created by the private sector, the public/social sector 
is seen as parasitic upon this money/wealth creation process. 
Money circulation through the financial system is seen as the 
outcome of private economic acts, not as a function of social 
relationships and public authority. The notion that money issue 
and circulation should reflect the demands of the market means 
that public expenditure must always be contingent on the activities 
of private economic actors. Expenditure on social or public needs 
must be secondary to privatised economic forces. The private 
sector will authorise how much can, or cannot, be afforded since 
public expenditure is seen as a drain upon the private sector. 
The financial collapse has exposed the neoliberal ideology of 
market fundamentalism for the illusion it always was. In capitalist 
economies, the state is a capitalist state and has always stood 
behind the capitalist financial system as guardian of the money 
system, financial properties and contracts. Although public sector 
spending is decried, the state is expected to produce unlimited 
sums of money to stabilise the financial system when it experiences 
its regular crises. The exposure of the reliance of the private 
financial sector on the state has brought the financial system into 
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full view and opens it up for analysis. The opportunity must be 
taken to challenge the private control of finance and ask whether 
such an important aspect of human society should be owned by, 
and serve, the interests of capitalism. If the conventional view of 
money and its systems is not challenged, public intervention in the 
financial sector during the current crisis will only be a stepping 
stone back to hidden state support of a more carefully regulated 
capitalist financial sector – until the next crisis.
The core argument of this book is that the money system 
needs to be reclaimed from the profit-driven market economy 
and socially administered for the benefit of society as a whole as a 
public resource. In order to make this case it is important to look 
in detail at the nature, history and functioning of money and its 
institutions. There are dilemmas in opening up a debate about the 
nature of money and its role in economic life. The ideology of the 
market presents the economy as a natural process administered 
by inspired entrepreneurs in which exchange through money is 
conducted on rational principles. To say that money is as much 
a social and political phenomenon as an economic one is not an 
easy case to make. Confidence in money has largely been based 
on illusions about the origins of money and how it is issued and 
circulated. Will people be able to live within a financial system 
that operates without those illusions?
Modern societies are heavily monetised so that nearly all human 
needs are met through monetary exchange, whether in direct 
purchases or through taxation and state expenditure. Many 
people also try to secure their future through money: in savings, 
pensions or other financial assets. It is therefore important that 
people feel that money is a tangible thing that has value and will 
hold that value. People must trust money and trust other people 
to hold to their money contracts if they are to feel secure. They 
must feel that their money is safe in the bank, that their pension 
will be paid or that the price of bread will be within their means. 
The case this book will make is that this economic security can 
only be achieved through public action and social solidarity, not 
through the market. In this context it is important to challenge the 
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concept of the market itself. The capitalist market is not created 
to meet needs, it is created to make profit. 
As radical economists, from Marxists to greens and feminists, 
have argued, the capitalist market system presents itself as a 
‘natural’ system while distorting human societies and destroying 
ecological systems. Feminist and green economists, in particular, 
have argued that the money system draws artificial boundaries 
around economic valuation that excludes women’s unpaid work 
and ecological damage. A more comprehensive concept of the 
economy that describes the meeting of human need both inside 
and outside of the money system is provisioning. In order to live 
fulfilling lives people need a wide range of supportive relationships 
and secure access to sustenance. They need physical goods and 
services, but they also need many other things including care and 
friendship, time and space to develop their skills and personality. 
Some of these are provided by the money economy (public and 
private) but many are not. Many of these needs are denied through 
pressure of work and lack of resources, including money. Some 
are achieved only through great personal sacrifice. One of the 
aims of this book is to explore whether it is possible to have a 
money system that could enable a comprehensive provisioning 
of human societies in an ecologically sustainable and socially 
just way. Understanding the present money system is central to 
achieving that end.
The first chapter will explore the origin, nature and function 
of money. It will look at different ways that money has been 
construed: as private, related to the capitalist market; as public, 
related to the authority of the state or as social, a construct of 
social relationships and trust. Concepts will be explored such as 
‘sound’ money and the relation of money to the ‘real’ economy. 
The chapter will look at the way that control of money has shifted 
over time from public authority to the privatised banking system. 
It will be argued that this shift is important because ownership 
and control of the issue and circulation of money gives to the 
issuer the benefit of initial expenditure of that money and, with 
that, direction of the economy as a whole. 
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The privatisation of money issue and circulation will be 
explored further in the second chapter which will look at the 
ownership and control of the financial system institutions. It will 
show how money issue and circulation has moved between the 
private and public sector in an intricate relationship between 
the state, commerce and the banking sector. It will show how 
government reliance on debt to the private sector was central 
to the modern banking system. This has been amplified by the 
shift from state issue of debt free money, mainly as notes and 
coin, to private bank generated debt-based money, which is 
effectively ‘fresh air money’ or ‘money from nowhere’. The radical 
implications of this will be explored. The chapter will go on to 
look at the changes that took place in banking in the late twentieth 
century which saw an explosion of new financial instruments and 
financial institutions. These innovations in the financial system, 
together with the globalisation of finance and a political regime 
of light regulation, laid the basis for the 2007–08 financial crisis. 
The third chapter will argue that the privatisation of money 
issue and circulation has led to the emergence of a financialised 
society where money value predominates. This has undermined 
public and collective approaches to social solidarity and security, 
particularly within the Anglo-American economies. Concepts such 
as ‘people’s capitalism’ and ‘the property owning democracy’ have 
encouraged people to think that they can individually safeguard 
their interests through the money system. As a result, public 
and collective assets have been privatised or demutualised and 
people have been encouraged to become shareholders, rather 
than members and citizens. The chapter will explore how people 
were enticed into financial capitalism through pensions, stock 
market investments and, particularly, mortgages. Savings became 
confused with investment with little awareness of risk. In the 
short term the stock market and house prices boomed. Personal 
credit also exploded as a major engine of capitalist expansion. 
Easy access to credit masked stagnant levels of pay. The use of 
credit also became central to policy responses to social need, 
poverty and inequality. Strategies such as microcredit saw people, 
particularly women, encouraged to borrow and invest their way 
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out of poverty. While debt had seemingly been democratised, the 
foundations were being laid for the future credit crisis. 
Chapter four looks at the main beneficiaries of the massive issue 
and circulation of credit under the privatised financial system. 
In the late twentieth century the financial sector eclipsed the 
productive sector of the Anglo-American economies and captured 
the policy agenda. Speculative investment appeared to be a crock 
of gold that promised capital gains for everyone, from the personal 
investor to the house owner and the pensioner. The chapter will 
explore the way in which debt became a major resource for 
speculative financial investment both in terms of ‘leverage’, that 
is, debt based speculation, and debt related ‘derivatives’ such as 
debts sold on as investments or insurance on debt. New forms 
of investment organisations fuelled by debt appeared, such as 
private equity companies and hedge funds. Public assets were sold 
off and public investment was privatised through private finance 
initiatives. The chapter will explore the implications of this latest 
phase of speculative finance capitalism and its role in creating the 
conditions for the financial crisis. 
The fifth chapter will describe the key stages of the financial 
crisis as it moved from the trigger of a subprime crisis to a banking 
and financial crisis and finally to a full-blown economic crisis. The 
origins of the crisis will be traced to the changes in banking and 
personal finance as described in chapters two and three and the 
activities of speculative finance capitalism explained in chapter 
four. It will be argued that what the crisis clearly reveals is the 
public underpinning of the financial sector, as states across the 
world struggle to sustain their banking systems, and increasingly 
the wider financial sector, through ‘Wall Street Socialism’.
The sixth chapter will look at the underlying causes and 
implications of the financial crisis. It will ask whether any lessons 
have been learned, or if the expectation is that everything will 
return to business as usual. It will be argued that the analysis 
of money and banking in chapters one and two shows that the 
privatisation of the money system has been built upon false 
assumptions. The immediacy and intensity of the financial crisis 
has exposed the illusion of prosperity through finance capitalism 
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and the fragility of market oriented financial systems. While 
private ownership and control of the creation and circulation 
of money has been vital to the dynamics of capitalism, it has 
ultimately rested on public and social foundations. The case will 
be made for seeing money as a socially constructed and publicly 
authorised resource that should be subject to democratic control.
The last chapter will look at ways in which money as a public 
resource could enable complex societies to meet their needs 
without the exploitation of each other, other societies or the 
natural environment. A ‘sufficiency’ or ‘steady-state’ means of 
provisioning would require a money system that could maintain 
circulation without demanding unnecessary growth. This would 
meet green demands that any provisioning system should be 
ecologically sustainable and the feminist argument that it should 
recognise all forms of beneficial work and activities. The chapter 
will look at a range of proposals for how the money and banking 
system could be reformed in order to provide a practical financial 
basis for a democratic, ecologically sustainable and socially just 
provisioning system.
Capitalism has survived many other credit-led booms, growth 
reversals and fraudulent episodes; is this just another of capitalism’s 
many crises or a crisis that may undermine its hegemony 
sufficiently both to enable and demand radical alternatives at 
the national and global level? The failure of the Anglo-American 
attempt to financialise society and turn the whole population 
into investors has shown that the idea of the democratisation of 
financial capitalism is a contradiction in terms. The huge cost of 
the financial implosion and its impact on the productive economy 
has fractured the dogma of the privatised money system and 
the supremacy of the capitalist market. Privatised control of the 
money system has meant that the benefits of the money system 
have been privatised while the risks have been socialised. Will 
the fact that so many people have been touched by capitalism’s 
failure this time spell its demise? Will it open up space for more 
socially just and ecologically sustainable alternatives to emerge? 
In order to open this debate it is important to discuss money itself.
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This is not a straightforward question. Money in its long history 
has been represented by many different things from precious 
metals, shells and beads to heavy, largely unmoveable stones. 
It has been made of substances that have value in themselves 
such as precious metals or represented by something that has no 
value in itself such as base metal coin or paper. Its operation has 
been represented in many ways from cuneiform tablets and tally 
sticks, to paper or electronic records. Conventional economics sees 
money as having a number of functions. It is a measure of value (a 
unit of account), a medium of exchange, a way of making deferred 
payments and a store of value. Money is seen as evolving with the 
market system. Barter is often assumed to be the original form of 
economic exchange with money emerging to solve the problem of 
finding suitable mutual exchanges. From this perspective, money 
is the product of pre-existing economic exchange.
The chosen commodity needed to be valuable, durable, divisible 
and portable. Precious metals such as gold and silver were obvious 
choices. As a result, gold has been particularly resonant for 
modern conceptions of money. Gold is seen as having an inherent 
or intrinsic value and was adopted as a basis for money value until 
comparatively recently. From this ‘metallist’ perspective, the value 
of money still relates back to gold or some commodity that has 
intrinsic value although, in practice, money can be represented in 
many forms, such as base metal coin, paper or electronic record. 
This view of money leads to the assumption that money can only 
function effectively if it is scarce and valuable. Douthwaite argues 
that this view, based on the historical scarcity of gold and silver, 
has distorted economic theory ever since. It has led to the false 
8
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idea that money can only be based on a scarce, and therefore 
valued, resource (1999:33).
The claim that money originated in barter has also been 
challenged (Innes 1913/2004, Ingham 2004, Smithin 2009). 
Rather than tying the origins of money directly to the emergence 
of a market economy, a variety of early uses have been identified 
such as tribute, wergeld (injury payment) or temple money 
(offerings). Money has also appeared in many different types of 
society and in many different forms. The emphasis on street level 
portable money in western economic thinking may reflect the fact 
that in Europe coin emerged a thousand years before banking. 
However, in historical terms the banking function is thousands of 
years older still. It emerged in Ancient Egypt and Babylon which 
both had extensive banking functions based upon grain storage. 
The invention of money as coin is credited to the Lydians of Greek 
Asia Minor in the seventh century BCE who made coin out of 
electrum, a naturally occurring gold/silver alloy. Alexander the 
Great (356–323 BCE) minted coins to fund his military campaigns 
and expand his empire. The Romans also used coins widely and 
their value was set on the authority of Rome. After the fall of 
Rome the use of coin became more chaotic in Europe and was 
even abandoned in Britain. However by the seventh and eighth 
centuries coins were circulating through much of Asia, the Middle 
East and Europe. Some of these coins travelled long distances, 
particularly the denier, a silver coin (Spufford 1988:40). Even so, 
as Buchan notes, until the twelfth century gold and silver were 
as likely to be used for decoration as money. However, from the 
twelfth century onwards the balance between decorative uses and 
money shifted in the direction of money and religious artefacts 
were being melted down and minted into coin to fund the crusades 
(Buchan 1997:53).
Although coins have historically been associated with precious 
metal such as silver and gold, as Mitchell Innes pointed out as 
early as 1913, the amount of precious metal in coin has varied 
widely over time. Rarely has the value of the actual coin been 
the same as the value of the metal of which it is made (Innes 
1913/2004). Given the varying amount of precious metal in coins, 
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the only guarantee of the worth of the coin became the face or 
signature of the issuer, basically the authority behind the minting. 
Far from being a precious commodity that had become readily 
accepted through trade as the barter theorists thought, money as 
coin has generally been issued by fiat, that is, issued and guaranteed 
by an authority, such as a powerful leader, an office-holder or a 
religious organisation. In fact, as Davies has argued, when coins 
were too closely associated with scarce precious metal, economic 
activities became restricted. Economies flourished where coins 
were plentiful, such that ‘long run trends in depression and 
prosperity correlate extremely well with the precious metal famine 
and surplus of the Middle Ages’ (Davies 2002:646). Even debasing 
the coinage by reducing the precious metal content was not in 
itself a problem as the countries which experienced the greatest 
economic growth were those whose leaders had ‘indulged in the 
most severe debasement’ of their coinage (Davies 2002:647).
Making coin out of a precious metal confuses the role of money 
as a measure of value with the value of the coin itself. Since gold 
and silver have value as commodities, it would seem reasonable 
to imagine that their value is intrinsic to the coins themselves. 
However to say that silver and gold have intrinsic value is not the 
same as saying that a gold coin has a particular value, certainly 
not one that is constant over time. Gold can change value both 
as a commodity and as a coin in terms of purchasing power. 
Therefore gold/silver as a commodity does not ‘have’ a value. It 
is valued, but at any point in time the exact value will vary and 
will need to be designated in some other form of commodity or 
money, such as silver or dollars. As Rossi argues, money cannot be 
a commodity because its value would need to be established using 
another standard of value such that ‘infinite recursivity makes 
this measurement logically impossible’ (2007:13). Money value is 
therefore much less certain than even an arbitrary measure such as 
an inch. Once an inch is chosen as a unit of measurement it stays 
constant, whereas money as a unit of measurement can never be 
assumed to be constant no matter what it is made of. Money does 
not in itself embody a value, it measures relative values.
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The historical popularity of scarce metal has obscured the 
fact that to say that something is worth a few shavings of silver, 
an electronic money sum, a number of gold coins, wampum 
beads or a Yap stone is all the same thing, that is, different ways 
of measuring value. The Yap stones of Yap in Micronesia are 
particularly interesting as they are large stones that can only 
be moved with great difficulty, if at all. Value does not imply 
anything about the material from which money is made. Gold 
and silver are therefore valued for themselves, but cannot act 
as a fixed measure of value, nor can they secure the value of 
a currency. Despite some contemporary arguments that money 
should be returned to a connection with precious metal (Lewis 
2007:409), money is more helpfully seen not as a ‘thing’ but 
as a social form (Ingham 2004:80). Ingham sees the idea that 
there is some ‘invariant monetary standard’ as a ‘working fiction’ 
(2004:144). ‘Sound money’ is a product of society, not of nature. 
Money is something that people trust to maintain its value or 
be honoured in trade, while its actual value can vary. Effectively 
when we say people trust in money we mean they are trusting 
in the organisations, society and authorities that create and 
circulate it, other people, traders, the banks and the state. Money, 
whatever its form, is a social construction, not a natural form. It 
has no inherent value but it has vast social and political power 
(Hutchinson et al. 2002:211).
This insight has not always been clear in radical thought. Marx, 
for example, was close to the ideas of the commodity theorists 
on the origins of money. At the same time, he saw the money 
relation as a social relation. This makes confusing reading. Marx 
seems at times to say that money is based on valuable metal and 
at other times that money has no value (Mellor 2005:50). He 
adopts a commodity theory of money as ‘a single commodity 
set aside for that purpose’ (Marx 1867/1954:36). However that 
commodity must be socially identified: ‘a particular commodity 
cannot become the universal equivalent except by a social act...
thus it becomes – money’ (Marx 1954:58); ‘money itself has no 
price’ (Marx 1954:67), and the even more confusing, ‘although 
gold and silver are not by nature money, money is by nature 
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gold and silver’ (Marx 1954:61). This is mainly because Marx’s 
focus isn’t money itself, but the exploited labour embodied in the 
exchange process that is obscured by the money system: ‘When 
arose the illusions of the monetary system? To it gold and silver 
when serving as money did not represent a social relation between 
producers, but were natural objects with strange properties’ 
(Marx 1954:54). One result of Marx’s confusing statements and 
the focus on the labour theory of value is that the analysis of 
money has not been central to radical economic thought. In this 
sense, much radical and conventional economic theorising shares 
a common idea that money is only the representation of a ‘real 
economy’ of economic exchange and is therefore of no special 
interest within economic theorising.
As we have seen, coins confuse the analysis of money if they 
are made of something that has a separate value as a commodity. 
This is not the case with paper money. Paper itself cannot have 
any inherent value as a substance. Whatever it represents must 
be the basis of a social agreement. Like coin, paper money has 
a long history. It was first used in ninth-century China during 
the Hein Tsung period 806–821 and the paper money of the 
empire of Kubla Khan (1260–1294) was recognised from China 
to the Baltic. Within Europe paper-based exchange was vital to 
the growth of commercial markets. Trade was enabled through 
promissory notes (based on the personal trustworthiness of the 
issuer) and bills of exchange (linked to the sale of goods) issued by 
traders and goldsmiths. Paper money also avoided more risky forms 
of payment such as carrying gold or coin. The exchange of paper 
was supported by the development of double entry book-keeping 
that was widely used in trading cities such as Genoa by the mid-
fourteenth century. The use of paper money and book-keeping 
systems enabled an expansion of trade that was free of the 
limitation of precious metal.
However this does not necessarily undermine the commodity 
theory of money. Paper money can be seen as merely representing, 
and being backed by, the original precious metal. The notion 
that there was a precious metal reserve ‘backing’ currencies 
was retained until the early 1970s through the attachment of 
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currencies to a dollar value for gold. This did not claim that there 
was an inherent value in gold, but that currency values should be 
based on the nominal value of gold priced in dollars. However, 
any real backing of currencies by gold would be impossible in 
modern economies (or even many traditional economies) given 
its scarcity: ‘the very notion of a commodity money is an illusion’ 
(Parguez and Seccareccia 2000:106). The dollar maintained this 
fiction the longest and it was the strain on American gold reserves 
that led to the final abolition of any attachment to gold in the 
early 1970s. On coming to power in 1997 the UK Chancellor of 
the Exchequer, Gordon Brown, acknowledged the impracticality 
of gold as a currency reserve by selling half the country’s reserves 
and buying instead a range of currencies: dollars, yen and euros. 
The alternative to the ‘metallist’ or commodity theory of money 
is a theory that sees money as resting on a social and political 
base, a combination of social conventions, banking systems and 
state authority.
Money as a social Phenomenon
The theory of the barter economy saw money as emerging 
organically out of the market. Ingham argues that this is logically 
impossible as the market could not exist without money and 
therefore ‘money is logically anterior and historically prior 
to market exchange’ (2004:25). Ingham makes this argument 
because he focuses on a different aspect of money from the barter 
theorists. The latter stress the importance of money as a medium 
of exchange, with the chosen valuable commodity taking the 
place of bartered goods. For Ingham, the most important aspect 
of money is its use as a notional or abstract measure of value 
which he sees as preceding coin by 2,000–3,000 years (Ingham 
2004:12). Even barter would need to have a notional scale of 
values with which to measure a carrot against a cabbage. For 
Ingham, measuring value in economic exchange is much more 
important than the actual medium used to transfer value. This 
is why the large and immoveable Yap stone can act as money if 
people calculate value in relation to it. The British guinea (21 
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shillings, or 105p) existed as a measure of value for a long time 
after the coin ceased to exist.
Money as currency is therefore not valuable because of its metal 
or other physical content as the metallist commodity theory of 
money claims, rather, it is a token of value. The latter ‘Chartalist’ 
approach (Chartal is taken from the Latin for token) sees the value 
of money as resting on the power of the issuer, not the intrinsic 
worth of the money. From the social perspective, whatever form 
money takes, that form does not embody a real value in itself. It is 
a token representing a notional value that is universally accepted 
and can be readily transferred. Money’s value therefore is not 
‘natural’, it is not determined by its metallic content or backing, 
nor does it emerge naturally from market relations. It is socially 
constructed. Whatever form it takes, what matters is that people 
agree to honour the value it represents. As Dodd argues, ‘money 
depends for its existence and circulation in society on a generalised 
level of trust in its abstract properties’ (1994:160).
For social theories of money the actual money-stuff that 
represents the accounting process is not important as long as 
people trust it. Whatever value money is given, it represents a 
credit or claim on the future production of society. Rather than 
being secured by some inherent value of the money-stuff itself, the 
social theory of money sees it as ‘a socially (including politically) 
constructed promise…money is always an abstract claim or 
credit’ (Ingham 2004:198). For Ingham ‘moneyness’ is provided 
by whatever is agreed as the ‘money of account’, that is the means 
of calculating the relative value of goods, services, debts or taxes. 
Holding money is a claim on society and all money is therefore 
a credit that can command resources based on whatever value it 
carries at any point in time (Wray 2004:234). The social view of 
money sees it as a system of credit-debt relations that is socially 
created and maintained. Money is a credit for those who hold 
it as it is a claim on future consumption or investment. At the 
same time it is a debt on those who have to provide the goods 
or services demanded when the holders present their money. 
They must give up a service or a product for what is effectively 
a credit note: ‘All money is debt in so far as issuers promise to 
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accept their own money for any debt payment by any bearer of 
money’ (Ingham 2004:198 [italics in the original]). For money to 
function effectively, whoever circulates money tokens in society 
must honour them by accepting them in payment, or guarantee 
them as a means of access to goods and services.
While the money system can be seen as a network of claims and 
obligations, for money to be universally acceptable it has to be 
given social credibility through respected authorities or institutions. 
Socially constructed money can emerge in many contexts, but 
modern money was built from an intricate relationship between 
the emerging capitalist market and the state (Knapp 1924, Ingham 
2004, Wray 2004, Smithin 2009). Power holders issued coin that 
had notional value and uncertain metal content, but even where 
gold and silver were in good supply, paper money formed the basis 
of many commercial transactions (Spufford 1988:259). Paper 
records of trades (bills of exchange) and credit (promissory notes 
or bonds) were used widely, particularly in the early north Italian 
trading cities (Ferguson 2008:41). The important shift came when 
this commercial paper became transferable, that is, when it did not 
just represent an agreement between people who knew and trusted 
each other, but could pass from hand to hand. Commercial paper 
became money when it was not tied to a particular credit-debt 
relationship of traders who knew each other, but could be used 
by any bearer for any purpose. For this to happen, money must 
achieve a high level of general trust, which rests on a stable social 
structure of authority such as well-established governments, traders 
or banks. As Zelizer has argued, ‘money was not the automatic, 
irrepressible outcome of…market economies…the creation of a 
centralized, homogenous uniform legal tender took enormous 
and sustained effort’ (Zelizer 1994:205). Smithin agrees that 
‘the monetary order is socially constructed, rather than deriving 
automatically from the market’ (2009:70–1).
Modern banking, which brought together financial and political 
power, emerged in medieval Italy and led to the establishment of 
major banking dynasties such as the Medici. The early Italian 
banks issued loans far and wide, including to English kings 
(Ferguson 2008:41). Banks, named after the benches on which 
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the goldsmiths sat on the Rialto bridge in Venice, were vital 
to developing modern money. Banks guaranteed payments by 
issuing their own paper money or ‘promise to pay’ in place of 
the commercial paper issued by traders or bonds (based on future 
revenues). Such paper notes from trusted bankers circulated like 
the coin issued by states. Notionally, behind the paper money 
were the reserves of precious metal held by the banker, but the 
real basis was a trust that all future payments would be made, 
that is, that everyone would honour their obligations so that the 
circulation of the trusted tokens could continue in perpetuity. As 
will be explained more fully in the next chapter, contemporary 
banking continues the link between commercial finance and 
state authority.
Money can only exist within a ‘monetary space’, that is, one 
where whatever is used as the ‘money of account’ in Ingham’s 
terms, is backed by an authority or a code of honour of some form 
(Ingham 2004:140). Money that achieves value through authority 
is described as fiat money. Fiat money is issued by authorities 
who have the political or social capacity to make demands upon 
others, as when monarchs issued coins. For Rossi, ‘fiat money is 
a form of credit that its issuer asks for, and obtains, from those 
agents giving up goods and services in exchange for it’ (2007:18). 
However, the power to issue fiat coins or notes is not unlimited, 
as their future value still has to be trusted by the population. The 
demands on goods and services made by the issuer cannot be 
more than the productive capacity of the population can stand. 
The money system therefore rests on a combination of authority, 
social trust and economic capacity (public or private). 
The state and Money
Ingham argues that the state was central to the development of 
modern money. Until private credit money was incorporated into 
the fiscal system of states which provided a secure jurisdiction 
and legitimacy, it remained ‘in evolutionary terms, a dead-end’ 
(Ingham 2004:122). The state theory of money was set out by 
Georg Knapp in the early 1900s. Central to his ideas was a link 
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between the issue and circulation of token money and state 
taxation. Rather than demanding goods and services directly, 
the state demands tax payment in a money that it designates. As 
Wray points out:
...what Knapp called the state money stage begins when the state chooses 
the unit of account and names the thing that it accepts in payment of 
obligation to itself – at the nominal value it assigns to the thing. The final 
step occurs when the state actually issues the money things it accepts. 
(2004:243)
In the case of coin, states have historically issued it as the ‘money 
thing’. The state then demands taxes which have to be paid in 
the money it has already issued and spent. The money is then 
returned via taxes to be issued again and again. The authority of 
the state rests ultimately on its ability to tax back, and therefore 
re-circulate, its money. An important benefit of issuing the ‘money 
thing’ is that states have the benefit of ‘seigniorage’, that is, the 
first use of the money issued less the cost of producing it (Huber 
and Robertson 2000:8). How this money is spent depends on 
the nature of the state: whether it is for war, palaces, cathedrals, 
irrigation systems or other more mundane goods and services. 
Seigniorage is a major benefit of the ownership and control 
of money.
An important stage in the development of modern money was 
when the two forms of money, trade-issued credit and fiat money, 
were brought together. This occurred when the state declared 
that not only was its own fiat-issued money legal tender, but also 
bank notes issued in the process of trade. Legal tender means that 
the state will accept a designated form of money in payment of 
taxes and the state also demands that everyone else has to honour 
that form of money when it is presented as payment for goods 
or debts. In the contemporary money system, state authorised 
money is seen as ‘high-powered money’ (Ingham 2004:202). 
High-powered money represents such a high level of trust that it 
has the capacity ultimately to settle all debts. It is the money of 
final payment within the money system. Under the commodity or 
metallist theory of money the basis of this high-powered money 
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was a store of precious metal. In practice, for both social and 
more market oriented theories, the basis of high-powered money 
is the capacity of the state to raise taxes and, behind that, the 
productive capacity of the national economy. For Victoria Chick 
money in the modern western economy rests on ‘the mutuality 
of state and social support’ (1992:142).
The public role of governments is to use their authority over the 
money system to secure the status of their money both nationally 
and internationally. States cannot always do this, as the collapse 
of the national currency in countries such as Zimbabwe shows. 
It is also difficult for states to guarantee financial commitments 
beyond their currency regime, particularly if those commitments 
outstrip the value of the national economy. There are also 
problems if another currency intrudes into the national money 
space, destabilising national currencies and undermining state 
control. Argentina in 2001–02, despite being a rich country in 
terms of resources, could not secure its currency because much 
of its population held their money in dollars. This, together 
with a very large informal economy (20–30 per cent), meant the 
Argentine state could not guarantee its tax income and so could 
not maintain viable high-powered money (Krugman 2008:38–41). 
As will be described in the next chapter, the private banking 
system has been central to the issue and circulation of money in 
modern economies and this has obscured the important role of 
the state in ensuring that money is ‘sound’.
Money, society and the ‘real economy’
For commodity ‘metallist’ theorists of money, money emerges 
from the market economy of production and exchange. It is merely 
a reflection of the ‘real economy’ of production and exchange. 
However, the idea that the quantity of money should reflect the 
value of the activities of the economy does not sit very well with 
the idea of money being represented by something that the market 
cannot determine, that is, the amount of precious metal available. 
Conventional economics has, therefore, been more flexible in its 
attitude toward the ultimate basis of money. It does, however, 
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still argue that the money system should reflect the needs of the 
market and therefore should be controlled by market forces. From 
this market-oriented perspective, the state, despite historically 
being a major force in money creation and circulation, should 
not interfere with the operation of the financial or commodity 
markets. The state should not be involved in the creation of money 
or, as far as possible, the spending of it.
Marxist theory agrees with conventional economic theory 
that money is only a representation of real economic relations. 
However, from a Marxist perspective, far from emerging benignly 
from market systems, the evolution of the money society has 
been a far from natural process (Wood 1999:7, Hutchinson et 
al. 2002:74). Money systems as represented in rents, taxes and 
waged labour have been imposed on people who have been from 
subsistence communities and who have been forced off the land. 
As economies became monetised, peasant populations were forced 
to sell their labour as lands were enclosed and privatised, and 
often mortgaged (Rowbotham 1998:31). For those without land, 
joining the money economy meant obtaining sustenance through 
waged labour. Spufford (1988:245) argues that the circulation and 
use of coin from the early middle ages enabled rich landowners 
to extract more flexible wealth from their feudal populations. 
Rather than extracting produce or labour, they began to demand 
money from their peasant populations. There were limits to the 
benefits that could be obtained from exploiting peasant labour 
directly or receiving a portion of their produce, but payment in 
money opened the possibility of wider consumption of luxury 
goods. Landlords could use their money wealth to become more 
urbanised and absentee, enjoying the benefits of city life (Veblen 
1899). Money systems also enabled the emergence of finance 
capital which enhanced exploitation and the extraction of profit 
(Hilferding 1910/1985).
Marx argued that profit-driven, money-based exchange 
distorted the nature of human activities. People did not labour 
to produce what they needed, but what could be commodified, 
that is sold for money:
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this division of a product into a useful thing and a value becomes practically 
important only when exchange has acquired such an extension that 
useful articles are produced for the purpose of being exchanged and their 
character as value has therefore been taken into account beforehand during 
production. (Marx 1867/1954:44)
Marx made a distinction between producing a good and then 
selling it in order to buy another commodity, that is, when a 
commodity (C) is exchanged for money (M) and is then exchanged 
for another commodity (C) expressed as C – M – C. Full commodi-
fication comes when the intention of production, rather than the 
utility of the product itself, is to make money. Money is invested to 
produce a commodity which is sold to earn more money, expressed 
as M – C – M+. At this point, ‘exchange values…do not contain an 
atom of use-value’ (1954:4). The money value of the commodity 
exchanged is an expression of market forces and bears no relation 
to any intrinsic value of the commodity being exchanged.
In this process, those who labour have lost any control over 
the things they produce. They cannot choose what to produce as 
this is determined by those who pay for their labour. As people 
who have to work for a wage, they have already lost control of 
any means of subsistence they may once have had. Given the aim 
is to make a profit, the wages paid are less than the value of the 
product their labour produces and therefore the labourers are 
also ultimately unable to buy back the full value of what they 
produce. This creates a dilemma for capitalism in that it makes 
money by paying labour less than the full market value of their 
work, but if workers do not receive sufficient wages they cannot 
buy the products made. In the absence of an alternative market 
this means the seller’s profit cannot be monetised, that is, turned 
into a readily transferable form. The huge surge in debt in western 
economies is one way in which this gap has been temporarily 
bridged. Equally, the need to find alternative markets was a major 
driver for western imperialism.
At the turn of the twentieth century, Georg Simmel put forward 
a more ambivalent view of the impact of money on society. He 
agreed that money rationalised social relations into ‘the purest 
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and most developed kind of interaction’ (Simmel 1907/1970:82) 
which had the effect of alienating all other social values and led to 
social fragmentation. People became caught up in a process where 
‘the abstract value of wealth…represented by money is…the soul 
and purpose of economic activities’ (Simmel 1907/1970:511). 
However, money payment was also ‘the form most congruent 
with personal freedom’ (1907/1970:285). Contemporary views of 
money reflect this ambivalence. Money-based societies are open in 
the sense that social status and traditional authority becomes less 
important than money wealth. However, money-based societies 
are more economically unequal as money is unevenly spread. 
Money is freedom in that ‘money’s empowerment of its holder 
derives from the freedom it provides for the expression of needs 
and desires’ (Dodd 1994:159). At the same time ‘money has been 
bound up with the unequal distribution of wealth and property 
whenever and wherever it has been found’ (Dodd 1994:150). This 
is because money can be an instrument of speculation and a tool 
of empire (Lietaer 2001:332–3).
Viviana Zelizer, in a more social analysis of money, sees it as 
playing a different role in different sectors of society (1994:30). 
Money is certainly used in commodified exchange through the 
market, but it can also be used for other purposes such as a 
personal or charitable gift. It can signify a neutral business 
transaction or a personal relationship. Zelizer argues that money 
need not necessarily commodify, it is not always in opposition 
to community or solidarity and could lubricate social relations 
or enable the formation of an economic community (1994:211). 
While conventional economics and much of Marxist theory sees 
money as being a reflection of the ‘real economy’ of production and 
exchange, social analyses of money see it as being a phenomenon 
that has its own political dynamics (Hutchinson et al. 2002:24). 
As Smithin points out, the dominance of economic theorising 
based on the notion of barter exchange of goods and services 
remains virtually unchallenged within the economics literature, 
resulting in very little attention being paid to more social and 
political questions around the accumulation of financial resources 
(2009:9). Ingham sees the dominance of this apparently ‘neutral’ 
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economic view of money as resulting from the fragmentation of 
the social sciences in the nineteenth century. Economics became 
separated from the other social sciences which meant that social 
and political questions about the nature of money were not posed 
(2004:197). Instead, conventional economic notions of money 
saw it as ‘neutral’ emerging organically from a ‘natural’ market 
system. In contrast Ingham argues that ‘money cannot be neutral; 
it is the most powerful of the social technologies’ (2004:202).
Not all economists marginalised the study of money: most 
notably Keynes saw money as a much more independent force. 
For Keynes ‘money plays a part of its own and affects motives and 
decisions…we live...in a monetary economy’ (Smithin 2009:60). 
Central to Keynes’ ideas was the severe impact on the productive 
economy if the money system malfunctioned. Markets were not 
necessarily efficient and money might not circulate: money could 
be created but people might not spend it. The government might 
therefore need to intervene to maintain the circulation of money 
(that is, liquidity), so that effective demand continued within the 
economy (that is, demand backed by money) (Chick 2000). The 
recent financial crisis has certainly revealed how the productive 
economy is dependent on the functioning of the money system. 
The argument of this book is that as money is such a critical force 
in the circulation of goods and services and therefore provisioning, 
it is vital to question how money is issued and circulated, owned 
and controlled. From this perspective money is more than just a 
reflection of value in the ‘real’ economy.
Profit-oriented money-based market systems have brought 
condemnation from a range of social theorists and political 
activists. Religious institutions have expressed concern about 
lending money at interest and the danger of avarice, the love 
of money. Green economists see growth oriented and profit 
driven economies as destroying ecological systems because 
they do not recognise the way they damage and exploit natural 
resources (Scott Cato 2009:38). Instead such damage is financially 
‘externalised’, meaning that economic calculations do not take 
account of these costs, treating the natural environment as a free 
resource. Ecofeminists combine the green critique with further 
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criticism of the so-called ‘real’ economy: that it excludes the huge 
range of human activities associated with the work and lives of 
women that lie beyond the market (Mellor 1997). They claim that 
what economists study represents only a small part of humanity’s 
existence in nature. The so-called ‘real economy’ is in reality an 
economy determined by capitalism and by patriarchy. Outside its 
boundaries lie the natural world and the un-monetised labour and 
needs of women, children and the poor, as well as non-monetised 
subsistence economies (Hutchinson et al. 2002:180, Bennholdt 
Thomsen and Mies 1999:19).
From this perspective it is a major error to confuse money-based 
exchange systems with ‘the economy’. The monetised economy, 
by definition, covers only those things that are exchanged for 
money. Money puts a restrictive boundary around access to the 
means of sustenance. Private money-based ownership, together 
with property rights over resources and productive capacity, 
means that the money economy excludes or marginalises those 
without money. The money economy represents the priorities of 
those who have historically controlled the designation of certain 
human needs and activities as worthy of money payment. The 
money designated economy has been created through the priorities 
of dominant social groups, capitalist traders and higher waged 
workers, nearly all men. The patriarchal and capitalist market, 
therefore, cannot be seen as the source of value in a human society. 
It is not a neutral ‘economic’ choice to give something a monetary 
value, it is in essence a social and political choice that dominant 
groups and classes have imposed. To the extent that the public 
sector shares the same priorities as the market it, too, marginalises 
women and the natural world.
Instead of the narrow boundaries of ‘the economy’ presented 
in conventional economics, the wider notion of provisioning 
would cover all the goods and services human beings need to 
attain their full potential, as well as taking into account all the 
impacts they have on society and the environment: domestic life, 
social and neighbourly activities, activities for leisure and pleasure 
and the integrity of the environment (Power 2004:6). Failing to 
understand the social nature of money and how money is created 
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leads to the environmentally ludicrous situation where activities 
for social or environmental benefit are rejected as ‘unaffordable’, 
while sports utility vehicles are produced in their millions, even 
in the face of peak oil. Such illogical activities in the name of ‘the 
economy’ have been described by Hazel Henderson as ‘flat earth’ 
economics (1981:21) and by Maria Mies and Vandana Shiva as 
‘mal-development’ (1993:284).
Money: From credit to debt
The social theory of money argues that all money, whatever its 
form, is credit to the holder and a debt on society. Whatever form 
money takes it gives the holder the potential to purchase goods 
and services. The word credit comes from the Latin credere, to 
believe. The holder of money believes that it has value and so does 
the person who accepts it in payment. However, in contemporary 
usage, very confusingly, when we talk about credit we take this to 
mean debt. This is because the main way of issuing new money 
in contemporary society is through taking on debt. When an 
authority issued money by fiat it was debt free, apart from the cost 
of producing the coins or notes. In contemporary society when 
someone is ‘given credit’ this actually means she or he takes on a 
debt. Debt comes from the Latin word meaning to owe (debere).
All sectors of current society are involved in debt: the 
government, industry, households, individuals, the financial sector. 
Governments have historically borrowed to finance their activities 
from wars to social services; commercial traders and industrial 
producers have borrowed to finance their businesses; households 
have borrowed to finance home ownership; people have borrowed 
to buy consumer goods; recently in Britain and elsewhere this has 
been joined by student loans. In earlier eras economic activity was 
led by agricultural and industrial borrowing. Through much of 
the twentieth century, mortgage debt was an important sector for 
money issue in the US and the UK as the same houses were bought 
over and over again at ever increasing prices. In the early years of 
the twenty-first century, mortgage and personal debt expanded 
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rapidly as did borrowing for financial speculation, fuelling the 
housing boom and leading to the credit crunch.
A fundamental problem of debt-based money issue is that it 
creates a growth imperative within the economy. People must 
find work of any sort, not only to meet current expenses but 
also to service their debts. Debt has long been used as a means of 
trapping people into work as in indentured labour. As well as its 
social impact, debt-driven labour can have ecological implications 
if people have to work unnecessarily hard or long, or engage in 
ecologically destructive patterns of production and consumption. 
As debts are paid with interest, the economy as a whole has 
to expand not only to cover the debt but the interest as well. 
Consequently there is a need for an ever expanding increase in 
debt-based money as more money must be paid back than was 
originally issued. In the short term this can be accounted for by 
faster circulation of the existing money form, but in the system 
as a whole there must be a source of expansion that can only 
be through more debt-based money issue. Capitalist market 
economies are dependent on these circuits of debt-based money 
(Graziani 2003) and as the financial crisis has shown, the whole 
system judders to a halt if credit, as debt, is not forthcoming.
Until comparatively recently, money was a mixture of 
state-issued fiat money (as coin and notes) and bank-issued money 
as debt. From the second half of the twentieth century the balance 
shifted dramatically towards debt-based money issue through the 
banking system such that ‘the creation of money is essentially 
tied to bank credit’ (Rossi 2007:21). With the dominance of 
bank-created ‘debt money’ the seigniorage benefit of money 
to the state disappears. States are therefore forced into higher 
taxation or more borrowing from the private financial system. 
However seigniorage has not entirely disappeared, it has changed 
location. Banks can benefit financially as they create new money 
and lend it. Also, those who can make more money investing or 
speculating than it costs to borrow money are also exercising 
seigniorage. The shift to the issue of money through the privately 
owned banking system has also removed from the public sector 
any direct control over the direction of money use. This means 
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that those who take on debt are making vital choices about the 
direction of the economy and, as the financial crisis reveals, those 
choices can rebound on society as a whole.
Bank credit and Fresh air Money
The most important aspect of the shift to money issue through 
bank debt is that banks can lend money they don’t have. The 
basic roles of a bank are usually seen as taking savings deposits 
and keeping them safe; acting as an intermediary between those 
who owe money and those who require payment and acting as 
intermediary between those who have savings and those who 
need money, that is, those who need to borrow. On these services 
the bank makes a profit from the difference between what is 
paid to the depositor and what is received from the borrower. 
In the process of making loans the bank must be careful to keep 
sufficient funds to pay out any deposits that are requested: it 
must hold a reserve. However most of the deposits the bank 
receives are placed ‘on demand’. Theoretically every depositor 
could turn up asking for their money and the bank would have 
to pay out regardless of what loans it had outstanding. If money 
was based on a scarce resource as commodity theorists claimed, 
the bank would very quickly run out of gold to make loans and 
depositors would not be able to demand their gold back until the 
loan was repaid. However, as Galbraith observed, bank money 
can be in two places at once (1975:19). Paradoxically, it can 
be lent out and yet it can still be paid back on demand to the 
depositor. It is the nature of money as an intangible social form 
that makes this possible. Steve Keen argues that neo-classical 
theorists continue to theorise banking as barter between savers 
and borrowers (2001:289) despite the fact that no matter how 
much the bank lends out, individual savers can still get their 
money back on demand.
In effect the bank is creating loans out of fresh air. Anyone who 
takes on debt is creating new money. In Galbraith’s well-recorded 
words, ‘the process by which banks create money is so simple that 
the mind is repelled. Where something so important is involved, 
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a deeper mystery seems only decent’ (1975:18–19). James Tobin 
has described bank money creation as ‘fountain pen money’ 
(1963:408). The implications of this capacity to create money 
through the banking system are largely unrecognised, because 
‘although today the fact that commercial banks create much 
more money than the government is now explained in every 
introductory economics text, its full significance and effects on 
the economy have still not been sufficiently considered’ (Daly 
1999:142 [author’s emphasis]). The most important outcome 
is that money creation is effectively in private hands through 
commercial decisions in the banking system, while the state retains 
responsibility for managing and supporting the system, as has 
become clear through the financial crisis. It is vitally important 
to make it clear that while society collectively bears ultimate 
responsibility for the failures of the commercial money creation 
system, there is no direct public influence on the overall direction 
of how finance is invested or used.
The fact that banks are creating new money raises questions of 
social justice. If new money can be created out of fresh air, like 
fresh air it should be seen as a resource available to everyone. From 
a social justice perspective such resources should be shared, or at 
least their availability should be open to democratic consideration. 
As Chick points out, ‘money confers on those with authority to 
issue new money the power to pre-empt resources’ (1992:141).
Much of this book will be concerned with the implications of 
this situation. Far from being a social resource, money is currently 
being mainly created and harnessed by the capitalist system.
Bank credit and capitalism
There is a clear connection between the privatisation of money 
creation and the emergence of capitalism. Money is a social relation 
that makes possible ‘both market exchange and the more extensive 
set of relationships known as capitalism’ (Smithin 2009:59). 
However, it is banking and the capacity of virtually unlimited 
creation of money through debt that enabled capitalist expansion. 
For Ingham ‘the essence of capitalism lies in the elastic creation of 
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money by means of readily transferable debt’ (2004:108). For full 
elasticity of credit to be available it is necessary that the creation 
of bank money breaks free of the limitation of matching loans to 
deposits. Far from money representing prior market activities as 
the barter theorists claimed, it is the prior issuing of bank credit 
that is essential to bringing profit-seeking activities into being. 
Capitalism would collapse if everyone paid their debts, or if no 
further debts were taken out. Despite this, there is not extensive 
radical analysis of the capitalist banking system. As Smithin 
argues: ‘Marxian theory does not deal at all adequately with the 
role of the banking system and credit creation’ (2009:12). This 
is particularly important since, as Ingham points out, capitalist 
finance is not without its own contradictions: ‘money is socially 
constructed as a reality in a process of conflict and struggle’ 
(2004:203). This conflict is between those capitalists who hold 
money and lend it and those productive capitalists who need that 
finance. The state is also party to that struggle. As Ingham points 
out, ‘the state and the market share in the production of capitalist 
credit money’ (Ingham 2004:144). However, in the last resort 
it is the state that is the most important. The elastic creation of 
credit-money is based on a ‘hierarchy of debtors’ which is topped 
by the state’s total liability for the system in its ‘high-powered 
money’. Without this structure of finance, capitalism cannot 
operate. In a crisis the state must step in.
conclusion
Money is an intriguing phenomenon with tremendous power in 
human societies. Despite some historic use of precious metals, most 
money in history has not had intrinsic value, nor does it emerge 
‘naturally’ from market activities. Money is socially and politically 
created by a combination of public, private and social actions. The 
money system combines an agreed unit of measurement with trust 
that the money-token or record representing that measurement 
will be honoured in a future transaction. The notion of the 
intrinsic value of money through association with precious metals 
is misleading. What matters is that people agree their financial 
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obligations and then follow them through. From this perspective, 
money and the market are both social phenomena. While social 
relationships are sufficient to enable money-based interaction on 
a personal scale, for money to obtain wider trust it needs to be 
supported by an institutional authority. If people are to accept a 
token in return for goods, services or labour, they need to know 
that someone somewhere will honour that token. This is the role 
played by the state in recognising money as legal tender and by 
the banking system in issuing, honouring and circulating money. 
Money is only as sound as the society and authorities under which 
it circulates.
Although historically producers and traders privately agreed 
instruments of credit and debt, the need to have personal relations 
of trust would have severely limited trade if money was not able to 
move to a more depersonalised, but still socially recognised, space. 
This happened through the activities of the state which not only 
issued most of the coinage in circulation, but also underpinned the 
money system through its legitimisation of ‘high-powered money’ 
represented by the notes and coin in circulation and the deposits 
of that money within the banking system. The basis of the ability 
of the state to support the money system rests on its capacity 
to raise payment for all liabilities through taxation. Despite the 
importance of the state’s role in sustaining the money system, as 
the issue of money as notes and coins was reduced control of the 
money system shifted towards the banking sector. Unlike the state 
which can issue money that does not have to be repaid, banks 
issue money as debt. All money is a credit or claim upon society, 
but bank-issued money also carries debt. It has to be paid back 
with interest. As will be explained more fully in the next chapter, 
bank-created money as debt is effectively produced out of fresh 
air. Within a commercial banking system, this means that money 
creation has been handed to the capitalist system.
Conventional economics has traditionally seen money as 
reflecting the activities of the market and not as a dynamic force in 
its own right. Equally, radical thinkers have paid it little attention. 
However, far from being an adjunct to the market economy, money 
is an important dynamic in society, possibly the most important 
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one. Money is far too important to be left to the market. If the 
money system breaks down, societies structured around the issue 
and circulation of money will not function. This is compounded 
in contemporary market economies where the emphasis on profit 
maximisation and cost cutting means that stocks of food and other 
essentials are kept very low. This leaves very little resilience in the 
event of a breakdown in the financial system. With low stocks, 
a collapse in the issue of credit preventing new production could 
rapidly produce shortages. Therefore, as a provisioning system, 
the market economy is very vulnerable to a break down in the 
money circuit.
Following the 2007–08 financial crisis, control of money issue 
and circulation returned very abruptly to public authorities. States 
had to attempt to use their authority to stabilise their money 
systems and in some cases failed. Despite this, state intervention 
in the financial sector is seen as temporary. States and financial 
markets alike are aiming for a return to (somewhat more regulated) 
business as usual. The future is seen as continuing private control 
of the money creation system, regardless of the fact that it is the 
commercial dynamics of capitalist finance that created the crisis 
in the first place. The financial crisis, with its highly active state 
intervention, provides the opportunity to open up a debate about 
the nature of money and launch a radical critique of the way that 
the money system has been privatised under capitalism. The time 
has come to explore money as a force within human societies. 
Money may be socially based and publicly supported through 
the state, but its control currently lies with the profit driven 
private sector. Understanding and challenging the ownership and 
control of money within capitalist economies is therefore vital. 
Far from being a ‘private’ matter, money should be treated as 
a public resource and should be used for social purposes, or at 
least be subject to democratic control. But first it is important to 
understand how private control of finance emerged in the modern 
money system. This will be discussed in the next chapter.
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The modern money system has developed as a tangled interaction 
between the market and the state and central to this has been the 
role of the banks. Banking, like coinage, is not new: it could go 
back as far as 3,000 BCE with communal grain stores operating 
as banks, transferring ownership of deposits between depositors. 
Central to the modern form of banking is its role in the issue, 
as well as the circulation, of money. This ability has enabled the 
commercial sector to gain control of the money system via the 
banking sector and put the state, and therefore the people, into 
the role of public debtor. In the process, the commercial creation 
of debt has slipped from public control although, as the financial 
crisis shows, not from public liability. While the capitalist financial 
system has privatised the money system, it remains a system of 
social trust. The market alone cannot sustain it.
Banking and the state
As Chapter 1 has shown, money in human societies has been 
created by political authorities or financial entities such as banks 
or money traders. In the case of banks, paper records of trade 
became open to wider circulation through the banking system. 
When traders received a promise to pay or wanted to receive 
payment immediately on a trade, they could go to a bank with 
the bill of trade or promissory note and ask the bank to exchange 
it for one of the bank’s own notes. The bank then took on the 
debt or payment looking to be reimbursed when the trade was 
completed, or the debt repaid. This service was subject to a fee so 
that the trader or creditor would be paid less than the face value 
31
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of the debt, that is, it would be discounted. Banks could also 
lend money to traders to initiate trade to be repaid with interest. 
Borrowing money in this way means that the borrower takes on 
a debt and receives a transferable currency in exchange: ‘banking 
proper can be said to emerge when a bank acquires trade bills 
by issuing its own banknotes and creating deposits that give the 
right to withdraw money’ (Lapavitsas 2003:79).
The modern banking system brings together private banking 
in relation to trade and the currency creating powers of the state. 
At first bankers issued their own transferable currency as credit 
notes drawn on the bank, but as money issue and banks became 
more regulated, the money the bank issued was declared legal 
tender, that is, universally recognised money authorised by the 
state. Through this process privately generated debts in the market 
sector were being turned into transferable state money through 
the banking system. Banks took in commercial paper and issued 
state authorised money in its place. The significance of this is 
vital. Commercial debt issued between traders is a liability on the 
commercial issuer. Commercial debt exchanged for bank-issued 
money is a liability on the bank. Commercial debt exchanged for 
bank money that is recognised as legal tender is a liability on the 
state. As explained in Chapter 1, money is a claim upon society. 
All monies designated in legal tender are therefore a claim upon 
society and that claim in the last instance must be honoured by 
the state. State endorsement of bank debt means that ‘banks are…
able to issue liabilities at will’ (Parguez and Seccareccia 2000:105).
Being able to issue money is a very important political and 
economic resource. When most money was issued as cash this 
was mainly regulated by a political authority and gave the issuing 
authority seigniorage. Whether the money was made from mined 
metals such as gold or silver, shells, tally sticks or paper, having the 
monopoly of issue provided interest-free, and virtually cost-free, 
expenditure. Monarchs and other leaders therefore kept very close 
control of currency issue. Banks or mints have been licensed and 
carefully regulated. Monarchs could use the minting system to call 
in all their currency every few years and either reissue it, taking 
the opportunity to extract a tax by offering less new coins than 
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the old ones taken in, or reduce the level of precious metal in each 
coin through debasement (Spufford 1988:289). The power of the 
issuer is not limitless however, as debased coinage or devalued 
money can lose public confidence. 
Modern states still create money through notes and coin but 
this is now very limited in comparison with money issue through 
debt. In Britain it has been calculated that notes and coin only 
account for around 3 per cent of total money issued while the 
rest emerges through the banking system as ‘sight’ accounts, 
that is, money recorded in bank accounts rather than physical 
currency (Robertson and Bunzl 2003:19). This shift between 
publicly-issued fiat money and bank-issued debt-based money has 
happened comparatively recently. Until the 1960s coin and notes 
still accounted for around a fifth of money issue (Rowbotham 
1998:309). There are two important implications of this change. 
First, unlike state-issued ‘fiat’ money which, when issued, becomes 
the property of the receiver to dispose of as they will, money 
issued by banks has to be paid back with interest. Second, control 
of money issue passes from the state to the banking sector and 
with it the benefits of seigniorage, that is, financial profit from 
making loans (Robertson and Bunzl 2003:27). For those who 
borrow, seigniorage is any financial benefit gained from the money 
over and above the cost of borrowing it. The shifting balance of 
money issue to the commercial sector was accompanied by an 
ideological defeat for any conception of public money. Money is 
seen as something that should be solely connected to the market 
and commerce. It is not without irony that the market claims the 
monopoly of wealth creation and describes this as making money. 
Through the banking sector this is what it quite literally does.
Banks, states and debt
The early Italian banks lent extensively to monarchs and other 
rulers, pending income from rents and taxes: ‘it was the simple 
fact of taxation…that provided the basis for the earliest systems 
of public debt in medieval Italy’ (Ferguson 2002:111). This 
gave the commercial lenders a direct link to taxation and other 
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authorised income which exists to this day. Bank lending to states 
meant that states, rather than issue their own currency, were 
borrowing from privately owned money sources. This was the 
basis on which the Bank of England was created. The Bank of 
England was set up in 1694 when King William approached the 
London goldsmiths for a loan of £1.2 million to finance his war 
against France. As many goldsmiths had been ruined by the Stuart 
kings not paying previous loans, they refused to lend the money 
to the king directly. Instead, they demanded an Act of Parliament 
to establish a Bank of England that would be owned by a private 
consortium of lenders. This bank would provide the sum of £1.2 
million to the state rather than directly to the king. This meant that 
if the king defaulted the state was liable to repay the loan, that is, 
it became a debt on the nation. Since that date the national debt 
has remained a permanent feature of the British economy. As Blain 
(1987) argues, when a government borrows money it gives away 
its sovereignty to its creditors. The creation of the national debt 
put the wealthy in charge of the state’s own money supply and 
therefore in a position of influence over the political direction of 
the country. The 8 per cent annual interest demanded by the Bank 
of England financiers meant new taxes of £100,000 a year were 
needed to pay the interest.
The merchants who formed the Bank of England also turned 
the promise of a steady income from the loan to the state into 
the basis for further private credit issue. On the strength of 
the promised repayment of the £1.2 million they had lent to 
the king (via the state) they created the same amount of debt 
to be lent commercially (Galbraith 1975:31). The first initial 
investment therefore yielded two income streams, one from the 
state and one from private borrowers. The bank also operated 
as a normal commercial bank and took deposits and discounted 
bills of trade. Other commercial banks in England issued notes 
under their own name, but eventually the Bank of England gained 
sole control over the issue of notes and coins. In 1946 the Bank 
was nationalised. Although it was formally made independent of 
the state in 1997, the Bank of England remains the lender of last 
resort with responsibility for managing the country’s money supply 
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and, as has been made clear, acts via the state as guarantor for the 
whole banking system.
The founding constitution of the United States enabled it to 
both borrow and ‘to coin money and regulate the value thereof’. 
Blain (1987) claims that it was the influence and financial interests 
of the banker Alexander Hamilton, the first US Secretary of the 
Treasury, that led to a decision by the first US Congress to raise 
money through a national debt, rather than to issue money 
directly. The War of Independence had already created a debt of 
$40 million which, with interest, had risen to $75 million. Many 
people held war loan debt including members of Congress. It was 
decided that these would be exchanged for stock in the proposed 
US bank that would manage this debt. This was established in 
1790. Blain alleges that congressmen bought up war loan debts 
at below face value before the bank proposals were announced, 
an early example of insider dealing.
The alternative approach to state funding was taken by 
Abraham Lincoln when he was faced with bankers asking for 
30 per cent interest on loans to fight the Civil War. Instead of 
borrowing at these rates he chose to create $450million directly 
in the form of ‘greenback’ dollars which were debt and interest 
free (Galbraith 1975:93). However, over time the debt-based 
money creation system prevailed and the interlinking of private 
banking with money issue became central to the evolution of 
the Anglo-American capitalist market system. Rather than issue 
money, governments issued bonds against their debt and major 
banks such as Barings and Rothschild became major bond dealers 
(Ferguson 2002:120–21). The Rothschild family, in particular, 
were major funders of state activities, including wars, across 
Europe. Nathan Rothschild alone turned capital of £20,000 
into a fortune of over £50 million (Rowbotham 1998:199). The 
increasing reliance by governments on borrowing put states both 
economically and politically in the hands of capitalist finance. 
Meanwhile, the ability to create ‘credit’ as debt enabled the 
privatised banking system to provide the loans necessary to fund 
capitalist development.
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Money creation and the Banking system
Banks are strange creatures in that the money they take in as 
deposits or investments are liabilities and their loans are assets. 
The presumption is that banks are intermediaries between savers 
and borrowers, but in practice this is not the case. The basic idea 
that banks lend the money that savers have deposited, in some 
relationship of loans to deposits, misunderstands how banking 
works. One remarkable aspect of banks is that they can lend 
out money they don’t have, that is, they can lend much more 
money than the deposits they have in total. This is known as 
fractional reserve banking. If banks held on to all their deposits 
there could be no loans. If banks lent out all their money they 
would not be able to return deposits when they were requested. 
The compromise is a fractional reserve. The bank retains sufficient 
money to meet reasonable demand. Even then this concept implies 
some physical limit, as if money were a tangible thing. As money 
is mostly intangible, and even in the case of notes and coin there 
is no physical limit, unlike for instance stocks of gold, the concept 
of a reserve is really an accounting term.
It is the nature of money as a social form that makes this 
possible. Money can be in two places at once, as Galbraith 
pointed out, because of its intangibility (1975:19). Money works 
because it is not gold and limited by its physical properties. This 
is why, as Keen argues, it is a mistake to see banking as a barter 
between savers and borrowers (2001:289). Theoretically every 
bank account holder, including those taking out loans, could turn 
up asking for their money and the bank would have to pay out, 
regardless of what loans it had outstanding. If money was based 
on a precious and limited resource such as gold the banking system 
would very quickly run out of reserves and depositors would 
not be able to retrieve their money until some loans were repaid. 
Paying interest would also be difficult: where would the new 
gold to pay interest come from if there was a fixed capacity of 
the money resource?
Nevertheless, banks do have to meet daily demands for 
both cash withdrawals and to settle surplus transfers to other 
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banks. The fractional reserve can be held in cash or assets near 
to cash, including a reserve balance lodged with the central 
bank. Traditionally, lending has been seen as proportional to 
the fractional reserve and this enables the mechanism of money 
creation. If the bank is required to keep a 10 per cent reserve, it 
can lend 90 per cent of any money deposited. However, once a 
loan is issued, it becomes a new deposit of money that circulates 
within the banking system, unless someone sends the money 
abroad or buries it in a pit. As the new money circulates it forms 
new deposits which become the basis of further loans. These in 
turn circulate as new deposits fuelling further loans. If the ratio 
of 1:10 is maintained the original sum will increase nine-fold. It 
is therefore impossible to disentangle deposits and loans. Since 
money is lent in relation to total deposits which also includes 
previous loans, money is effectively created out of fresh air as 
‘loans can never be financed by some pre-existing deposits’ 
(Parguez and Seccareccia 2000:106–7).
Privately-issued bank money is therefore no more tangible in 
origin than the publicly-issued fiat money of the state. In fact, the 
key to the flexibility of bank-issued money is that it is independent 
of deposits: ‘This creation of credit-money by lending in the 
form of issued notes and bills, which exist independently of any 
particular level of incoming deposits, is the critical development 
that Schumpeter and others identified as the differentia specifica 
of capitalism’ (Ingham 2004:115). ‘If banks could not issue money 
they could not carry on their business’ (Innes 1914/2004:53). 
‘Credit creation is the actual business of banking’ (Smithin 
2009:66). Schumpeter himself pointed out that until the 1920s 
economists didn’t really understand how banks created money 
(Daly 1999:142). For modern banking to work effectively it must 
be based on something that has no natural limits, such as base 
metal coin, paper notes or sight accounts, that is, those that are 
a matter of written or electronic record.
As James Tobin has pointed out, ‘a long line of financial heretics 
have been right in speaking of “fountain pen money” – money 
created by the stroke of the bank president’s pen when he approves 
a loan and credits the proceeds to the borrower’s checking 
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account’ (1963:408). Victoria Chick defines bank deposits as 
‘privately issued forms of money’ (1992:141) and Daly argues 
that ‘money creation has become a source of private income’ 
(Daly 1999:141). If the contemporary banking system based on 
elastic credit creation is not determined by prior deposits, then 
there are no limits to its money creation capacity other than those 
imposed by accounting conventions and regulatory authorities. 
However such a potentially unlimited system is still underpinned 
by centralised authoritative ‘high powered’ money, that is, the 
resource of currency or tax revenue available through the state 
(Smithin 2009:67). While the privatised banking sector has 
harnessed money creation for itself through the issue of debt, the 
state still remains as the final basis on which the whole tottering 
system rests (Wray 2004:260).
Making debt-based money the main source of money issue and 
circulation creates major problems for economic systems. Debts 
must be repaid, and at interest. Paying annual interest means that 
long term debts such as mortgages repay several times the original 
sum. For green economists this entails destructive pressure for 
continuing growth and expansion in the economy (Douthwaite 
2000:30, Scott Cato 2009:38). Equally, as debt-based money 
always threatens the provisioning of society it can never be the 
basis of a sustainable economy (Hutchinson et al. 2002:41). It is 
also problematic for capitalist economies: profitable circulation 
of money depends on continual issue of new debt. If the debt 
cycle ceases it is disastrous for capitalism. In fact, it was the 
halting of lending between banks that launched the 2007–08 
financial crisis. Banks would no longer give credit to each other 
because they no longer believed in the financial products they 
were exchanging and therefore they no longer believed in the 
viability of the banks themselves. Blain argues that creating 
money as debt means that repayment of debt always threatens 
the money supply in the absence of any other form of money 
creation (1987). Keynes had argued that government expenditure 
was essential if slumps were to be avoided, but the monetarist 
and neo-liberal arguments of the 1980s and 1990s overwhelmed 
Keynesian economics and any justification for a government role. 
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Neo-liberal tub thumpers should have looked to history. As Blain 
records, when governments tried to pay off the national debt it 
caused a shortage of money. Blain gives the example of Andrew 
Jackson who vetoed the second renewal of the charter of the Bank 
of the United States and reduced the federal debt to $38,000 in 
1836. This caused a collapse in money supply that created a deep 
depression in 1837.
The eclipse of a substantial public role in money issue means 
that the people, individually and through the state, are being 
made to repay with interest commercially generated fresh air 
money when they could have created the money out of fresh 
air for themselves. This is very hard for people schooled in the 
ideology and practice of capitalist economics to take on board. 
The ideological claims for private control as against public 
control of money issue will include accusations such as potential 
mismanagement, inflationary pressures and inefficiency. These 
claims of market efficiency ring hollow in the light of the almost 
unlimited issue of bank credit, following 1980s deregulation. 
Warburton argues that the Anglo-Saxon economies lost control of 
credit creation in the 1980s and this was the basis of the impressive 
performance of global equity markets in the boom years (1999:8). 
This should not happen according to the ‘endogenous’ theory of 
money creation which argues that producers call forth money 
in order to launch the circuit of production. In what Rossi calls 
the ‘monetary production economy’ (2007:32) bank deposits are 
created by firms ‘monetising’ their production costs since ‘if there 
were no workers to remunerate bank deposits could not exist…as 
there would be no production at all and financial markets would 
be meaningless’ (Rossi 2007:34). The new money issued pays the 
cost of production, this is then repaid in the process of exchange 
and consumption, and the circle turns again.
On this basis there should never be a problem of money 
inflation as the new money would always be accompanied by new 
production and consumption. However, it is clear that in the late 
twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, the bank credit creation 
system was not just responding to the needs of production but to 
the demands of speculative inflation. It is notable that Rossi does 
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not address the possibility of borrowing for pure speculation: 
‘we leave financial speculation aside, as at the end of any purely 
speculative…transaction there is always consumption’ (Rossi 
2007:122). While neo-liberal ideology would quickly pounce on 
the possibility of the state borrowing or creating money, citing the 
problem of inflation, the massive issue of credit for speculative 
finance went largely unremarked. It was no less inflationary, but 
this was presented as ‘wealth creation’. Certainly it made many 
people very rich and some of the money found its way in to state 
coffers through tax. However, as states were receiving the product 
of uncontrolled credit creation, the public would eventually have 
to pay the price in its role as guarantor of the money system.
From regulation to deregulation
Shifting money creation from the public sector to the private 
sector does not make it any less a social phenomenon or public 
responsibility. As has become evident in the financial crisis, the 
benefits of privatised money creation have accrued to capitalist 
speculators (as will be discussed in Chapter 4), while the state 
and the population have to pay the price. During its history the 
banking system has seen many failures. Many of these have 
followed periods of speculation (Kindleberger 1996:20). This 
was particularly so after the Great Depression when thousands 
of banks failed. Among the causes of failure was the use of bank 
loans to speculate on the stock market and banks speculating 
themselves, known as proprietary trading. One of the key reforms 
in the US was to separate deposit-taking retail banks from other 
financial services, including investment. This was enacted under 
the Glass Steagall Act of 1933. Britain did not have a similar 
ruling, but prior to the 1980s financial institutions were regulated 
as to what they could charge and the conditions under which 
they could lend. This was particularly the case with mortgages 
(Glyn 2007:54). They were also required to maintain substantial 
reserves. The wider money system was equally carefully controlled 
with national currencies subject to fixed exchange rates and 
exchange controls.
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The regulatory system began to break down in the early 1970s 
for several reasons. One was the collapse of the Bretton Woods 
system of fixed exchange rates as national currencies started to 
break free of their national boundaries. This was particularly true 
of the dollar, where due to the purchase of oil in dollars, large 
amounts of dollars were held outside the USA. Eventually these 
‘euro-dollars’ started to be circulated through the global banking 
system. Governments found they could not control their boundaries 
against the movement of currencies and had to abandon control 
on the movement of money. Credit restrictions were also lifted. 
In 1971, the Conservative government in Britain released credit 
controls in a ‘dash for growth’. This led to a mushrooming of 
‘fringe’ banks and a commercial property and house price boom. 
In November 1973 one of the new banks, London and County 
Securities, collapsed and the whole fringe ‘secondary’ banking 
system started to unravel. Even some of the mainstream banks 
were threatened. The collapse was triggered when the government 
raised interest rates to curb inflation following the quadrupling 
of oil prices after the 1973 Yom Kippur war. The outcome was 
two years of recession with high levels of inflation and several 
banks having to be supported by the Bank of England. It might be 
thought that lessons would have been learned, but similar crises 
and bailouts occurred throughout the next 30 years, interspersed 
with periods of debt driven prosperity.
Disregarding this history, the push for less bank regulation 
continued particularly in Britain and the USA. Reagan substantially 
deregulated the financial sector while Margaret Thatcher launched 
her ‘Big Bang’ in 1986. This unleashed a wave of speculative 
investments in real estate and risky high interest ‘junk bonds’. 
Bank failures were not far behind. The US’s Citibank had to 
be rescued with $1.5 billion of Saudi cash in 1989. Johnson 
Matthey bank in Britain and Continental Illinois in the US had 
to be nationalised. In the late 1980s the US Savings and Loans 
organisations fell victim to speculative losses and had to be bailed 
out. In 1991 Britain saw the collapse of another fringe bank, 
BCCI, the implications of which were still being unravelled in 
2008. Despite these problems, the Glass Steagall legislation was 
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being challenged. In 1997 Citibank merged with the insurance 
group Travelers which breached the US ruling that banks should 
not cross-sell financial products (Scurlock 2007). Following 
intense lobbying, the Clinton administration finally rescinded the 
Glass Steagall Act in 1999. The Financial Services Modernisation 
Act freed banks to embrace a wide range of financial activities: 
banking, insurance, mortgages, stock market trading, personal 
and speculative lending and bank direct investment.
Europe had always allowed ‘universal’ banks, but there had 
been restrictions which banks agitated to be removed. The central 
problem for the traditional banking sector was pressure from 
competition for their savings and loans market. From the 1970s 
the high street banks’ basic business became less viable as people 
started to invest and borrow from a wider range of financial 
institutions. In this process of ‘disintermediation’ (Langley 
2002:22) banks ceased to be the primary vehicle for people’s 
money as they turned to other forms of saving, such as pensions 
or investment funds (Langley 2006:919). Large companies were 
also raising their own loans and even developing financial services 
themselves, such as consumer credit. In the 1950s nearly 50 per 
cent of new US savings went into banks, with around a third 
going into investment funds. By 1994 virtually none was going 
into banks and more than 70 per cent into investment funds 
(Warburton 1999:95). Consumer credit, credit cards, mortgages, 
insurances and stock market investments were expanding rapidly. 
By 2008 US regulated banks only accounted for a quarter of 
total credit (Wray 2008:7). In Britain, high street banks could 
no longer rely on the steady inflow of customers’ savings and 
borrowings and began to agitate for more flexibility. They were 
allowed to broaden the scope of their lending, most notably 
to mortgages which put the traditional building societies under 
pressure. This drove a process of demutualisation where building 
societies converted from being mutuals to become commercial 
banks. Abbey National led the move early on in 1988, others 
held on but the late 1990s saw a large number transferring: 
Alliance and Leicester, Woolwich, Bradford and Bingley, Halifax, 
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Northern Rock, Bristol and West, National and Provincial all 
transferred in 1997.
Liquidity and solvency
As banks lend disproportionately to their deposits, and are always 
facing a potential demand for cash or excess bank transfers, they 
are in continual danger of problems of liquidity and solvency. 
Liquidity means having enough ready money to meet immediate 
demands for withdrawals. Solvency means the overall assets of the 
bank (which are mainly held in the form of loans and investments) 
are sufficient to meet its overall liabilities (which are mainly to 
savers, investors or creditors). While there are no physical, or 
even accountancy, limits to money creation provided the books 
balance, the system is always unstable. The financial system, 
as a capitalist system, is one that must always be in forward 
motion. If it falters it will collapse. The dilemma for banks is that 
they ‘borrow short and lend long’. This is because the deposits 
they take are returnable on demand while loans will not return 
until they are due. Banks, therefore, have a fatal combination 
of small reserves, illiquid assets and returnable bank deposits, 
with everything depending on depositor confidence (Warburton 
1999:54). As Martin Wolf of the Financial Times put it, if we were 
not so familiar with banking we would surely treat the notion 
of borrowing ‘short and safe’ in order to lend ‘long and risky’ as 
fraudulent’ (20 March 2009).
The way banks deal with the problem of liquidity is by holding 
a certain proportion of ready assets in cash or near cash. This is 
often held through an account at the central bank. That leaves the 
question of the level of reserves needed. For much of the twentieth 
century the regulatory norm was 10–12 per cent. From the 1980s 
under the Basle rules it was around 8 per cent, however as lending 
expanded the ratio dropped much lower. Speaking in 2008, 
D’Arista calculated that prevailing US bank reserves covered less 
than one-tenth of one per cent of deposits, compared with 11 per 
cent in 1951 (D’Arista 2008). Calculating what should form the 
basis of a reserve, and what it should be held against, is complex 
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and has been the subject of negotiations through the international 
banker’s organisation, the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) 
in Basle. BIS has struggled to find a means of defining how a 
bank’s reserve should be calculated. A BIS Accord in the late 1980s 
proposed an 8 per cent ‘Tier 1’ reserve as a combination of capital 
assets and cash deposits. However, as banks began to operate in 
new ways in the deregulated environment the composition of the 
bank balance sheets became much more complex. A ‘Tier 2’ level 
of reserves was identified that sought to match different types and 
level of reserve to the varied liabilities and viability of assets. In 
response Basle II allowed banks some extent of self-regulation, 
including the use of agency ratings and devising their own risk 
assessment models (Wade 2008:20). 
The idea of a reserve is seen as meaningless by Steve Keen, 
particularly where this is represented by reserve deposits lodged 
at the central bank. He argues that such a reserve does not exist, 
but is simply represented by another layer of credit issued by the 
central bank. Keen argues that, in practice, far from the text-book 
model of the level set by the central bank reserve system driving 
the level of loans, the central reserve bank has to follow the 
clearing banks’ lead by creating a suitable notional reserve to 
back money issue:
rather than the state directly controlling the money supply via its control 
over the issue of new currency and the extent to which it lets banks leverage 
their holdings of currency, private banks and other credit-generating 
institutions largely force the state’s hand. (Keen 2001:303)
Lapavitsas and Saad-Filho argue that the central bank must always 
respond to the quantity of loans made in the banking system as 
these are driven by requests from borrowers who are engaged 
in the productive system. When firms request loans to start the 
productive cycle and banks create these ex nihilo, that is, out of 
fresh air, this determines the money supply. Given that the loans 
have already been made, the central bank, if requested, cannot 
refuse to back these loans if the system is to maintain its viability, 
‘consequently, the central bank cannot control the quantity of 
base money…loans make deposits, deposits make reserves, and 
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credit money determines base money’ (Lapavitsas and Saad-Filho 
2000:311–12). As Lapavitsas argues, the central bank as the apex 
of the pyramid of the credit system is effectively banker to the 
money market (2003:84). Despite the fact that bank credit ‘has the 
most clearly social character in a capitalist economy’ Lapavitsas 
is quite clear whose interests would prevail in a crisis. As the 
central bank is a creature of the capitalist credit system ‘at times 
of crisis…the broader interests of society are subordinated to the 
needs and demands of the credit system’ (Lapavitsas 2003:86).
With limited direct means of issuing money, the state through 
the central bank has two main instruments: open market 
operations and interest rates. Open market operations involves 
the buying and selling of government bonds to control the overall 
money supply. Selling bonds decreases money supply, buying back 
bonds increases money supply. Interest rates aim to encourage or 
discourage the issue of new money by making money more or 
less expensive. Banks are expected to follow base rate guidance. 
However in the financial crisis even this mechanism failed in 
the UK, when the interbank rate of lending (LIBOR) broke free 
of the central bank and did not follow a base rate reduction. 
LIBOR is the basis on which banks interact with each other in 
the money markets. The British Bankers’ Association London 
Interbank Offer Rate is calculated daily for ten currencies and 
for 15 different time periods from overnight to 12 months. 
MacKenzie argues that LIBOR ‘matters more than any other set 
of numbers in the world’ and controls contracts of around $300 
trillion (2008:237).
The problem with trying to control bank lending through 
interest rates is that they are slow and reactive. As any shift in 
interest rates takes some time to work through and central banks, 
in any event, are often fighting the last battle, they find themselves 
‘behind the curve’. In reacting to inflation, central banks increase 
interest rates which can cause recessions. In times of recession 
they lower interest rates which can increase credit and threaten 
speculative booms. Speaking on the BBC Today programme (28 
September 2007) Alan Greenspan, who headed the US Federal 
Reserve from 1987 to 2006, acknowledged that central banks 
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find it very difficult to resolve financial problems because these 
cannot be anticipated. He also admitted that central banks don’t 
really have control over interest rates and cannot control large 
flows of capital worldwide. Greenspan was a cheerleader for 
the free market and was praised for helping the US out of the 
dotcom collapse and the post 9/11 crisis by lowering interest 
rates. However, many of the problems that the world economy 
now faces developed under his regime. Reflecting later, Greenspan 
talked of his ‘big mistake’, which was not realising that banks 
might not act in the long term interests of their shareholders 
or even their businesses (Tett 2009:297). This would not have 
surprised John Kenneth Galbraith who remarked on the low 
quality of people who manage money and the fact that ‘failure is 
almost never at a cost to those responsible’ (1975:302).
A central task of bank regulation is to ensure that the financial 
system is solvent and not fraudulent. When Labour came to power 
in 1997 the regulatory system was reformed and the Bank of 
England was given independent control of monetary policy. A 
tripartite system was set up with regulation split between the 
Treasury, the Bank of England and the newly-created Financial 
Services Authority. The Financial Services Authority monitored 
individual banks while the Bank of England had responsibil-
ity for managing the money supply. Unfortunately neither of 
the organisations nor the Treasury had oversight of the overall 
integrity of the financial system. For most of the 1990s and early 
2000s the banking system seemed to be able to do no wrong. 
Banking shares led the stock markets, financial assets were rising 
and more and more people were able to access credit. There were 
insurances for depositors in place and the market seemed to be 
self-regulating. However, innovations within the financial system 
were developing that no-one, least of all the supervisory system, 
were able to understand or control.
Innovations in Banking: securitised Finance
One of the major changes in the banking system came with a shift 
from money lending and circulation through the banking system 
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to money circulation through the money market. The money 
market brings together all those wanting to borrow money and all 
those with money to lend. The growth of the money market was 
a response to the huge amounts of money that had been created 
and were now circulating looking for a home. This included 
savings from resource rich or trading surplus countries such as 
the oil states and China, and companies, institutions and investors 
generally looking for higher returns. Money was seeking a way 
to make more money, but with so much ready money available, 
there was a limit to where viable investments could be found. 
This led to what looked like a virtuous circle. Relieved of credit 
restrictions, banks were running up against the formal limits of 
their balance sheets. They were also finding it difficult to generate 
sufficient profit even with the volume of credit they were creating.
The neat solution appeared to be to sell the debt on to the money 
market. Banks began to tap into the flow of money available by 
selling the debts they were issuing as an asset for investment, that 
is, as a security. Like the traders who once swapped the debts they 
held for ready bank money, banks started to swap the debts they 
held for ready money market finance. Investors would buy bank 
debt at a discount and receive a profit as the loans matured. This 
was a tremendous benefit for the banks’ balance sheet because 
whereas in the past banks kept the loans they made on their books, 
now they were sold on and were therefore ‘off balance sheet’ and 
did not count against any lending ratios or against profits. More 
importantly, instead of loans that were slowly being paid off, the 
banks had more ready cash to expand their business. The more 
debts the banks sold on the more profit they made against capital. 
In the end it was not the need for loans that drove the market, 
but the need to find loans to soak up all the investment available 
for securities and thereby make more profit.
The process of ‘securitisation’, whereby debts were packaged 
up and sold on as asset-based securities, was very much a US 
innovation because the US, and particularly its investment banks, 
were responsible for 80 per cent of all securitisations (Phillips 
2008:97). It was a market that grew very rapidly from the 1980s 
onwards. In 1990 Citicorp converted future credit card interest 
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into marketable bonds and between 1985 and 1995 the US secu-
ritisation market grew from $600bn to $2000 billion (Ingham 
2004:221n7). The process was known as ‘originate to distribute’. 
Lenders originated the debt and then distributed it via the secu-
ritisation process to the market. Debt buying became ‘the new 
frontier, the Wild West of the financial world…the fastest growing 
business on Wall Street’ (Scurlock 2007:27). Selling of debt was 
applied to all sorts of lending activities but the most notable, and 
the one that contributed to the downfall of the banking system, 
was mortgages. Through securitisation, the income stream from 
mortgage loans could be traded as a financial investment. Between 
1990 and 2006 the amount of residential debt processed by issuers 
of asset-based securities increased from $55 billion to $2,117 
billion (Panitch and Konings 2009:75). The securities went under 
a variety of names: mortgage backed securities (MBS), asset-based 
securities (ABS) and collateralised debt obligations (CDOs).
Mortgage backed securities seemed to be a good, safe asset 
because the history of mortgage lending had shown it to be 
relatively free of risk. Mortgage lending since World War II, 
particularly in the US, had been very stable with no history 
of major defaults. The house price boom also seemed to be 
unending and any debts that might occur would be covered by 
the rising value of the property. This innovative way of raising 
money seemed to offer almost unlimited funding and profitable 
investment. Securitisation developed dramatically in the housing 
market during the 1990s, but particularly after 2000. At the time 
of the credit crunch in August 2007 funds for between a half and 
two-thirds of British mortgages were being raised in the money 
markets as ‘wholesale funds’, whereas before 1990 more than 
two-thirds of mortgages were linked to savings deposits, mainly 
through building societies.
In order to avoid the remnants of the regulatory regime and 
liquidity limits, banks organised the new activities in what was 
effectively a ‘shadow’ banking system. Semi-detached ‘structured 
investment vehicles’ (SIV) were set up to administer the securities 
issued. Investment banks played a very large part in setting up the 
securitised loans and this brought them into a very close working 
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relationship with retail banks and other mortgage lenders. Phillips 
sees the structures of the shadow banking system as ‘liquidity 
factories’ creating ‘candyfloss money’ (2008:185). As a result 
of the seemingly unlimited amount of money available through 
this process, the lending criteria became more and more lax. A 
lot of money was to be made at all levels from the initiator of 
the ‘originate to distribute’ process, through those who packaged 
up the loans, to those who invested in them. This led to a build 
up of subprime loans which were initially attractive to investors 
because they paid higher rates of interest. Any residual risk would 
be overcome by another innovation of the new system. As well 
as tapping into the wider money market, the securitisation of 
mortgage debt would mean that any risk was spread among many 
investors through CDOs, that is, collatoralised debt obligations.
Collatoralised debt obligations were packages of mortgages that 
included both prime and subprime loans. These were presented 
in the form of ‘structured finance’ that was ‘sliced and diced’. 
This meant that bundles of mortgages could be sold to different 
investors at different rates of interest. Institutional investors such 
as insurance companies and pension funds were offered less profit 
margin, but were the first to be paid out in the event of any loss 
overall. A second level could be offered which would be paid 
out second and so on, down to the most risky that would be 
paid out last and was priced to give a very high rate of profit. 
Each investor therefore knew the risk they seemed to be taking. 
However, even the most risky level of investment was still 
receiving high credit ratings from the rating agencies because, 
even though they contained subprime debt, mortgages were seen 
as an unproblematic area of investment. Also the organisations 
selling the finance had good ratings and the icing on the cake was 
that the debt was insured. Alongside the structured finance was a 
framework of guarantees against non-payment from well-estab-
lished insurers. In recognition of these facts MBSs were given the 
top rating of security (Triple A) by the rating agencies. Scurlock 
has described this process as ‘mortgage laundering’ (2007:87).
What no-one took account of at the time was that mortgages 
were being sold in dubious ways. People were being pressured 
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into taking out mortgages, ability to pay was not verified and 
people were offered deals that seemed very good, but only lasted 
a short time. In the US in particular, people had been used to 
long term fixed rate mortgages and were very confused by a shift 
to mortgages with adjustable rates. Also, mortgage companies 
knew they could sell on the product very quickly and, therefore, 
any risk would be off their balance sheets. Under the ‘originate 
to distribute’ model of lending it was difficult, if not impossible, 
to assess or locate risk. Lenders were selling on their loans in 
complicated packages that made any risk that went with them 
unclear. The problem of risk was addressed by yet another financial 
innovation, Credit Default Swaps (CDS). For a fee, insurers would 
provide cover against the risk of default.
As there was no organised market for such arrangements, 
these tended to be private ‘over-the-counter’ arrangements 
between organisations. Because they were private unregulated 
arrangements the only security the ‘counter-parties’ had was that 
the insurers and sellers were both rated Triple A. This had the effect 
of making the debts themselves seem safe. The credit insurance 
market rapidly became one of the biggest growth areas of the 
new regime. By 2007 total credit lent out and insured in credit 
default swaps and various other credit derivatives reached over 
$60 trillion, according to the International Swaps and Derivatives 
Association. Many of these were multiple insurances relating to 
the same debt, as insurances were sought each time the debt 
was traded. Finally, problems of debt default in the US subprime 
mortgage market led to a collapse of the whole shaky edifice of 
debt-based securities and wholesale finance. This destroyed the 
optimism and trust which underpinned the whole system resulting 
in a credit crunch (Brummer 2008, Morris 2008, Turner 2008). 
Institutions saddled with unknown levels of risk refused to offer 
any more credit in any direction.
In August 2006 a special issue on banking of the New Inter-
nationalist magazine (No.392) charged the banking system with 
mainly investing in the new financial instruments rather than in 
productive companies or, even less, in small businesses or the billion 
low-income, self-employed in the world. Banks were not supplying 
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essential financial services such as sending migrant workers’ 
remittances back to their home countries cheaply. Moving such 
remittances safely and cheaply is essential as they are worth double 
the size of world aid and are a major contributor to the income 
of small, poor countries. Instead, banks were helping rich people 
to avoid tax, the amount of which New Internationalist estimates 
to be equivalent worldwide to the GNP of Hong Kong each year. 
For some time banks had also been withdrawing from traditional 
frontline banking services (Leyshon and Thrift 1997:225). Running 
small accounts and providing local branches was expensive and 
the push was to rationalise. This meant that poorer communities 
were left without ready access to bank branches, or even building 
societies (Fuller and Mellor 2008:1506). In Britain the government 
tried to encourage banks to set up basic bank accounts for the 
lower paid, but this was not embraced enthusiastically. Ironically 
Britain once had a government-owned bank run through post 
offices, the Giro bank, but under the enthusiasm for privatisation 
this was sold into the private sector and ceased to exist. Such a 
bank might not have helped as post offices were also being closed; 
in fact a major programme of post office branch closures in Britain 
was only prevented by the financial crisis itself. The crisis has also 
revived the idea of a PostBank run through post offices.
The new mechanism of raising money and selling debt had 
profound implications for the banking system. It meant that 
banks were becoming reliant on securing a constant flow of 
money from the money markets and were themselves becoming 
debtors and insurers of debt. The world of finance was also 
expanding rapidly with a credit fuelled orgy of speculation. John 
McFall, Chair of the UK Treasury Select Committee, writing in 
the Guardian (9 January 2009) calculated that the ‘alternative 
banking world’ of investment banks, hedge funds and money 
market funds had amassed $10–$12 trillion by early 2007 
and produced $500 trillion of complex derivatives. Even if the 
regulatory authorities had had their eye on the ball, the ball itself 
had run away from them into the long grass. Presciently in 1999 
Warburton warned of the danger that by acting off-balance sheet 
banks would over-extend themselves and went on to ponder how 
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safe bank deposits would be, let alone bank shares, in this ‘brave 
new world’ (1999:69).
Panitch and Konings (2009) challenge the case that poor 
banking regulation was the cause of the financial crisis. They 
point out that it was not the fact that governments had failed 
to regulate, there was still a system of regulation, but that states 
were complicit in the innovations that took place. For the US they 
see the global shift to deregulation as not about freeing financial 
institutions, but consolidating the imperial power of American 
finance (2009:68). They point out that in 1993 the Clinton admin-
istration actually exempted some of the new derivative instruments 
from regulation (2009:68). Greenspan had been relaxed about the 
innovative approaches and even after the crash did not advocate 
the regulation of derivatives (Greenspan 2008:528). As Warburton 
warned, an extraordinary reversal of roles was taking place where 
the large developed economies were becoming the servant of a 
global financial system and not its master. He blamed the central 
banks for not challenging the financial innovations and for having 
little regard for global stability in not restraining the growth of 
global finance (1999:xi–xiii). Panitch and Konings on the other 
hand, see financialisation as enlarging the international power 
of the American state through the extension of ‘strategic leeway 
available to capital’ but at the same time the state was involved in 
a ‘step-by-step construction of a too-big-to-fail regime’ (2009:72).
The state and central banks had supported and encouraged the 
new banking system, and its link to the expanded market in 
money, because they did not understand, or had forgotten, the 
social and public nature of banking. The financial system is never 
a private matter, its problems will always rebound on the public.
Private Good; Public Bad
By the late twentieth century, bank created debt had almost totally 
eclipsed the state in money issue: ‘for most practical purposes, 
the rapid growth of banks’ balance sheets is synonymous with 
the rapid growth of money supply’ (Warburton 1999:64). While 
credit creation in the private sector became almost unlimited, 
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neo-liberal ideology declared that public sector borrowing or a 
state role in the money system would have a negative impact on 
‘market forces’. The notion of money creation by the state was 
associated with hyperinflation and utterly rejected as ‘printing 
money’. Recurrent examples like the hyperinflation in Zimbabwe 
did not help this perception. An alternative view of the cause of 
inflation is that it is not the public issue of money in itself that is 
the problem, but issuing it in an unbalanced way so that consumer 
demand is not matched by material wealth in the production of 
goods and services. Parguez and Seccareccia see this as the cause 
of the pre-war German hyperinflation (2000:107). In the case of 
Zimbabwe this was clearly a failed state whose productive system 
had collapsed. Its hyperinflation and debased money was arguably 
as much a reflection as a cause of its predicament. The fact that 
through history public authorities have created and circulated 
money without necessarily incurring inflationary consequences is 
ignored as, too, is the historical evidence of disastrous activities 
by banks. In the privatised world of private good, public bad, the 
public sector has been forced to meet expenditure by borrowing 
from commercially created and circulated money.
The banking and financial sector, on the other hand, has been 
able to borrow and circulate money almost without limit. Failing 
to see that commercial money creation was behind the flood 
of money in the new financial world, bankers and financiers 
congratulated themselves on the amount of money they were 
making. This gave rise to a culture of paying huge bonuses to city 
traders and bankers mainly related to the constant inflation of 
financial asset values, high volumes of trade and, particularly, share 
price. This fuelled a short term bonus and profit driven business 
culture regardless of long term risk. As money markets have 
grown, bringing together a wide range of financial organisations 
including the banks, the privatised financial system is effectively 
creating money for itself. The state has a residual regulatory role 
through the central bank, but is itself just another borrower. 
While financial institutions continue to buy state debt and trust 
its ability to pay, the state can create money as a borrower, but the 
power in the relationship has passed to the creditors, basically the 
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large financial engines of the private sector. States are given credit 
ratings like other borrowers and can find credit prohibitively 
expensive or impossible to get. The modern system of money issue 
has left the direction of the economy almost entirely in private, 
commercial hands. In Britain this leads to contortions of public 
policy where investment in the public sector, such as hospitals, 
were funded by commercial finance through PFI (Private Finance 
Initiative) schemes leading to increased overall costs in the long 
term (Pollock 2004:27).
The dominance of the private sector was shown in the 
construction of the European monetary regime. Central to 
this was the independence of the European Central Bank from 
European states with no mechanism for co-ordinated public 
input. In its founding legislation, the EU central bank cannot 
lend directly to governments, it can only lend to the financial 
sector. The euro can only be brought into being by the demands 
of private agents, states cannot request it. Governments are also 
limited in their capacity to borrow. Under the EU Stability and 
Growth pact budget deficits can be no more than 3 per cent of 
GDP and total borrowing (national debt) must be no more than 
60 per cent. As Ingham argues, ‘the Maastricht conditions and 
the single currency represent a triumph of economic orthodoxy – 
especially the monetary preoccupation with inflation and “sound 
money”’ (2004:192). Gordon Brown in the UK also capitulated to 
economic orthodoxy by making the Bank of England independent 
from the state. The US government is also legally unable to create 
money (Greenspan 2008:515). However, as the financial crisis 
escalated, these artificial boundaries started to crumble with the 
need to return monetary responsibility to the public, as represented 
by the state.
The rejection of any public role in money issue is based on the 
ideology of the efficiency of the market. All economic wealth is 
seen as coming from the market and all government borrowing 
therefore is a drain on private, wealth-creating activities. This 
assumes that the public sector cannot generate value, that there 
is no wealth to be had in public and communal activities. If 
market-based theories of money are right, money represents 
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the vitality of the economy and will rise and fall with market 
activities. Any mechanism that interferes with the market could 
throw the money system out of balance. On the other hand, if 
social, and particularly state, theories of money are correct, if 
the state cannot engage independently in the money creation and 
circulation process, the money system has no backstop. Money 
would have to revert to being a trust between producers, traders, 
workers and consumers, mediated by bankers. Money would 
once more be a private instrument, no longer guaranteed by state 
‘high powered’ money, that is, notes, coins and bank deposits 
designated in publicly authorised currency. Money would still be 
social in that it would be based on trust, but it would not have 
public authority.
It may be argued that while banks may have only limited 
cash reserves, they have assets and capital value to support their 
balance sheets. However both disappear in a crisis, share prices 
collapse and assets lose value or, in the case of loans, become 
unrecoverable. Long before the current crisis Galbraith noted that 
banks have ‘age-old spasms of optimism and feckless expansion’ 
(1975:306) but noted that the public and private could never be 
separated because ‘the problem of money has now become fully 
coordinate with that of the economy…even the polity’ (1975:303). 
As long as the state still endorses the money system ‘money is 
always fiat money…even…when the role of the state is marginal’ 
(Parguez and Seccareccia 2000:106). Public may be bad in the eye 
of the market, but it is essential to the money system.
conclusion
The main focus of this chapter has been the way that money 
issue and circulation has moved dramatically towards the private 
sector. This has implications for the control of the money system 
and for the integrity of the system itself. Capitalism requires a 
banking system with money creation capacity. The current era of 
neo-liberal lax banking regulation has presented it with an almost 
unlimited supply of credit. Banks, as profit driven companies, 
must seek to maximise profits and when boring safe banking 
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proved not to be profitable, banks sought out more adventurous 
ways to make money. The result was the securitisation of debt, 
linked to the growth of money markets which shifted the money 
system beyond any form of public control. This was fuelled by 
a growth in financialisation, that is, extensive investment in 
financial products and the prioritisation of increasing the money 
value of assets. This was not confined to speculative capitalists, 
but spread throughout whole economies as will be discussed in 
the next chapter. Now that the system has gone bad, and the 
financial products and their underlying debt have turned toxic, 
many people’s economic security is threatened, through pension 
funds, house prices, jobs and even the circulation of basic goods 
and services.
As regulatory ‘fire-walls’ broke down, unregulated banks 
and non-bank financial institutions became entangled with the 
regulated banking system. These were supposed to be beyond 
the state’s sphere of responsibility, but as the financial system 
expanded and the money market grew, all aspects of the financial 
system became so interlinked that to break it at any point could 
threaten the whole circuit. Given the entangled nature of the 
privatised money system, the public as represented by the 
state cannot avoid becoming involved. Once there is a direct 
link between the capitalist market and the state via the money 
system there is effectively no such thing as a private sector. 
While money creation and circulation is in private hands and 
used for private benefit, the state still retains responsibility for 
managing and supporting the system with ultimate responsibility 
for its functioning. Therefore, society through the public sector 
collectively bears the consequences of a failure of the capitalist 
money system, but has no influence on the overall direction of 
how finance is invested or used.
The most important aspect of control of money through 
capitalist banks is that there is no public control over the economic 
priorities it represents. Who pays the piper (on borrowed money) 
calls the tune in the economy. While public debt is seen as a ‘drain’ 
on ‘the economy’, private debt is welcomed even if the investment 
is in armaments, rain forest clearance or speculating against the 
Mellor 01 text   56 23/02/2010   15:07
The PrIvaTIsaTIon oF Money  57
state’s own currency. This is even more important given the way 
that money is created, effectively out of nowhere, as fresh air 
money. If it were actually fresh air, money would be seen as a 
public resource to be used for public benefit. It would also be 
seen as something to be monitored to maintain its quality. As 
something that has come from nowhere, money should be treated 
as a public resource and not harnessed for private benefit. One way 
to challenge the exclusionary, exploitative and destructive effects 
of capitalism would be to demand that money issue and use be 
made subject to democratic control, or even (re)claimed wholesale 
by the public sector. As will be discussed in the final chapter, 
democratic public control of money issue could be a means of 
achieving socio-economic change towards a more ecologically 
sustainable economy.




The Anglo-American model of capitalism has been built on 
globalisation, neo-liberalism and financialisation. This has 
appeared to bring a superficial prosperity to a substantial 
minority of the population of dominant economies at the expense 
of widening inequalities both within individual societies and 
across the globe. For the more prosperous western economies, 
globalisation has encouraged rampant consumerism based on the 
import of cheap goods. Neo-liberalism has encouraged privatised 
individualism and discouraged public and collective forms of 
action. Financialisation has increased the dominance of money 
and money value: ‘financialisation means the increasing role of 
financial motives, financial markets, financial actors and financial 
institutions in the operation of the domestic and international 
economies’ (Epstein 2005:3). By the late twentieth century the 
principles of privatisation and financialisation had intruded into 
the personal lives of the population (Langley 2008). People have 
been encouraged to ‘stand on their own two feet’ and see their 
security in money terms backed by personal financial assets. As 
concepts such as ‘people’s capitalism’ and ‘a property owning 
democracy’ were promoted with ideological fervour, people were 
encouraged to think that there was ‘no such thing as society’ and 
that the state was an interfering nanny stealing their hard-earned 
money out of their pockets. This undermined public and collective 
approaches to social solidarity. Collective forms such as trades 
unions went into decline and hard won social policies such as 
pensions and various social insurances were undermined.
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At the heart of financialisation was the assumption that money 
can be made out of money and that money in itself can secure a 
person’s economic life. Savings were no longer security for a rainy 
day, they were investments. A house was no longer a home, but a 
financial asset. Private investments and the privatisation of public 
and mutual sector organisations saw a huge influx of people on 
to the stock market, which appeared to give large parts of the 
population a stake in the capitalist financial system. As Panitch 
and Konings argue, financialization ‘played a vital domestic role…
integrating subordinate classes into a web of financial relations 
through private pensions, consumer credit and mortgages’. 
Speaking of the American experience, they point out that far 
from Polanyi’s notion that markets have become disembedded 
from society, ‘neoliberalism and financial expansion…embedded 
financial forms and principles more deeply in the fabric of 
American society’ (2009:68).
The ‘democratisation’ of debt
Debt has always existed in human societies. As the first two 
chapters have shown, the issue of money as debt has played an 
important part in the emergence of the modern money system 
and, as will be discussed more fully in the next chapter, the 
development of the capitalist system. However, debt has also 
proved to be a major source of social and personal problems 
and has been proscribed by many religions (Pettifor 2006:132). 
Debt-bondage still occurs in many societies and indebtedness 
is a problem for many people from poor farmers to economic 
migrants, the unemployed, low-paid workers and overburdened 
consumers. The difference between traditional and contemporary 
debt is that debt has become an established and socially accepted 
way of life. This has seen generations of young people emerging 
from universities already heavily in debt. In the expanding 
economies of the post-war era, to have accrued high levels of 
debt was not a matter for social concern and shame, but a sign 
of social status and creditworthiness. This was particularly true 
as debt became ‘credit’ and consumer goods were bought on ‘hire 
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purchase’. Status symbols such as cars were purchased with loans 
and there was a massive expansion of mortgage debt through the 
promotion of home ownership. As the use of credit escalated, 
retail companies began to make more money through loans than 
on products. This was particularly true for cars and white goods, 
with companies like General Electric and General Motors forming 
highly profitable finance arms.
Credit cards were an important aspect of the new credit boom 
and the United States and Britain were major users, much more so 
than mainland Europe. British people hold 70 million credit cards 
as against, for example, Germany’s 2.3 million (Lawson 2009:87). 
Credit cards were originally developed by companies to encourage 
corporate loyalty. Oil companies issued the first Diner’s Club Card 
in 1949 and holding one was a status symbol. The VISA card 
was issued by Bank of America in 1958. At first it was difficult to 
obtain a credit card, but by the late twentieth century they were 
a major force for the ‘democratisation’ of debt, as most people in 
the US and the UK had at least one. In fact, not to have a credit 
card became problematic, as it meant that the person concerned 
did not have a ‘credit profile’ and therefore might find it difficult 
to obtain debt finance. Credit card borrowing also meant that 
large amounts of money were being issued into the economy by 
consumers as they spent and borrowed. Arguably, this is a form of 
economic democracy as the consumer’s choice will prevail, but this 
ignores the role of advertising, impulse buying and the problems 
of those burdened with consumer debts (Lawson 2009:74). As, 
in Lawson’s terms, Britain became an ‘all-consuming’ society 
it also became the credit capital of Europe, owing £1.3 trillion 
by 2008 (Lawson 2009:87). The same pattern emerged in the 
US where household debt leapt from 70 per cent of disposable 
income in 1985 to 122 per cent by 2006 (Pettifor 2006:1). This is 
because debt has been rising much faster than household income. 
As Scurlock points out, the most recent generation of people has 
seen US household income rise by only 1 per cent whereas debt 
has risen by 1,000 per cent (2007:5). As a proportion of GDP, 
US household debt rose from 50 per cent in 1980 to 100 per cent 
in 2007 (Gowan 2009:26). There has been much handwringing 
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over the level of debt in society, but as Scurlock points out, the 
banking system makes much more money by putting people into 
debt than by encouraging them to save: ‘banking is about selling 
a single product: debt’ (2007:46). Ann Pettifor warned in 2006 
of the dangers of ‘debtonation’ where the first world would be 
mired in debt in the same way that the Third World economies 
were in the 1980s. She predicted this would result in a deflationary 
crisis (Pettifor 2006:45).
Selling debt became a major source of profit for the financial 
services industry. As Ann Pettifor points out, for the early part 
of the twentieth century, and particularly the post-war period, 
interest rates were low. However, the new era of deregulated 
privatised credit has become usurious, particularly for borrowing 
on credit or store cards with interest charges of up to 30 per cent 
(Pettifor 2006:76–7). While the early credit cards went to the 
better off, often with an annual charge, later there was a much 
less discriminate mass issue of cards. The market became highly 
competitive with many finance companies becoming involved. 
Charges were dropped and people were often bombarded with 
offers of credit. The main source of profit for the credit issuers was 
the interest and charges on those who did not pay off their card 
each month. While many credit card holders use their card as a 
convenient means of payment, many others remain in permanent 
debt, particularly the less well off. A pattern emerged that was 
to recur in the housing market: the most profitable borrowers 
for the credit companies were those least able to pay. Companies 
started to target the marginal poor who were the most profitable 
group as they paid higher levels of interest on their debt over 
longer periods. The inevitable logic was that credit card companies 
would search out those who were most likely to be ‘maxed out’ 
and pay the highest interest rates and penalties on borrowings. 
There was also an incentive to have as many holders as possible 
on minimum payments. In the US this is around 12 per cent of 
holders, while up to 70 per cent of Americans do not pay their 
credit card bill in full at the end of the month (Scurlock 2007:68). 
The ideal borrower is the regular defaulter who pays maximum 
interest and penalty fees, with the latter earning companies up to 
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$20 billion (Scurlock 2007:22). According to the Financial Times 
(5 August 2009) total US credit card debt was $850 billion and 
10 per cent of balances in the US and UK were defaulting.
As a result of the rising levels of credit many people found 
themselves with levels of debt that were completely unsustainable. 
One caller to the UK Credit Card Counselling Service owed 
£225,000 (Lawson 2009:87). Scurlock reports that the US 
personal bankruptcy rate in the 2007–08 crisis is ten times the 
level in the Great Depression (2007:5). The evidence is that most 
of these bankruptcies don’t represent profligate expenditure but 
people, particularly women, trying to keep their head above 
water. A major cause of indebtedness in the US is borrowing to 
pay for health care (2007:154). In the UK the Citizens Advice 
Bureau reported that even before the crisis it was dealing annually 
with 1.7 million debt problems, averaging more than 6,600 a 
day (Lawson 2009:160). By 2009 these had risen to more than 
9,000 per day.
Lack of appreciation of the difference between secured and 
unsecured debt has led to many people taking out ‘consolidation’ 
loans. These tend to be advertised heavily on daytime TV, where 
they are more likely to be seen by women. Home owners with 
unsecured loans have ‘consolidated’ their loans against their 
homes, thereby putting their home at risk. Consolidated loans 
can also lead to people paying up to ten times more than the 
original sum borrowed as they are paid over a longer period. As 
levels of debt and default escalated, debt collection became big 
business. ‘Vulture’ companies bought debt from banks and other 
agencies for a small percentage of the face value and then pursued 
the debtors who could be individuals, households, companies or 
even states.
While those mired in debt are a major feature of the 
contemporary economies, there are those for whom credit is even 
more problematic. For those on very low incomes, borrowing 
has long been a way of life. Lack of access to affordable credit 
means that borrowing for the poor is an expensive way of 
meeting immediate needs (Collard and Kempson 2005). Around 
a fifth of all households in the UK and the US are too poor to 
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access mainstream credit and banking services and are thereby 
excluded from a wide range of provisioning (Dymski 2007:9). 
Poor families often have to borrow from doorstep lenders at 
high, and sometimes extortionate, interest rates of up to 2,000 
per cent (Pettifor 2003:25). Dymski cites the example of the pay 
day loan market, which in the US grew rapidly from the early 
1990s. In 2001 it saw 70 million transactions (Dymski 2007:11). 
However, even pay day loans (borrowing until the next pay day) 
do not represent the most financially excluded, as borrowers need 
to have a checking account to be able to access the loans. In 
response to the demand for subprime credit, mainstream banks 
have increasingly linked up with subprime lenders.
While many households have been sucked into financialisa-
tion through high levels of debt, people have also been sucked in 
through the promise of profitable investment.
From savings to capital Investment
The financialisation of social life has seen people enticed into 
financialised capitalism through pensions and various forms of 
financial investments, including shares. This is characterised by an 
approach to savings that treats them more like capital, with the 
expectation of growth over time. As Langley has argued, there has 
been a shift to a market-oriented notion that pockets of money 
can be accumulated to secure individuals against the future. 
Security has become based on investment rather than insurance 
and collectivised risk (Langley 2006:920). The idea is that money 
or assets can be put aside so that welfare needs can be ‘bought’ 
in the market place rather than being available as social services 
when required. In a situation where money is rapidly entering 
the economy and asset prices are rising, this seems a reasonable 
option despite the fact that inflation more generally acts against 
all sorts of money-based saving such as pensions or trusts. The 
ideal is inflation in the investment market and stable prices in the 
consumer market. For a time the flood of money coming into the 
financial sector and the globalisation of production to minimise 
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wage costs seemed to offer this ideal combination for the Anglo-
American economies.
Pensions are an area where there has been a marked shift to the 
idea of investing in individualised wealth. Traditionally people had 
relied on their employer or the state to secure their pensions. In the 
1970s the British Conservative government created incentives for 
people to opt out of work-based pension schemes and accumulate 
a ‘personal pot’ of savings and insurance. Many people were 
persuaded by commission-hungry salespeople to dump their 
company pension for a private one. This meant that they lost the 
employers’ contribution to their pension and were also thrown 
on the mercy of the financial sector. Often these problems were 
not clearly explained, which resulted in a mis-selling scandal with 
pension companies being forced to pay compensation to around 
5 million people. As with many financial investments, as money 
initially poured in returns looked very good, but as soon as the 
market turned, people faced an impoverished old age (Blackburn 
2006). One mutual, Equitable Life, made the fatal mistake of 
guaranteeing a pension level to some of its savers which resulted in 
the collapse of the company as it became clear that such a promise 
was impossible to keep in fluctuating markets. Money purchase 
pensions also required huge ‘pension pots’ to create a reasonable 
pension income. In 2008 in Britain a pension pot of £100,000 
would give an annual pension of under £5,000 a year and by 
2009 this would be even lower as interest rates fell to 0.5 per 
cent. It is very unlikely that many people will have accumulated 
enough money in their private sector schemes to produce even 
this level of pension.
One of the claims for the democratisation of investment is 
the participation of many people in the stock market through 
institutional investors. In the US and UK before the crash, 
institutional investors held 40 per cent of the equity in the top 
500 companies (Glyn 2007:55). However, Stanford argues that 
pensions cannot be the basis of a ‘people’s capitalism’ as they have 
never formed a major part of share ownership, particularly in the 
US. Stanford claims US pension investments peaked at around 9 
per cent in 1990 and had fallen to under 7 per cent by 2006. For 
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Britain the starting point was better, taking around 32 per cent of 
share investment in 1990, representing the strength of company 
pension schemes. However by 2006 this had collapsed to under 
13 per cent (Stanford 2008:222). Investing in the stock market 
also had a very negative effect on pensions. Seeing the rising stock 
market value of their funds companies took pension holidays. 
They did not take account of the inevitable share falls as capitalism 
went through its business cycle. Firms did not secure their pension 
funds against difficult times and certainly did not put in enough to 
cover the possibility of share collapse. Royal Mail, BT and even the 
Bank of England had taken pension holidays. These left large holes 
in British pension funds totalling around £200 billion by 2008 and 
many funds shut their doors to new members or closed altogether. 
By 2009 very few defined benefit schemes were left where pensions 
were defined by length of employment or proportion of salary 
rather than economic performance.
The pension debacle is a good example of the total inappro-
priateness of a market approach to provisioning. It reveals a 
complete lack of economic wisdom and foresight on the part of 
major employers who did not anticipate the problems that would 
be created by the business cycle. It would be even worse if they 
knew full well what would happen when the stock market turned, 
but did not care. Even if they had been successful, occupational 
pension schemes only covered a minority of the population. Most 
people’s only support in old age would be the state. Similarly, 
direct or indirect investment in the stock market was only open 
to a minority of the population. They are the ‘fortunate 40 
percent’ of relatively wealthy households (Froud et al. 2001:72). 
This group has the majority of disposable income and accounts 
for 80 per cent of private and occupational pensions and their 
personalised savings directly accelerates inequality and privilege 
(Froud et al. 2001:76).
These people are the basis of what Lawson has referred to 
as the ‘turbo consumer society’ (2009:52). Lawson traces the 
turbo consumer society back to the ideas of the Austrians, Ludwig 
von Mises and Friedrich von Hayek. They argued against public 
expenditure in favour of private expenditure with a small state, 
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low taxes and free markets which led to the whole panoply of 
privatisation and ‘greed is good’ (Lawson 2009:89). From the 
perspective of the investment winners the model seemed to hold 
good. According to Ann Pettifor, between 1982 and 2004 world 
average income rose only threefold whereas world financial assets 
increased in value 32 times: ‘it turns out that working for a living 
over this period was most unrewarding. Earning rent on assets, 
by contrast, was immensely rewarding’ (Pettifor 2006:80).
The privatised ideology of the financialised turbo consumer 
society encouraged people to join the private financial sector 
through the privatisation of public assets and the demutualisa-
tion of collective assets. During the rounds of privatizations under 
the British Conservative government in the 1980s people were 
encouraged to buy shares in previously publicly owned utilities 
such as telephones, gas and water. This resulted in many people 
joining the stock market for the first time. The privatisation 
policy initiated in the UK became a major aspect of neo-liberal 
policy around the world. People were encouraged to think of 
themselves as shareholders in the great capitalist bonanza, rather 
than members of mutual organisations or citizens. Britain had seen 
a major programme of nationalisation following World War II 
and had a long history of people engaging in structures of mutual 
financial support, such as friendly societies, insurance societies 
and building societies. Such organisations represented major 
solidaristic and collective innovation by working class people. 
Some had grown into large organisations such as the Halifax 
Building Society and the Trustee Savings Bank, both of which 
ended up as part of Lloyds Bank.
For the building societies, demutualisation was a response to 
competition from banks when credit restrictions were removed. 
Also, as building societies, they could not access the burgeoning 
money markets in the same way as banks. Following Abbey 
National’s lead in 1988 others followed, some willingly, while 
others were driven by the activities of ‘carpet baggers’. When 
building societies demutualised, in some cases members were 
issued with a block of shares regardless of how much they had 
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invested. This meant that someone with £1,000 would get the 
same as someone with £100,000, usually a hundred or so shares. 
When these were traded on the stock market the owner got a 
windfall, in many cases much more than £1,000. This led to 
a tragic episode where people who probably had little care or 
interest in mutual societies spread their savings around several 
societies and led the pressure to demutualise, thereby making 
extensive windfall profits. As a result, the collective assets of 
more than a hundred years of working class savings passed to 
the capitalist financial sector. In the early 1970s there were over 
150 building societies with total deposits of around £150 billion: 
by the end of 2008 there were only just over a third left. The 
remaining building societies tightened up their rules to prevent 
carpetbagging, but the damage had been done and working class 
savings were put at the mercy of the capitalist markets.
In 2007 the nationalisation of the former building society 
turned bank, Northern Rock, made clear the problem some people 
had distinguishing between share-holding and saving. 11 per cent 
of the shares were held by staff and more than 20 per cent by 
hedge funds, but the most vocal were the small shareholders, 
many of whom had retained the shares they had been allocated 
when the company converted from a building society. They saw 
these shares as ‘savings’ rather than ‘investments’ which could 
rise and fall. One woman interviewed in the media said she had 
lost her ‘life savings’. Her shares had been worth £12,000 at 
their peak (£12 per share) but their value had now collapsed to 
a few hundred pounds at most. A spokesperson for the Northern 
Rock Small Shareholders Group said that nationalisation meant 
that the bank was being ‘stolen’ away from them. This left the 
government in a difficult position because it was being challenged 
to compensate shareholders for their losses. By 2008 all the 
privatised building societies had failed or had been absorbed by 
other banks. Following the banking crisis the remaining building 
societies saw their deposits rise dramatically as people returned 
to the safety of mutual savings.
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housing: home or asset?
Housing has been central to both the boom and the bust in the 
Anglo-American economies. Mortgage debt has been a major 
aspect of money creation in the second half of the twentieth 
century, accounting for up to 80 per cent of personal debt in 
the US and 60 per cent of bank loans (Phillips 2008:32). Finan-
cialisation of housing meant that homes were no longer seen as 
just places to live, but as a store of wealth. As house values rose, 
homes were seen as a kind of milch cow that could be milked 
for consumer spending or for life cycle costs such as college fees, 
health care needs or income in old age. House ownership was also 
a source of status, particularly in the UK and the US. Renting was 
seen as something poor people did, it was a waste of money as 
it did not accrue a financial asset. To have a mortgage was not a 
debt, but an investment.
Anglo-American ‘home ownership ideology’ is not universal. 
Spain and Greece, for example, have home ownership levels of 
over 80 per cent compared with 70 per cent in the UK and US 
and similar economies such as Australia, yet the latter have a 
much stronger link to market relations and neo-liberalism (Ronald 
2008:2). Ronald’s explanation is that much of the housing in 
economies such as Spain and Greece is rural and traditional with 
owner occupation linked to long term family residence. I can 
confirm from my own experience that rural property was once 
seen as having little or no value and could even be seen as a 
liability. My own family inherited cottages in a Cornish fishing 
village. In the 1950s they had no value as they were tumble down 
and without facilities. My father was trying to give them away. 
By the time of the crash those cottages were premium ‘quaint’ 
second homes changing hands for up to £400,000.
Ronald sees a commodified housing market as accompanying 
urbanisation and industrialisation. However, even in some 
urbanised societies, there is not such an ideological commitment 
to home-ownership. For example, in much of Europe there is very 
little stigma attached to rented housing (Ronald 2008:xi). Even 
public ownership is not necessarily a problem. In Singapore all 
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housing is built and mortgaged by the state, with owner-occupied 
tenure for 99 years (Ronald 2008:6). One result of treating homes 
as financial assets is that British housing value is much higher in 
comparison to GDP than the European average. Based on 2005 
figures, Ronald points out that housing equity in the EU is around 
40 per cent of GDP whereas in the UK it is more than double GDP 
(£3.8 trillion to GDP £1.5 trillion) and housing debt is around 
one-third of GDP in Europe compared to 80 per cent in the UK 
(£800bn) (2008:3).
Home ownership in Britain and the US was strongly supported 
by government policy. Before World War I most people in Britain 
rented privately, but by the end of the century the position 
was largely reversed with the majority being owner-occupiers. 
Support was provided through government support for expanded 
building society activity, municipal mortgages and mortgage 
tax relief, although from the 1970s the latter was reduced 
and then abolished. In the US home ownership was actively 
encouraged and underwritten by the state through the home 
loan organisations Fannie Mae and then Freddie Mac. Fannie 
Mae, the Federal National Mortgage Agency, was created by 
the Roosevelt government to provide mortgage funds following 
the Depression, and Freddie Mac, the Federal Home Mortgage 
Corporation, was created in 1970 to provide competition for 
Fannie Mae. Mortgages were long term and fixed rate. The 
Labour Party in Britain did promote public sector housing 
which rose to around 30 per cent of total housing by the 1970s. 
However, successive Conservative governments raised the cost 
of public housing substantially, and encouraged tenants to buy 
their council houses with deep discounts. As a result, more than 
2 million homes transferred to the private sector. House building 
by local authorities also effectively ceased and restrictions were 
put on municipal mortgages. Local public housing was replaced 
by social housing built through housing associations and funded 
by a national body, the Housing Corporation.
The collapsing housing market in the US and the UK in 2006–07 
marked the end of a remarkable era when home ownership had 
been a key aspect of most people’s lives and expectations. Much 
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of this was related to the incredible boom in house prices that 
made housing an important area of speculative growth and capital 
accumulation for buyers, builders and lenders. House prices in 
Britain had been rising since the early 1970s and particularly 
at the end of the 1980s before they fell back during 1988–92. 
Prices started to rise again rapidly from 1995 and particularly 
from 2000 in a huge bubble of house price inflation that followed 
the end of the dotcom boom. As prices rose people were able to 
raise more debts on the increased value of their housing through 
‘equity release’. Applying the concept of equity release to taking 
a second mortgage or trading down the housing market to release 
value indicates the way this growth in value was perceived. 
Rather than being seen as house price inflation, or evidence of an 
unsustainable boom, house-owners were encouraged to see these 
gains as permanent, even though the period from 1988 to 1992 
in Britain was recent evidence that house prices could fall sharply.
Rising house prices, or more correctly house price inflation, 
encouraged the view of homes as assets. Housing had become 
monetised or ‘propertized’ (Ronald 2008:112). The housing market 
seemed to be able to create wealth out of nowhere which, given the 
huge shift to bank-based credit money creation, is exactly what it 
was doing. House price inflation created ideological support for 
financialisation, capital accumulation and the capitalist market 
system. Middle England didn’t seem to mind the rich getting 
markedly richer and the number of billionaires increasing, when 
annual house price rises could be higher than annual wages, which 
were generally stagnant or falling in real terms. Treating housing 
as a rising and secure financial asset also allowed neo-liberal 
policy makers to encourage the idea of asset-based welfare; that 
is, the house can be seen as a source of money for the future when 
needed. As Ronald argues, ‘Whether or not owner-occupied homes 
can effectively provide insurance against the risks of economic 
conditions is highly questionable, and they may constitute greater 
exposure to risk…what is constructed as security, opportunity 
and choice…is essentially risk’ (2008:109). This is particularly 
the case where people were encouraged to ‘release equity’ which 
actually meant taking out a loan and putting their house at risk 
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if they could not pay, or ceding their home to a finance company 
in return for cash or an income. An asset-based welfare system 
with its promises of opportunity and choice will inevitably be 
undermined if asset prices start to drop. There is also a conflict 
in seeing a house as an asset for personal security and as an asset 
for family wealth. Homeowners may not, in practice, be happy 
to see their homes sold to pay for care in old age, instead of being 
passed on to their children as an inheritance.
Engagement with financial markets also had further manifes-
tations within the housing sector. In Britain one was the formal 
linking of mortgages to the stock market through so-called 
endowment mortgages. These were launched in the 1980s. Interest 
was paid to the mortgage company, but the capital sum of the loan 
was invested in the stock market. These mortgages were slightly 
cheaper than traditional repayment mortgages and were sold 
aggressively. At their peak up to 80 per cent of UK mortgages were 
endowment-based. This very large swing of money to the stock 
market could arguably explain the long stock market boom. As is 
usual in new markets, the first people to take out these mortgages 
made a lot of money but as the market peaked those last in were 
left with deficits. Houses were also bought directly as financial 
assets through ‘buy-to-let’. This resulted in an expansion of the 
private rented sector, with many of the new tenants being people 
who could not afford to buy houses. The UK Council of Mortgage 
Lenders reported in 2006 that 750,000 buy-to-let mortgages had 
been granted since 1996. The buy-to-let market was helped by the 
fact that from 1996 people had been able to buy with interest-only 
mortgages, coupled with very low interest rates. For one building 
society turned bank, Bradford and Bingley, buy-to-lets accounted 
for up to a half of its mortgage book with securitisation providing 
a similar proportion of its funding. This contributed to its collapse 
in 2008. Similar problems were experienced by other building 
societies including the West Bromwich and the Dunfermline. 
The speculation in buy-to-let, together with large scale building, 
particularly of inner city flats, led to many buy-to-let owners 
facing severe deficits and repossession. Often tenants, through 
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no fault of their own, found themselves evicted at short notice 
when owners defaulted.
One of the main triggers of the financial crisis was lending to 
subprime borrowers. Subprime borrowers are those without a 
credit record, with a bad credit record or no deposit and low, 
insecure income or even no income. With so much cheap money 
sloshing around the money markets and the boom in house prices, 
even very marginal people began to look profitable, particularly 
as they could be charged higher rates of interest. Potential 
homeowners, or those with low, or no, debt on their homes, 
were often seduced by promises of low interest rates, although 
the small print said that rate would only prevail for a short time, 
sometimes only a month or even a day. People were able to self-
certificate their earnings. Earnings were often exaggerated, either 
by the borrower or the salesperson drawing up the contract. Some 
loans were described as ‘NINJA’ loans – no income, no job, no 
assets. House buyers in the US were particularly vulnerable to 
sales pressure because they often did not understand the new 
forms of mortgage on offer. They had been accustomed to fixed 
rate mortgages for 30 years and many were sitting on houses with 
a high capital value. They were faced with tempting sounding 
options that would ‘release capital’ from their homes or allow 
them to become homeowners for the first time. They were offered 
adjustable rate loans rather than the fixed rate they were used 
to, piggyback loans, short term teaser rates, low interest or 
interest-only mortgages that appeared to be within borrowers’ 
means, but with no mechanism for repayment or analysis of future 
capacity to pay. Rather cynically, some of these were christened 
‘neutron’ loans which, like neutron bombs, were designed to 
impact on people without damaging the economic viability of 
property. With interest rates very low and existing financial 
institutions finding it difficult to make a profit, even well known 
high street banks entered the subprime market.
Until things went very wrong, subprime lending was seen as 
helping disadvantaged groups to access the housing market. The 
African-American community, in particular, was excluded from 
commercial and government sponsored mainstream mortgage 
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finance through ‘redlining’, that is, areas where loans were not 
made as they were thought to be more risky. From the late 1960s 
onwards a series of reforms aimed to end redlining including the 
1968 Fair Housing Act, 1974 Equal Credit Opportunity Act, Home 
Mortgage Disclosure Act 1975 and Community Reinvestment 
Act of 1977 (Dymski 2007:8). Because of this history of dis-
crimination, the US government did nothing to halt the growth 
in subprime lending, and even encouraged it, as it seemed to be 
offering the chance of home ownership to the excluded poor. 
The 1977 Community Reinvestment Act had put the onus on US 
banks to provide financial services to poor communities. President 
Clinton used this legislation to urge banks to expand their lending 
to financially excluded groups. This took subprime loans from 5 
per cent of the total in 1998 to 30 per cent of the total by 2007. 
Interest-only mortgages became very prevalent towards the end 
of the housing boom. As these mortgages did not necessarily have 
any mechanism to repay the capital, they were arguably much 
worse for the holder than renting. Scurlock reports that by 2007 
half of new mortgages in California were interest-only; in the 
UK at least 30 per cent were interest-only (2007:38). Not all the 
subprime loans were what they seemed. Dymski quotes a study 
that showed that many of those acquiring subprime mortgages in 
the US should have been eligible for a conventional loan: up to 51 
per cent in 2005 and up to 61 per cent in 2006 (Dymski 2007:15). 
However, by this stage the commercial benefit of making subprime 
loans outweighed any concern for the economic status of the 
people concerned.
In the UK one of the most active banks in the field of 
‘democratised’ lending was Northern Rock, which provided 
mortgages for people who were trying to enter the housing market 
for the first time (Walters 2008:33). It lent to people who did not 
have deposits and would lend up to six times income. There was 
general recognition that young people were finding it hard to get 
on the property ladder and Northern Rock was seen as a bank that 
would help them do so. It was also willing to lend more than the 
value of the house through its ‘Together’ loans that allowed people 
to borrow 125 per cent of the value of a property. This meant 
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the bank was very exposed to non-payment or to a fall in house 
prices. It was also very exposed to securitisation which led to its 
collapse in September 2007 (Brummer 2008:7). The subprime 
crisis heralded that the dream was over and by 2009 one in nine 
UK mortgage-holders were thought to be in negative equity. 
House prices had fallen substantially and the housing market 
had stalled. The US market had also collapsed with price drops 
of up to 50 per cent with forecasts of foreclosures of between 1 
and 2 million. Phillips sees the cost of the housing crash in the 
US as reaching $10 trillion, about half of total housing market 
value, with major parallels to the 1930s housing crash, when 10 
per cent of homes foreclosed (2008:12).
One of the many negative aspects of the financialisation of 
housing was the failure to see it as an inflationary boom. While 
it lasted, the rapidly rising prices resulted in a massive transfer 
of wealth between the generations. The older generation who 
had benefitted from the rising price of property during the boom 
years were selling to the young who were having to pay for 
that wealth through their own debt. Many young people were 
priced out of the housing market, but those who did buy were 
mortgaging themselves very heavily, sometimes up to seven times 
household income. Equally, those who were ‘releasing’ the value 
of their homes with new mortgages were taking on more debt. 
The wealth that had been wrapped up in housing was being sold 
via securitised equity release and new mortgage vehicles. The 
accumulated value of generations was being turned back into 
debt, while the assets themselves tumbled in price. It remains to 
be seen what the economic hangover of this financial binge will 
be. Whatever the outcome, debt will be an important aspect. 
As Scurlock puts it, homes were a ‘debt-delivery mechanism’ 
(2007:33) where, until the crash, Americans were ‘making money 
selling each other houses with money borrowed from the Chinese’ 
(2007:27). The money borrowed from the Chinese was, in fact, 
recycled dollars from the US balance of payments deficit. Through 
its cheap labour and trading dominance China was accumulating 
large amounts of dollars which it returned to the US mainly by 
buying US government debt and helping to keep interest rates low. 
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While it would not be correct to blame the Chinese for the ills 
of American financial capitalism, certainly in a boom people do 
make money, quite literally through borrowing, and that is why 
booms are so very hard to stop as no-one wants to spoil the party.
debt as development
While mortgages were a major source of debt-based money 
issue in the latter half of the twentieth century, debt was also 
being seen as an instrument of social policy. Given that debt has 
been so central to the development of modern economies, it is 
not surprising that debt should be seen as an agent of economic 
development. Hernando de Soto has long promoted the idea of 
granting property rights to poor households so that they have 
assets against which to raise credit at a reasonable price (2000:24). 
As a policy instrument, the use of debt to enhance development 
gained its most public profile through the work of Mohammad 
Yunus and the idea of microcredit.
In 1976, Mohammad Yunus gave small loans to buy working 
materials to some craftworkers in Bangladesh who were being 
forced to borrow small sums from traders and money lenders 
at extortionate rates. Yunus’s loans substantially improved the 
economic viability of the borrowers and the loans were readily 
repaid. This led to the founding of the Grameen Bank in 1982. By 
1998 it had over a thousand branches employing around 12,000 
people lending to more than 2 million borrowers. Loan defaults 
were very low initially at around 2 per cent but rose somewhat over 
time (Affleck and Mellor 2003:33). The principles of microcredit 
are that loans are very small and borrowers are not required to 
demonstrate prior possession of savings or collateral. In fact, loans 
are targeted at those who do not have assets or banking access. 
Under the Grameen principle, borrowers are brought together 
in small groups and collectively guarantee repayment. This puts 
considerable peer pressure on individual borrowers and also 
has the effect of putting the risk and costs of default on to the 
borrowers themselves. Interest rates are quite high for borrowers, 
although still much lower than money-lender rates. This is because 
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the loans have to cover administration and training costs which 
are high in relation to the small sums being handed out. Yunus 
was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2006 and his movement 
has spread even to the heart of capitalism in New York City, 
where a branch has been set up in a low-income area to counter 
the explosive growth of expensive payday loan companies, cheque 
cashers and pawn shops. Microcredit became an important aspect 
of development programmes with a microcredit summit held in 
Washington DC in 1997 and the General Assembly of the UN 
declaring 2005 the International Year of Microcredit.
Unlike ‘top down’ development projects, microcredit was seen 
as a ‘bottom up’ approach enabling people to escape permanently 
from the bondage of poverty by achieving social change through 
economic empowerment. It was to be a market solution to 
poverty (Affleck and Mellor 2006:309). Microcredit would 
tap the potential for entrepreneurship that was assumed to lie 
within the community itself. The main barrier was seen as lack of 
financial access. The market was ready and waiting, all that was 
missing was some financial credit and business training. Through 
microcredit people, particularly women, were encouraged to 
borrow and invest their way out of poverty. Its supporters claim 
that many millions of people have been helped and that local 
economies can be invigorated by small scale injections of cash 
and people can be empowered by taking control of their own 
livelihoods. By December 2002 there were nearly 70 million 
clients linked to over 3,000 microcredit organisations and around 
two-thirds of the borrowers were women (Fernando 2006:1). The 
centrality of women borrowers is a very notable feature of the 
microcredit movement, although there is debate about whether it 
achieves women’s economic empowerment (Pearson 2001:312).
Some commentators argue that the good intentions of the 
microcredit movement are distorted in practice by the wider 
framework of financial drivers. As the microcredit approach to 
development has become more mainstream, it is losing its local and 
personal focus. As Fisher and Sriram argue, microcredit has tended 
to become a top down policy, seen as an end in itself rather than a 
means to other more socially-based development approaches. They 
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subtitle their book ‘putting development back into microfinance’ 
(2002). Fernando, in his study of microcredit in Bangladesh and 
Sri Lanka, also noted that a large number of mainstream banks 
were entering the field, indicating that microfinance was moving 
up market with less concern for the very poor. Fernando also 
notes the pressure that funders were putting on NGOs to show 
early results from microcredit initiatives. Ensuring success meant 
excluding the poorest and putting pressure on borrowers: ‘the 
so-called collateral-free lending practices of the NGOs not only 
exclude the poorest of the poor but, even more strikingly, also 
function as mechanisms of controlling and disciplining the lives 
of the borrowers’ (Fernando 2006:26). Borrowers were often 
expected to start repayments immediately, rather than allowing 
enterprises to grow. Overemphasis on microfinance also led some 
NGOs virtually to become banks.
Fernando fears that notions of bottom up self-help could mask 
the withdrawal of state responsibility for the needs of the poor: ‘the 
language of reliance, self sufficiency and empowerment through 
microfinance appear to be extremely productive given that they 
simultaneously provide legitimacy for the withdrawal of the state 
from development, and creates conditions for capitalist expansion’ 
(2006:21). Fernando points out that at present 80 per cent of the 
world’s population live mainly within the informal sector without 
access to finance. If through judicious use of credit these people 
could be encouraged to create their own economic dynamism, 
this would have a range of benefits for capitalism. As well as 
making up for the lack of a welfare state, or the problems of the 
wider economy, it would help support underpaid workers and, 
in the longer run, provide new markets (Fernando 2006:17–18).
The main challenge is whether finance through debt can achieve 
economic development for poorer communities. One of the main 
aims of microcredit is to create microenterprises that would 
eventually be able to access mainstream bank credit and grow 
into larger enterprises that could build a local economy. Margolis 
suggests that microcredit is not economically feasible for the very 
poor, and points out that the Brazilian government has had to pick 
up nearly half the lenders’ costs for a credit programme covering 
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1.3 million subsistence farmers (Margolis 2007). Another problem 
is that there may not be the level of untapped entrepreneurship that 
the microcredit approach would hope. Evidence from interviews 
with micro-lenders in the UK indicate that making credit available 
is unlikely to stimulate widespread economic activity, in fact 
many lenders were having trouble getting their money ‘out of 
the doors’ (Affleck and Mellor 2006:314). As an earlier study 
of the formation of worker co-operatives in the face of factory 
closure indicated, it is very hard for people to enter a market that 
has already excluded them (Mellor et al. 1988:79). It increases 
economic pressures on those who are already marginalised within 
the wider economic community if they also have to take on debt. 
Debt-free credit might be more successful, but this is not what is 
on offer within market oriented microcredit: it is credit as debt. 
A more promising aspect of the microfinance movement is to 
provide funding for social enterprises (Pearce 2003:106). These 
are organisations founded on democratic principles that trade for 
social benefit. Such organisations cannot be judged by market tests 
of viability. They are set up to serve poor communities and the 
most appropriate form of funding would be a grant or interest-free 
loan, or a combination of both.
debt and capitalism
The rising level of debt has been central to economic growth 
within the UK and US economies, particularly the expansion of 
personal and mortgage debt. Phillips calculates that, before its 
collapse, the US housing sector and its services, with $12 trillion 
of mortgage debt, represented 25 per cent of GDP and 40 per cent 
of US growth (Phillips 2008:11). Equity release through refinanced 
mortgages alone accounted for 20 per cent of US growth in 
2002, while in the UK households took out the equivalent of 
$19 billion worth of refinanced mortgages in the third quarter 
of 2002 alone (Harvey 2003:112–13). Lawson argues that house 
prices drove the UK consumer boom with £246 billion of equity 
wealth being withdrawn from housing in the ten years to 2009 
(Lawson 2009:83). By the latter part of the twentieth century, 
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debt had become an important element in sustaining household 
expenditure in the face of stagnating incomes (Panitch and 
Konings 2009:72). In the short term, together with globalised 
cheap labour goods, this appeared to overcome Marx’s prediction 
that capitalism would be in crisis if the mass of the people in 
society did not receive enough in wages to enable them to buy 
the products of the economy. However, the danger in relying on 
debt to maintain the dynamics of the economy is that it depends 
on people’s willingness, or ability, to take on debt and, as later 
became apparent, the willingness of banks to make loans. As 
Harvey has argued, ‘ever expanding endebtedness is a perilous 
way to keep consumerism alive’ (Harvey 2003:77).
Writing in the Guardian newspaper in 2003, Wynne Godley 
and Alex Izurieta argued that the only driving force for the 
British economy since 1997 had been household expenditure 
(and household debt) with the ratio of debt to income rising 
to 120 per cent by 2002–03 (22 July 2003). Phillips describes 
Anglo-Saxon speculative capitalism as being an orgy of credit 
and debt with governments and economists turning a blind eye 
to the dangerous growth in private debt. In 2007 US private 
(financial, personal, mortgage and corporate) debt was $37 trillion 
as opposed to government debt (federal, state and local) of $11 
trillion. This total of $48 trillion had grown from $10.5 trillion 
in 1987. Phillips notes that this is three times larger than US GDP 
and is very similar in ratio to the position in 1929 when debt was 
287 per cent of GDP (2008:181). Even so, debt generated growth 
was reaching its limit: in the US by September 2003 it was taking 
six dollars of extra debt to generate one dollar of growth.
The dilemma for the financialised Anglo-American economies 
was that debt had become a (failing) agent of growth and a 
heavy burden to borrowers. Elastic debt issue may have enabled 
capitalism to expand, but it has severe limitations as a solution 
to poverty and has led to immense inequality. As Smithin has 
argued against de Soto’s case for property title and access to credit 
as a source of future wealth, capacity for earning money is also 
important (Smithin 2009:63). When the only source of future 
income is more debt being issued, it cannot be a secure source 
Mellor 01 text   79 23/02/2010   15:07
80  The FuTure oF Money
of wealth. Japan is a clear example of the limits of debt-based 
growth with its seemingly unmovable debt overhang (Krugman 
2008:56). While bank issue of debt money has been central to 
the growth of capitalism, it has its own limits and contradictions. 
When debt issue becomes the only engine of capitalist growth it 
must eventually come up against Marx’s contradiction that, if 
profit is to be extracted, people will not have sufficient money to 
enable them to consume all the goods produced, even with debt. 
The debt machine must run out of steam.
conclusion
A substantial minority of people have become entangled with 
the financial system in many ways. They have become heavily 
involved in financial investments through pension funds and 
other sorts of invested savings. At first these investments made 
the capitalist system seem like a horn of plenty as they tapped 
new sources of money. The privatisation of public utilities and 
conversion of mutual societies to private companies also produced 
a new generation of shareholders. As a result, a large number of 
people have experienced the roller coaster of capitalist boom and 
slump. They have also become involved, actively or passively, in 
asset price inflation, mainly through housing. While some people 
have treated housing as a capital investment, many others have 
more passively experienced house prices rises and therefore have 
shared the expectation that they, or their family, will benefit from 
a highly valued home. If house prices collapse, as some people 
predict, by between 40 and 50 per cent in real terms over time, 
these expectations stand to be disappointed. At the same time 
many families, rich and poor, are facing unprecedented levels 
of debt. Governments are struggling to get lending going, but it 
may be that people have reached their absolute limits. There is 
no growth left within the household sector and as this has largely 
driven the booms, there is nowhere to go.
The full economic and political consequences of the Anglo-
American experiment in financialising private life remains to be 
seen. The Great Depression in the 1930s in the US and UK brought 
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about radical change towards the left. In Germany, economic 
collapse brought fascism. The difference may well depend upon 
which politicians and leaders seize the moment. There is a danger 
that the collapse of the economy together with the collapse of the 
dreams of people caught up in it, will lead to a profound distrust 
of the economic and political process. The capacity of democratic 
leaders to respond to this disillusionment will depend upon the 
extent to which they understand the underlying problems of the 
economy, in particular the vital role played by the capitalist capture 
of the issue and circulation of money. This will be discussed in 
the next chapter.
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credIt and caPItalIsm
As previous chapters have shown, credit is essential to 
contemporary capitalism. This is for three reasons. The first 
reason would be common to all businesses whether capitalist or 
not. Money is needed to enable the productive or trading process 
to start. Producers need to purchase raw materials, machinery 
and labour to create products before they can be sold. Traders 
need money to buy goods to trade before they can sell them to 
customers. For small traders this money may be provided by 
family members, but even that money must also have been issued 
at some point. Money has to come into being whether as tangible 
currency such as coins or beads, or as less tangible credit. A trader 
may get goods from a producer on credit pending sale. The credit 
notes that traders issued formed one of the origins of the modern 
banking system. The case made in Chapter 1 is that money does 
not emerge from a prior exchange of goods: the issue of money as 
credit is the start of the production and exchange process. Banks 
have played a major part in the issue of money as credit, that is, 
as debt to the borrower.
The second reason is that while producers and traders need 
credit to start the economic process, customers also need credit 
to be able to purchase goods. This is either because the goods 
are too expensive for cash payment such as a house or a car, or 
people do not have enough money to buy the goods produced. 
Running up debts to enable consumption goes back a very 
long way. Inheritors of feudal property rapidly converted this 
into cash by taking out mortgages, quite literally a debt until 
death (Rowbotham 1998:31). More recently, and more specific 
to capitalism, consumers have needed to borrow to maintain 
82
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consumption because they do not earn enough to purchase the 
goods produced. This is the classic dilemma for capitalism that 
Marx identified. Workers’ wages are much less than the value 
of the goods they produce. The difference, the surplus value 
created, contributes to the profit of the business. The problem 
comes when those goods come to market and there is not enough 
money circulating through wages to enable people to buy all 
the goods. If another market cannot be found, the surplus value 
cannot be ‘realised’ through the sale of all the goods. Enabling the 
consumer to access credit whether through hire purchase, deferred 
payment, personal credit or second mortgages on homes bridges 
the gap and enables the purchase of all the goods on offer. This 
does not solve the basic problem: it defers it until people become 
so indebted that they cannot afford any more credit. 
The third reason is the most important for capitalism. If capital 
is to accumulate there must always be new money coming into the 
system. Capitalism must expand or die. This is because of the way 
capitalism functions and the role of money in enabling profit to 
be extracted from the circuit of production and exchange. Marx 
made a clear distinction between commodity exchange through 
markets and capitalist exchange. As discussed in Chapter 1, in 
commodity exchange money is the medium which enables goods 
to be offered for sale and purchased. A commodity is sold for 
money and the money is then used to buy another commodity 
(C – M – C). Capitalism is very different. The motive for making 
the commodity in the first place is to make money. Money is 
therefore invested in commodity production with the aim of 
selling that commodity at a profit, that is, M – C – M+. Whereas 
the first system could operate on a steady state basis without 
necessarily dramatically expanding the money supply, the second 
must have a continually growing supply of money to create the 
desired profit. The desire to extract more money than is put in 
to the process through wages and other costs is a dilemma for 
capitalism. Within the circuit of production and exchange, more 
money must come from somewhere if profit is to be made and 
capital is to accumulate. Therefore to make this circuit possible 
new money must continually enter the system.
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For this reason, the way money is issued as credit in a capitalist 
economy cannot rely on obtaining credit from prior savings as 
this is not new money. Therefore lending, as discussed in Chapter 
2, cannot be related to some previous stock of money issued, but 
must reflect a bank’s willingness to create liquidity, that is, to 
create more money. While it may be possible for one capitalist 
to extract more money from the economy than was put in during 
production (as wages, cost of raw materials etc.), this cannot 
be done for the economy as a whole. As Smithin points out, for 
capitalism to survive it must require someone to hold a deficit, 
that is, go into debt. Debt is therefore central to capitalism. Money 
profits are enabled by money creation over and above the initial 
costs of production: ‘in capitalism, the creation of credit is…an 
integral part of the productive system…the realisation of profit’ 
(Smithin 2009:12). Finance, and particularly credit, has been 
central to the growth of the capitalist system. Access to money 
or credit is the most ‘relevant source of power in the capitalist 
system’ (Smithin 2009:72).
From Finance capital to Financialisation
A key stage in the emergence of capitalism was the shift from 
physical ownership to financial ownership. Veblen (1899) and 
Hilferding (1910/1985) both saw the emergence of paper claims 
to productive capacity, that is, the stock market, as a new stage 
in capitalist development from productive capitalism to finance 
capitalism. Paper ownership of productive facilities allowed 
absentee ownership of productive resources, but it also allowed 
capital to accumulate through the buying and selling of shares. 
However, the paper ownership was not the real source of wealth. 
Paper ownership was ‘fictitious’ in the sense that wealth came 
from the real productive sources that the paper represented. 
The main difference between a traditional Marxist approach to 
finance capital and the new financialised regime is that financial 
assets are no longer seen as ‘fictitious’. In the traditional theory 
of finance capital the pieces of paper that were traded through 
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the stock market represented real factories and businesses. The 
paper had no value in itself. Financialisation sees financial assets 
not as representing wealth in the ‘real’ economy, but as wealth 
creating investments in their own right (Wigan 2009). In the new 
financial era ‘there is no necessary connection between productive 
investment and the amassing of financial assets’ (Foster and 
Magdoff 2009:82).
The new era of capitalist finance turned the money system 
into an object of capitalist speculation. Money itself became 
something to be traded as currency controls were removed. 
Daily foreign exchange transactions moved from $570 billion 
in 1989 to $1.9 trillion by 2004 (Epstein 2005:4).The financial 
sector no longer serviced the wider economy: it had become the 
economy, particularly in the US and the UK. Within companies 
financialisation led to the dominance of financial gains and the 
rise in importance of shareholder value, in the banks as much as 
elsewhere. As they were growing very quickly, banks became stars 
of the new financialised world and their share price rose rapidly. 
Financialisation also drove the growth of the money markets 
which fed into the new ways of raising and circulating money. 
The preoccupations and needs of the financial markets began 
to dominate the rest of the economy. The strength of the new 
market in money rested on a stream of liquidity (Langley 2010). 
‘Leverage’ became an important aspect of financial investment, 
that is, speculation with borrowed money or speculation based 
on partial payment of a financial asset (bought ‘on the margin’). 
Financialisation and the new money markets seemed to have the 
Midas touch and this gave rise to the notion of a ‘turbo-capitalism’ 
that seemed to be able to produce unlimited wealth. The market 
could do no wrong and participants in the financial sector were 
lauded and showered with financial rewards.
Financialised capitalism is a stage where money is invested in 
financial assets to create more money (M – M – M+). By 2000 
UK money supply was growing more than twice as fast as GDP 
(Scott Cato 2009:79). Financial gain becomes the only measure 
of successful economic action, summed up in concepts such as the 
bottom line and shareholder value. The money value of an object, 
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asset or activity is much more important than its use or beauty. The 
drive towards the financial sector and prioritising shareholder or 
investor value rather than value to the employee, customer or wider 
society, was not solely driven by accumulation strategies for finance 
capitalism. The financialisation of everyday life (Langley 2008:49) 
meant that pensions increasingly relied on funding through financial 
growth and many people had been seduced into seeing savings as 
investments. Growth in the financial sector eclipsed other sectors 
of the economy. Financial firms and financial assets were much 
more profitable than traditional production and exchange. Profits 
of the US financial sector went from 20 per cent of non-financial 
profits in the 1980s to 50 per cent in 2000 (Glyn 2007:52). With 
little profit to be made in manufacturing, even traditional industries 
turned to investment in financial services. In 2004 40 per cent of 
corporate profits in the US came from financial activities and only 
10 per cent from manufacturing (Phillips 2008:26). By 2008 there 
were two dollars invested in financial assets as against one dollar 
in ‘tangible capital’ (Stanford 2008:219).
State support was vital to the dominance of the financial 
sectors in the US and UK. In 1980s Thatcher’s Britain, as in 
Reagan’s America, the financial sector rose to social and economic 
prominence while the productive sector was run down, particularly 
in industries where trades unions were strong. Factories in Britain 
were dismantled and their assembly lines sometimes taken abroad. 
Basic industries such as mining were closed down as uneconomic. 
The stock market was no longer an engine for raising money for 
the productive sector, but a forum for speculation. In the US more 
than 95 per cent of its activities were speculating and trading in 
already-issued equity: the buying and selling of existing shares 
(Stanford 2008:218). If companies wanted to raise money they 
were more likely to go to a bank or raise money directly on 
the money markets by issuing a bond. Rather than resist finan-
cialisation, the US and UK governments aimed to ride the new 
beast. They sought to be market leaders in global finance. Both 
governments deregulated the financial sector, a policy continued 
by the Democrats and New Labour. ‘Light touch’ regulation was 
promoted despite a history of regular financial crises on a national 
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and international scale, including the secondary banking scandals 
of the 1970s, the Third World debt crisis, the Latin American 
crisis, the Asian crisis, the Savings and Loans problem in the US 
and many others.
While there was certainly ideological pressure for deregulation 
from the free market lobby, it was also clear that governments 
were acceding to the realities of globalised finance capital 
as it escaped from national control. Financialisation, neo-
liberalism and globalisation were driving the policy agenda with 
governments trailing in their wake. Saul sees the development 
of the globalised market system, and the ideology of progress 
by private economic development alone, as beginning with 
the final collapse of the Bretton Woods framework for global 
finance in the early 1970s (2005:55). Market fundamentalism 
then established its ideological and practical dominance through 
the deregulation of financial systems, privatisation of public 
assets and the formation of bodies to promote market ideology 
such as the World Trade Organisation. The financial market was 
seen as particularly efficient in distributing money to the most 
profitable investments. It was even claimed that the operation of 
the international financial market would smooth out the problem 
of volatile currencies, in effect replace the Gold Standard (Bryan 
and Rafferty 2007:32). Speculators would seek out undervalued 
or overvalued currencies and buy or sell them until they reached 
the ‘correct’ level. George Soros was an early exemplar when he 
speculated through his Quantum investment fund against the 
British pound in 1992 leading Britain to pull out of the European 
Exchange Rate Mechanism.
The political dominance of capitalist finance enabled the 
emergence of a new layer of super-rich individuals which led one 
British commentator to ask ‘who runs Britain?’ (Peston 2008). As 
Peston points out, the sums of money earned by ‘uber-capitalists’ 
particularly in the financial sector are ‘absurdly large’ enabling the 
creation of ‘well-heeled dynasties that have not been seen since 
Victorian times’ (Peston 2008:14). Other writers have seen the 
markets as being revered almost as religions, for example Larry 
Elliott and Dan Atkinson’s ‘The Gods that Failed’ (2008) and 
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Thomas Franks’ ‘One Market under God’ (2001). The dominance 
of finance in the late twentieth century was represented by dynamic 
images of finance and speculation. Most of the new recruits were 
young males who were often pictured on the news or in fiction 
shouting into phones in shirt sleeves. Greed was good. Huge 
salaries and bonuses rewarded short-term profits, based on share 
price and turnover, rather than rewarding long-term stewardship. 
The whole of the City was permeated by a bonus culture where 
annual pay of £20 million or even £40 million was not deemed 
excessive. Corporate expenditure and hospitality was extensive. 
John Thain, the ex-CEO of Merrill Lynch, which had had to be 
rescued by Bank of America, reportedly had managed to spend 
a million dollars just refitting his office.
Earnings in hedge funds and private equity companies were 
even higher. Four of the top hedge fund chiefs including George 
Soros were reputed to have earned over $1 billion in 2008. 
Finance-driven wealth was not limited to finance companies. 
Stock options and other incentives to maximise shareholder value 
led the CEOs of the top 500 US companies to move from 30 times 
worker earnings in 1970 to 570 times in 2000. This compared 
with only 10–25 times in Japan and Europe (Glyn 2007:58). 
Unlike the sweatshop workers of the old productive industries, 
there seemed to be no losers in this new breed of capitalism. As 
the stock market rose and profits increased, so did the income of 
pension funds and other investments in financial assets. Inequality 
was growing rapidly with an increasingly impoverished minority 
being left behind, but finance capitalism seemed to be able to 
claim the moral high ground, or at least the political high ground. 
The financial sector also seemed to have the secret of magical 
money making with its opaque science of algorithmic trading 
developed by the so-called ‘rocket scientists’, an alchemy not 
available to ordinary mortals. One UK financial company even 
called itself Alchemy.
Deregulation, and the repeal of laws that separated utility 
banking from investment banking, meant that capitalism was 
once more able to exploit the speculative benefits of access to 
virtually unlimited credit creation. Leverage became the most 
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important tool of financial accumulation. Leverage is just another 
word for debt, but it is the way that the debt is used that is 
important. In the same way that pressure on a small lever can 
move a large boulder, debt piled on a small amount of initial 
investment can vastly increase the profit made. The secret is access 
to cheap credit, borrowed in the short term to make the trade, 
and banks were lending incredibly cheaply to speculative finance 
companies. As Lowenstein records, the failed hedge fund Long 
Term Capital Management (LTCM) was able to access large 
amounts of very cheap credit with virtually no questions asked 
(2001:82). Highly leveraged investment enabled rapid capital 
accumulation, particularly in the activities of hedge funds, private 
equity companies and the privatisation of public assets.
credit and speculation: hedge Funds and derivatives
Hedge funds are mainly private companies that invest money for 
wealthy individuals. Phillips describes them as ‘betting syndicates 
for the very rich’ and estimates that at their height, hedge fund 
activities accounted for up to half of daily trading on the London 
and New York stock exchanges (2008:6). Hedge fund assets are 
often held offshore and investment is usually a minimum of a 
million dollars. Fund managers charge fees of between 1 and 2 
per cent and take 20 per cent of the profits. Their earnings are 
often in excess of $250 million. In January 2007, in the run up 
to the crisis, there were more than 10,000 hedge funds with a 
reported $2.1 trillion in assets (Peston 2008:178). They became 
a major source of income for investment banks, even in Europe. 
In 2007 26 per cent of the revenues of the big European banks 
came from hedge funds (Veneroso 2008).
Access to bank credit is central to financial accumulation in 
hedge funds, even though their investors are already very rich 
people. Leverage greatly enhances the profitability of hedge 
activities and can go up to 40:1 or more (ratio of borrowing 
to investment). The principle is simple. If £100 was invested 
in a stock market or currency gamble which would bring a 
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return of 2 per cent that would bring a total return of £102. 
If however a short term loan of £1,000 at a cost of 1 per cent 
was added that would make an additional £20 profit, less £10 
in interest. The original sum of £100 would now make £112, 
a much better return. The lending bank would have earned a 
substantial fee for a very short term loan. If investors leverage 
up their bets and win, they pocket money made not only by 
their own invested money, but by the privately created resource 
of credit money. Profits on some hedge funds were up to 100 
per cent or more, indicating that the benefit of using leverage 
was enormous.
A major activity of hedge funds is derivative trading. This is 
where productive or financial assets are not traded directly but 
at one remove: in effect, a bet on a future market movement. 
The simplest example is a ‘future’ such as a farmer agreeing 
to sell a crop after the harvest for a particular price. A more 
complex example would be an international trader agreeing a 
price in another currency for delivery in six months time and 
then insuring that price with another company, or agreeing to 
buy that currency at a particular price in the future to make 
sure that any change in currency values would not affect income 
at the point of sale. The usefulness of these types of activities 
makes it very difficult for governments to ban hedging activities 
outright. However, most hedge fund derivative activities are 
purely speculative, that is, there is no underlying exchange of 
goods or services. They gamble on anything, shares, securities, 
futures, currencies. Although the idea of hedging had been around 
for some time, the real growth in hedge funds stemmed from 
the 1970s when exchange rates were floated after the Bretton 
Woods system finally broke down and the dollar was no longer 
pegged to a nominal value in gold. The activities of hedge funds 
can have a major impact in world currency markets. It has been 
estimated that speculation could account for up to 95 per cent 
of daily international currency movements (Stretton 1999:720). 
George Soros’s Quantum Fund bid against sterling in 1992 made 
his fund $1 billion profit in one day.
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The huge growth in hedge funds was enabled by the work 
of Fischer Black, Robert Merton and Myron S. Scholes. In the 
1970s they developed what has become known as the Black–
Scholes model for pricing options, for which Merton and Scholes 
were awarded the Nobel Prize in 1997 (Fischer Black had died 
before the prize was awarded). The Black–Scholes model is a 
formula that enables computerised portfolios of investments in 
complex hedging arrangements. This quantitative or algorithmic 
method enabled fund managers to set up patterns of derivatives 
that off-set each other so that (theoretically) every possibility was 
covered. It was argued that such calculations enabled risk to be 
anticipated and priced. The people who undertook this modelling 
were described as ‘rocket scientists’ as many had science or maths 
degrees. The claim was that the model was so comprehensive in 
guarding against all outcomes that investments using its formula 
were fail-safe.
One of the attractions of hedge funds to investors is that they 
can make money in a rising or a falling market. In a rising market 
they can invest ‘long’, that is buy a share or other financial asset 
at a low price, hoping to sell at a higher price on a later date. In 
a falling market they can go ‘short’, that is, selling an asset they 
do not at that point own, hoping that prices will fall. Sometimes 
the asset sold is borrowed from another owner for a fee. This 
is then sold and the investor/gambler hopes to buy replacement 
assets at a later date at a cheaper price. Sometimes the investor 
goes ‘naked’, that is, they do not have an asset to sell at all. If 
too many investors promise to sell what they do not have, there 
may be no assets available to buy when the time comes to hand 
over the asset. Another way of engaging in speculation on credit 
is to trade ‘on the margin’. This is effectively leveraging without 
borrowing money. The speculator pays part of the price of the 
asset, intending to pay the full amount after the trade. Equally, 
a small sum may be put down in order to secure the option of 
buying or selling something in the future. If all goes well, a lot 
of money is made for very little outlay. If all goes badly, the real 
value of the trade may have to be found.
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One of the more outrageous ways in which banks can be 
embroiled in hedge fund activities is where no actual options were 
bought or sold but the fund took a ‘position’ or side-bet with a 
bank. For a fee, the bank would reimburse the speculator with the 
profit they would have made if the ‘investment’ was successful, 
that is, if the actual price of the stock or security moved in the 
right direction. This is directly equivalent to gambling, with the 
bank acting like a bookmaker in the casino of capitalism (Strange 
1986). Because they are seen as private investment organisations, 
hedge funds are not regulated by the central bank or stock market 
regulators and do not need to be transparent in their dealings. This 
has led to suspicions about their activities and some of the risks 
they take. Derivatives in particular have famously been described 
by the world’s richest man, Warren Buffet, as financial weapons 
of mass destruction. The case made by regulators such as Alan 
Greenspan is that because hedge funds use their own money they 
are not of concern to the regulators. This is certainly not the 
case if hedge funds are leveraging by borrowing from regulated 
banks or, as with Bear Stearns, need rescuing by the state while 
leveraging at 40:1 (Veneroso 2008).
The general acceptance of the proliferation of hedge funds, with 
their lack of transparency and regulation, is surprising given the 
failure of one of the earliest, Long Term Capital Management 
(LTCM), that cost the banks dear. The fund, which launched 
in 1994, was famous because it had among its partners Nobel 
prize-winners Robert Merton and Myron S. Scholes. LTCM 
adopted the highly leveraged hedge fund formula of borrowing 
extensively and building chains of derivative betting ‘on the 
margin’, that is, based on a small outlay and sometimes no outlay. 
For its first few years, LTCM was hugely successful, building its 
partners a capital fund of $5 billion. The Fund initially raised total 
investments of $1.25 billion and arranged credit facilities with 
more than 50 banks. As Lowenstein records, LTCM exploited 
the banks’ hunger for fees driving the most advantageous terms 
with the banks like ‘hopeful parents’ nurturing their ‘incorrigible 
child’ in the hope of future profits. He describes Merrill Lynch and 
Salomon Brothers as the main ‘sugar daddies’ in terms of financing 
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(Lowenstein 2001:82). According to Alan Greenspan, LTCM 
borrowed around $120 billion and had derivative positions worth 
around $1.25 trillion (Greenspan 2008:193–5). As Greenspan 
notes, it was hard to estimate overall leverage, but suggests it 
might have been 35:1. Elliott and Atkinson claim it might have 
been 100:1 (2008:264).
What brought down the fund was something the model was 
supposed to anticipate: the unexpected. In this case it was a 
default on debt by Russia. LTCM found itself with huge potential 
losses on its positions. As the biggest hedge fund, if it had had to 
unwind all its ‘bets’ the impact on the financial markets would 
have been enormous. It was deemed too big to fail and 16 of the 
world’s biggest banks were called in by the Federal Reserve to 
put up rescue money of $3.6 billion to enable LTCM to unwind 
its positions slowly. The case was made to the banks that they 
would lose much more money if LTCM collapsed. Greenspan 
was also proud that no taxpayer’s money was directly involved. 
It is clear from such a statement that the taxpayer is deemed to 
have no interest other than the tax implications of what banks 
do in their name. As Lowenstein puts it, LTCM was ‘not an 
isolated instance but the latest in a series in which an agency of 
the government (or the IMF) has come to the rescue of private 
speculators’ (2001:230). Despite the crash of LTCM and the 
earlier well-publicised example of the collapse of Barings in 1975, 
because of Nick Leeson’s derivative trading, regulators seemed 
very sanguine.
Hedge funds are an emblem of the globalised casino economy, 
with most of their funds held offshore to avoid tax. They have 
had a huge impact on stock markets, currencies and other areas 
of financial speculation. Their very high levels of leverage also 
create great potential for financial volatility. As Janet Bush points 
out: ‘If the hedge fund industry’s positions in the market are 
twenty times the cash they hold, their potential impact on the 
world financial system is about equal to US GDP’ (2006:27). At 
their peak, hedge funds had over $2 trillion invested and the BIS 
estimate of the size of the global derivative market was nearly 
$750 trillion. This compares with total global output of around 
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$60 trillion. Given their need for credit, hedge funds were early 
casualties of the credit crunch. Many were also caught up in the 
subprime market. By 2009 many funds in Europe and the US were 
either closed or running down their activities.
credit-driven Take-overs: Private equity
Private equity firms, like hedge funds, took advantage of the flood 
of cheap money to engage in speculative trading. However, their 
focus is not financial assets and derivatives, but trade in companies. 
Like hedge funds, most private equity firms are not listed on the 
stock exchange and fall outside the regulatory framework. They 
specialise in trading in existing companies, taking over private 
companies or taking stock market companies back into private 
ownership. Making money through mergers and acquisitions and 
asset stripping is not new and was condemned in the early 1970s 
by the British Prime Minister, Ted Heath, as the ‘unacceptable face 
of capitalism’. Private equity firms claim that they are not asset 
strippers but make their money by streamlining a firm, making 
it more ‘efficient’ before selling it on at a profit. Private equity 
firms borrow extensively to buy companies, with a high ratio of 
borrowing to money directly invested. The borrowed money is 
usually placed on the balance sheet of the company purchased, 
rather than on the balance sheet of the private equity company. 
The aim of the private equity investor is to sell the company at a 
profit, despite the heavy debt the business carries. Private equity 
has proved to be very profitable with investors anticipating a 
20 per cent return on their investment within three to six years 
and their activity has led to relatively small groups of people 
controlling company assets worth billions.
In February 2007 the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, declared 
Britain to be one of the number one places in the world for 
private equity. Britain became a haven for private equity because 
it allowed tax relief on interest payments and also had a favourable 
tax rate for investment. Private equity is tax efficient in two ways. 
First, investment through debt is more tax efficient than equity 
finance. Second, a policy change in the UK in the late 1990s to 
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encourage venture capital, that is, capital for new businesses, led to 
capital gains from investment being taxed at 10 per cent. Although 
they were not usually supporting new businesses, private equity 
companies benefited from this change. Also private equity partners 
were able to count their fee income as capital gain, thus paying 
10 per cent tax and not 40 per cent as higher wage earners. One 
private equity director broke cover on this anomaly by pointing 
out that he paid less tax than his cleaning lady. Subsequently UK 
capital gains tax was raised to 18 per cent.
Leveraged private equity companies came to public notice 
through the takeover of the food and tobacco giant Nabisco in 
1979 by the US firm KKR (Kohlberg, Kravis Roberts) (Burrough 
and Helyar 1990). This was followed by a steady stream of 
acquisitions by private equity companies in Britain and the 
US. At its height, one in five private sector workers in Britain, 
around 2.5 million people, were working directly or indirectly 
for a private equity company. This included many well-known 
names: Scottish and Newcastle, Canary Wharf, Anglia Water, 
Thames Water, Madame Tussauds, Kwikfit, Toys R Us, Little 
Chef, New Look, Odeon UCI, Travelodge, Matalan, United 
Biscuits, Associated British Ports, Pizza Express, Phones 4U, NCP, 
Twyford Bathrooms, Birds Eye and Gate Gourmet. The latter saw 
a bitter strike over pay and working conditions.
Several of the buyouts were controversial. When the British 
private equity firm Permira and its partners purchased the 
previously member-based Automobile Association in 2004, there 
was considerable disquiet. It was a very profitable purchase that 
made £300 million profit in three years. The purchase price 
was £1.75 billion, of which £1.3 billion was borrowed. Savings 
were made by cutting the 10,000 AA staff by one-third, and 
de-recognising the GMB trade union. Staff alleged that high 
pressure management tactics were being used and the morale of 
staff was at rock bottom. In 2003, a private equity consortium 
bought the UK department store Debenhams back into private 
ownership from the stock market. Two years later it was sold back 
to the stock market with the investors making more than three 
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times their initial investment. Debenhams was left with debt of 
nearly £2 billion to face difficult trading conditions.
One of the last major private equity purchases before the crash 
was Alliance Boots, bought by a consortium led by KKR and 
an Italian entrepreneur. It was bought in 2007 for £11 billion 
of which £9.3 billion was debt. An investigative team from the 
Guardian newspaper reported that the cost of servicing this debt 
meant that Boots’ debt costs rose from £25 million before the 
buyout to more than £600 million after. The Guardian team also 
maintain that much of this debt still lies on the lending banks’ 
books, having fallen victim to the collapse of the securitisations 
market. Debt that had been traded was achieving only 60 per 
cent to 70 per cent of face value. There has also been a loss to 
the taxpayer. The consortium relocated Boots’ headquarters to 
Switzerland and, as a result, £131 million of tax revenue has 
been lost (Guardian 9 February 2009). It is not only high street 
businesses that have been lumbered with huge debts by private 
equity speculation. Football clubs have also been prime targets. As 
a result of a buyout Manchester United is reported to have debts 
of around £700 million and Liverpool of around £350 million.
Robert Peston calculates that the major banks have lent up 
to $300 billion to fund private equity buyouts and much of this 
was securitised and sold on to the money markets (2008:176). 
He argues that the interest rates charged for these activities were 
too low given the level of risk. Also, loading the bought-out firms 
with huge debts to pay for management fees and high returns 
to investors could undermine the businesses by reducing their 
credit ratings. In March 2007, a report from the ratings agency 
Standard & Poor’s indicated that private equity firms might be 
undermining the financial strength of Europe’s corporate sector. 
The proportion of companies with debt rating as junk had risen 
from around 1 per cent in the early 1990s to 17 per cent in 
2006. (Junk bonds offer high rates of return to take account of 
high levels of risk.) In the US the level might be as high as 50 per 
cent. Trades unions have also accused private equity companies 
of anti-Labour practices, excessive management fees, profiteering, 
asset stripping and dealing offshore to avoid corporation tax. 
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As private equity companies do not have to provide the same 
information as publicly quoted companies, back bench Labour 
MPs and trades unions called for more financial transparency, 
social and environmental reporting and the treatment of workers 
and suppliers to be monitored. In 2007 the British Private Equity 
and Venture Capital Association agreed a voluntary transparency 
code for around 200 private equity companies then operating in 
the UK.
In January 2009, a report on the private equity industry by 
Ernst and Young (published jointly with British Venture Capital 
Association), indicated that half the profits had come from using 
debt; around a third from the stock market rise and only a fifth 
from increased efficiencies (the main justification private equity 
companies give for their activities). Average return on investment 
was 330 per cent for the firms that had been sold on or floated 
with higher returns linked to higher debt. Levels of debt in 
ex-private equity companies was more than three times the level 
of debt in non-private equity companies. However, contrary to 
union criticisms, the report did not find marked evidence of job 
losses or asset stripping, but the very high level of debts made 
the firms involved very vulnerable in a credit crunch. The credit 
crunch also hit private equity badly as both credit and investment 
opportunities dried up. Many closed. The private equity firm 3i 
which is UK stock market quoted (and was itself a privatisation 
of a government agency) saw its share price fall by over 70 per 
cent during 2008.
credit and Privatisation
A major impact of the shift from issue of money as notes and coin 
to the privatised issue of money as debt is that the state no longer 
has direct access to money issue. If the government cannot raise 
sufficient income from taxes, it has to borrow money from the 
private sector, mainly through issuing bonds. These are sold at a 
discount and repaid at face value. Having lost the ability to create 
its own money, the state has to get the private sector to create it 
for them by buying and trading in government bonds. Having to 
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go to the private sector to raise funds limits the capacity for state 
expenditure, particularly when there is a philosophy that state 
borrowing ‘crowds out’ private investment. As Harvey points 
out, the state is put in a politically disadvantaged position if it 
has to borrow money from the private sector. He argues that 
from the 1980s onwards finance capital was able to move to 
centre stage, exercising power over state action. This, in turn, 
gave finance capital ‘disciplinary power’ over working class 
movements (Harvey 2003:64). New Labour helped this process 
by rejecting its roots in the Labour movement to court the new 
financial elite. One of its first acts was to revoke clause 4 of the 
Labour Party constitution that called for public ownership of 
the economy.
In Europe, a limitation on the state’s access to the privatised 
money system was enshrined in the Maastricht treaty where 
government deficits, that is, higher public expenditure than 
government income, was not expected to go over 3 per cent of 
GDP. In Britain the solution was to borrow money through the 
private sector itself. Private companies would receive government 
contracts but initially finance the contracts themselves, receiving 
repayment over time. By setting up public-private partnerships, 
and particularly private finance initiatives (PFIs), state expenditure 
on capital projects could be moved off the state’s balance sheet. 
PFIs were first introduced under John Major in 1992 and were 
greatly expanded when Labour came to power in 1997. By 2008 
total investments had reached over £60 billion. Many PFIs were 
able to re-finance as interest rates fell and make additional 
profits, reportedly up to 100 per cent on the original contract. 
Such windfall profits were criticised by the National Audit 
Office. Critics have argued that PFI is an expensive way for 
governments to borrow money, as governments can raise money 
more cheaply than the private sector. Although the government 
benefits from taking the expenditure off its balance sheet in the 
short run, private finance adds to costs in the long run (Pollock 
2004:26). Despite the claim that the private sector would bear 
any financial risk under private finance initiatives, in practice the 
government has had to meet the cost of projects in difficulties. 
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The government was forced to bail out the privatised London 
Tube contract and even more PFI contracts were in trouble as 
the economy contracted in 2008–09. PFI had proved to be a fair 
weather friend to the state.
A seeming solution to both the government’s need to raise 
money and the demands of anti-state neo-liberal ideology was to 
sell government assets for cash. This led to a wave of privatisation 
of public utilities in Britain copied extensively in other parts of 
the world. Harvey has described privatisation as ‘accumulation 
by dispossession’, the conversion of collective state property to 
exclusive private property (2003:144–5). Like the private finance 
initiatives the state found itself having to rescue some of its priva-
tisations, most notably renationalising Network Rail in 2001. The 
link between the ownership and control of finance and banking 
and the ability to accumulate through privatisation is most starkly 
exhibited in the demise of the Soviet Union and the fast track to 
capitalism that was imposed.
In Sale of the Century Freeland explores the way that 
privatisation of the financial system accompanied the acquisition 
of the formerly state-owned productive assets. In her study of one 
of the main oligarchs, Freeland points out that ‘like so many of 
the future oligarchs, Potanin swiftly realised that the real money 
was to be made in banking’ (2000:123). Valdimir Potanin formed 
his own bank by taking over the $300 million assets of one of 
the failing state banks. Through the bank he made loans to the 
new factory enterprises and held their accounts. Often these loans 
were exchanged for shares so that the bank eventually became 
the owner of the asset. Potanin also handled the state’s customs 
agency account and the state arms trading agency. In the end 
he became the biggest Russian financial investment company, 
controlling 10 per cent of Russian GDP by 1997. She argues 
that this was a dangerous position to be in, as even Rockefeller 
at his most powerful only counted for 5 per cent of US GDP. As 
Freeland points out, most of the oligarchs made their money by 
getting hold of natural resource businesses or through banking, 
but mainly through handling large state accounts (2000:140).
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The privatisation scramble was a combination of cheap money 
and cheap assets. Those who could get themselves into a position 
to bring the two together became the oligarchs. Freeland describes 
this as ‘insider privatisation’ with the consent of the government. 
Potanin followed the traditional banker’s route to state assets by 
lending the government money in return for the right to manage 
state assets. When the government loans came up for payment 
the state assets were taken in lieu. Most of the oligarchs’ banks 
failed, but they still held on to the assets acquired. As Freeland 
argues, ‘the main thing was to create a capitalist system; it didn’t 
really matter who the capitalists were’ (2000:70). Freeland 
says, ‘I couldn’t help asking myself how different the Russian 
(oligarchs) really were from our own hero-entrepreneurs, the 
gizmo-makers and internet tycoons and financial wizards our 
society so fawningly lauds’ (2000:180).
From speculation to Fraud
One result of the lauding of financial wizards was the opportunity 
for fraud. The classic example was Charles Ponzi in the boom 
years before the 1929 crash. Ponzi schemes are those where there 
is no real investment and existing investors are paid out from the 
money from new investors. Such schemes can continue undetected 
as long as regulators don’t look too closely and the investment 
market is growing. However, when new investment money dries 
up they are quickly exposed. The 2007–08 crash revealed a 
15-year scam in the US by the aptly named Madoff, which might 
have netted $65 billion. When regulators looked at Madoff’s 
books there was no evidence that he had ever traded a share 
on behalf of his investors, although he did file the required tax 
returns as if they had been made. The US Securities and Exchange 
Commission had received warnings as early as 1996 that Madoff’s 
returns were too good to be true, but it didn’t investigate, possibly 
because Madoff was a respected figure. Many rich people were 
defrauded in the Madoff scam, but so were banks and charities. 
The latter reflects the danger of trying to meet social need through 
the capitalist system. Rather than directly funnelling money to 
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social needs, charities have to run the roller-coaster of bull and 
bear markets in order to create financial ‘wealth’.
The neo-liberal ideology of the efficiency of markets, the 
demand for deregulation and the drive for speculative profits 
has created a climate that Black has described as ‘criminogenic’ 
with accounting as the ‘weapon of choice’ (2008). Practices 
include overstating asset values, lending to the worst borrowers 
to maximise income, covering up defaults, treating refinancing 
as new income, growing rapidly using Ponzi schemes and using 
off-balance-sheet to hide liabilities. Black argues that many people 
must know about these strategies including appraisers, internal 
accountants, officers and employees, rating agencies, computerised 
underwriters, stock analysts and external auditors. However as 
they are linked together in a ‘responsibility tango’ it is hard to 
identify where responsibility for losses and fraudulent behaviour 
lies. Black points out that only 200 of 35,000 Suspicious Activity 
Reports (SARs) submitted to the US Treasury led to prosecutions. 
He thinks the SARs represent only a fraction of the actual frauds 
and that it is almost impossible to prosecute in an environment of 
deregulation. He argues that the breakdown in interbank lending 
that led to the credit crunch could be because bankers do not trust 
other bankers, knowing the games that they play.
Examples of accounting frauds include Enron and Worldcom. 
Enron, which had engaged extensively in energy trading, misled 
investors on its viability telling its shareholders it had made 
profits of nearly $2 billion while telling the US tax service it had 
made a billion dollar loss. As well as criminal charges against 
senior Enron executives, three senior Merrill Lynch bankers were 
charged with aiding Enron by making a loan look like an asset by 
temporarily ‘buying’ three barges full of generators. Its auditors, 
Arthur Andersen, whose Houston office earned 25 per cent of its 
auditing revenue from Enron in addition to extensive consulting 
fees, collapsed shortly after. Worldcom’s chief executive was jailed 
in 2005 for 25 years for an $11 billion fraud involving misleading 
financial information, including hiding $7 billion of operating 
expenses as capital expenditure (Glyn 2007:59). Other financial 
practices are more difficult to prove, such as insider trading or 
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rumour mongering to manipulate the market. As Glyn points 
out, there is little incentive for transparency: underwriters seeking 
new business or aiming to not be caught with unmarketable 
shares have no incentive to warn customers or talk down share 
price (2007:60). 
The Limits of Financialisation
speculators may do no harm as bubbles on a steady stream of enterprise. 
But the position is serious when enterprise becomes the bubble on a 
whirlpool of speculation. when the capital development of a country 
becomes a by-product of the activities of a casino, the job is likely to 
be ill-done. 
John Maynard Keynes 1936 (stanford 2008:216)
Financialisation of the global economy has seemed to eclipse more 
traditional industries. Ingham has long argued that the two main 
aspects of capitalism, productive and financial, are inherently 
in conflict (1984). Capitalism is divided against itself. Finance 
seeks short term gain while productive capital needs long term 
investment. The financial sector is not just about the activities 
of a financial market (intermediation between those with capital 
and those who need capital), it is about the process of financial 
accumulation. In Ingham’s terms financial capital (creditor 
capitalism) has triumphed over producer capitalism and it is this 
that has expanded on a global scale. With its financial resources, 
finance capital has its own power base. It is much more responsive 
and flexible than capital locked into factories or other concrete 
assets. The plethora of new financial instruments meant that ‘the 
financial superstructure increasingly took on a life of its own’ 
(Foster and Magdoff 2009:72). This was particularly true of the 
huge derivatives market that swamped world output many times 
over (Wigan 2009).
Foster and Magdoff see financialisation as the dominant force 
in neo-liberalism and globalisation. Productive capitalism is no 
longer creating opportunities for the accumulation of profit and 
attention has therefore turned to more rewarding places to invest 
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and speculate. As the productive economy stalled, capital started 
to flow into the financial markets, not to invest in productive 
companies but to engage in trading and speculation in finance 
itself. Harvey agrees that lack of opportunities for profitable 
investment in productive capital drove the growth of finance 
capitalism (2003:88) while Brenner points out the period from 
1973–93 was one of ‘persistent stagnation’ in the productive sector 
(2002:7). However, Foster and Magdoff do not agree with Ingham 
that financial capital has triumphed over producer capitalism. 
Instead they see a hybrid emerging that they call ‘monopoly-
finance capital’ (2009:77).
Financial and productive companies are not on opposite sides 
in the contemporary financialised era. Rather they have both 
gone to the same side, non-financial and financial companies are 
both engaged in financial trading (Foster and Magdoff 2009:85). 
The most notable, of course, was Enron which started as a pipe 
laying company and ended up as speculators in energy trading. 
Foster and Magdoff build on Baran and Sweezy’s classic analysis 
of Monopoly Capital (1966) to argue that the large productive 
monopolies of the twentieth century had surplus capital and 
nowhere to invest profitably. The innovations in the financial 
sector were an answer to their prayers. In the stage of monopoly 
finance capital: ‘both production and finance under capitalism are 
at one and the same time both real and monetary in nature’ (Foster 
and Magdoff 2009:70). However they see this seeming tangibility 
in the financial sector as illusory, in the end capitalism must return 
to its productive base. While countries may seem wealthy on paper, 
little can be shown for it. Paper asset value can be as ephemeral 
as the paper of which it is composed. Foster and Magdoff point 
to the great irony in the new era of financial investment: the 
stagnation and low profitability of the productive sector has been 
reproduced within the financial sector. In the financialised era, 
leverage is needed to enable profitable accumulation. Debt-based 
finance is driving the economy. However while elastic finance 
encourages capital to become flexible and mobile, it also leads 
to conditions of crisis.
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Even at its most neo-liberal, the globalised financialised market 
system did not have it all its own way. Following the Asian 
financial crisis of 1997–98 Malaysia showed it was advantageous 
to re-impose capital controls (Abdelal 2007:185). In 1998 the 
Multilateral Agreement on Investment, which would have allowed 
global capital unfettered access to any domestic market, was 
defeated and, beginning in Seattle, from 1999 massive protests 
accompanied world trade talks. The Doha round of WTO talks 
finally collapsed in 2008 over the US’s unwillingness to suspend 
its agricultural subsidies. Much of South America was politically 
diverging from neo-liberal globalisation. China was advancing 
steadily towards world leadership. By 2009 the Davos meeting of 
the neo-liberal capitalist and political elite was much more muted 
in the face of the changing political climate and economic collapse 
(Tett 2009:287). The anti-capitalist grass root movement continues 
to meet and organise to assert the existence of an alternative 
(Boaventura de Sousa 2006, Bennholdt-Thomsen et al. 2001).
speculating with the People’s Money
The argument put forward in this book is that although the 
money system is controlled by capitalist finance, it is still publicly 
underpinned by social trust and political authority. The money 
system is backed by the capacity of the state to borrow money on 
the basis of future taxation, or issue money that will be accepted as 
viable through the trust of the people. The money system therefore 
is only as strong as the solidarity of the society itself, and the 
capacity of the political authority to ensure payment of taxes or 
access other forms of national income. As the privatised issue of 
credit money through the banking system leads to speculation 
on a massive scale, it falls to the state authority to act as lender 
of last resort in a crisis. The unregulated money systems of the 
Anglo-American model of financialised capitalism have engaged 
in just such an orgy of credit creation for financial speculation. In 
doing so they are not using a private resource, or creating wealth, 
they are speculating with the people’s money.
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As has been argued in the chapter on banking, issuing bank 
credit money is equivalent to issuing ‘fresh air’ money in that 
there is no direct connection between the savings people deposit 
and the money banks lend out. Also as loans and savings cannot 
be distinguished from each other within the banking system, one 
person’s loan becomes another person’s savings. In the absence of 
state-issued fiat money, bank credit itself becomes the main source 
of money issue. Given the ‘fresh air’ nature of bank credit, this 
is also effectively fiat money. It is not issued on any substantive 
base: it is issued by the bank on the authority of the state. The 
benefit of fiat money is that it creates seigniorage for the issuer, 
that is, the benefit of the first use of that money over and above 
the cost of producing it. While state fiat money was the main 
basis of money issue, governments of all shades benefitted from 
its first use.
Seigniorage largely disappears when money is issued as debt. 
This is because money is no longer free at the point of issue. Not 
only must it be repaid, but repaid with interest. However, creating 
money as a borrower still enables control over the direction of the 
economy. Anyone who takes on bank-issued debt is making vital 
choices about priorities for the economy through how they choose 
to spend or invest that money. In a regulated banking system the 
organisations that create debt can be monitored and given rules 
on lending priorities. Under deregulation and innovative forms of 
lending, the impetus for credit creation has largely passed to the 
speculative financial sector. The widespread use of unregulated 
lending to act as high levels of leverage in speculative investment 
has created a new form of seigniorage. While borrowers have 
traditionally had to earn the money to repay their debts or invest 
in long term business projects, borrowing to leverage speculative 
deals is much more short term and potentially profitable. The 
benefit of the money issued to the borrower is much greater 
than the cost of its creation, that is, the interest paid on short 
term borrowing. Leverage with bank credit money means that 
borrowers can gain huge benefit for a small amount of personal 
investment. If the speculative gamble fails, it is the banking system, 
backed by the public sector, that has to pick up the pieces.
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Despite the importance of the public sector to the security of the 
financial system, one notable aspect of the financialised super-rich 
is their reluctance to pay taxes. As Peston notes, they appear to 
have an aversion to making any contribution to the public sector 
(2008:16). The same is true of corporations with estimates of 
corporate tax avoidance in Britain of up to £13 billion. Failure 
to tax corporations and financial capital flows means that public 
and social infrastructure loses income, while there is more hot 
money washing around the global casino. William Brittain-Catlin 
(2006) sees financial developments from 1970 onwards as the 
disengagement of capitalism from nation states. This he describes 
as the off-shoring of capitalism through tax havens and off-shore 
finance. Multinational companies and banks have expanded 
globally to set up outlying ‘vehicles’ for these purposes. Most 
banks have off-shore operations or can arrange for clients to move 
their investments off-shore. The UK itself became an off-shore 
location for US financiers seeking to avoid both regulation and 
taxation. It was these off-shore activities that led to the push for 
more general deregulation, enabling the unrestricted movement 
of money across borders. As Richard Murphy points out, moving 
finance off-shore does not remove the liability of states. He notes 
that the Cayman Islands have financial commitments 500 times 
their income and Britain is unlikely to escape responsibility if 
there were to be a financial crisis there or in any other of the tax 
havens linked to the UK (2009:75).
While the failure to get rich individuals and financial companies 
to pay tax has a major impact on public expenditure, it also has 
implications for the financial system itself. There is the danger 
that the state will no longer be able to play its role of legitimating 
and underpinning finance. The same is true for the globalisation 
of money. What authority in the global domain will in the end 
guarantee payment? The modern banking system evolved through 
a close link between the needs of capitalism and the needs of the 
state. Financialised capitalism no longer wishes to keep its side of 
the bargain. While it will still supply the state with loans through 
the money market (if the state’s credit rating is high enough), it is 
not willing to support the other important aspect of the money 
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system, taxation. Since it is taxation that is the ultimate source 
of high powered money which underpins all other aspects of the 
money system, globalised money must be fragile.
The case that capitalism has made for private control of the 
money system is that it takes the risks that justify profits. Since 
it has become clear that it is society as a whole that carries the 
risk, there is no justification for the privileges of debt-fuelled 
privatised financialisation. Leveraged casino capitalism has linked 
the money creation system directly to speculative finance. This 
speculation feeds on itself so that financial asset prices become 
artificially inflated. When speculators base their leverage on bank 
credit they are reaping profits from the privatisation of what is, 
and what should be, a social and public resource. Not only do 
speculators exploit the socially grounded and publicly authorised 
banking system to feed speculative booms, the financially wealthy 
compound the problem by trying to avoid tax as far as possible. 
As it is the taxation base that ultimately underpins the banking 
system, this must end in crisis. In a democratic society it would 
be expected that the benefit of a public and social resource such 
as money would be to the benefit of society as a whole, not just 
to the few in a position to speculate.
conclusion
The privatisation of the money system and the eclipsing 
(temporarily) of the role of the state, has meant that there 
had been little or no public control over money creation. This 
‘elastic’ approach to money has fuelled financial speculation 
and accumulation. Through this process, capitalist individuals 
and companies have been able to project themselves as ‘wealth 
creators’ and the privatised banking system as the supporter of 
‘wealth creation’. ‘Profitable’ business has become the only basis 
upon which money can be legitimately issued and its interests 
must be prioritised at all times. Money issue for public or social 
reasons is deemed ‘uneconomic’ because it doesn’t produce a 
profit. Yet the profit that capitalism claims can only be extracted 
through the continual issue of new money. Capitalism is issuing 
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money to itself and claiming it as profit. While there may be 
some merit to capitalist claims if essential goods and services are 
being supplied along the way, when the activities of capitalist 
businesses are purely financial and speculative there can be no 
demonstrable benefit to the wider population of capitalist credit 
driven activities. Any claim of the capitalist system to be ‘private’ 
is dispelled if the money system it has harnessed rests on public 
and social support. While the benefits are private, the regime of 
accumulation rests on publicly grounded money. This has been 
clearly revealed during the financial crisis of 2007–08 which will 
be discussed in the next chapter.
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the fInancIal crIsIs of 2007–08
The financial crisis of 2007–08 was not unheralded. As Paul 
Krugman argued in his book The Return of Depression Economics, 
first written in 1999 and re-issued in 2008, there were many earlier 
crises that were building up to what was likely to become another 
major depression. The 1990s alone saw crises in Latin America, 
East Asia, Japan and Russia. Argentina followed in 2001–02. Most 
notably, Japan had experienced a debt-fuelled property boom and 
collapse in the early 1990s from which it had not yet recovered. 
The 2007–08 crisis began in the US subprime housing market but 
quickly proved to have ramifications for banks in Europe and 
across the globe; states and regulating agencies struggled to find a 
response. From a subprime loan crisis it quickly became a banking 
and financial crisis and finally an economic crisis on a global scale. 
What was unexpected was the depth to which financial systems 
across the globe were undermined. What initially appeared to be a 
problem in the housing sector of one country in mid 2007 became 
a major crisis of the world financial system by October 2008 and 
a global economic recession/depression by 2009.
The subprime crisis
The subprime crisis was a trigger rather than a cause of the 
financial crisis. Mortgage finance was central to the financial 
innovations that had taken place in the banking sector. Mortgage 
backed securities were one of the main mechanisms by which 
banks began to tap directly into the money markets through the 
‘originate to distribute’ sale of securitised debt. Following the 
collapse of the dotcom boom, money, particularly in the US, 
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was very cheap but opportunities for profitable investment were 
limited. With US interest rates as low as 1 per cent, the returns 
on mortgage backed investments looked very good.
Mortgage lending was also an increasingly important source 
of income for the banks. Before the 1990s nearly two-thirds of 
British mortgages were issued through building societies. With 
the privatisation of building societies and the new mechanisms 
of raising loan finance, this had slumped to a fifth with high 
street banks taking the lion’s share. In the US mortgages had 
traditionally been fixed interest and mainly underwritten by the 
large notionally private housing finance institutions, Fannie Mae 
(Federal National Mortgage Agency) and Freddie Mac (Federal 
Home Mortgage Corporation). Between them they provided 
backing for half the nation’s mortgages worth around $5 trillion.
What changed in the US was the introduction of adjustable 
rate mortgages. By 2007 nearly 50 per cent of US mortgages were 
issued as variable rate. Mortgage finance had become financially 
exciting with its huge new sources of income through the securiti-
sation of loans and a new market for home loans in the subprime 
and equity release markets. With house prices rising, many people 
were sitting on homes worth much more than their current 
mortgage commitments. They could be readily encouraged to 
‘release’ that value, that is, take on more debt, or hand over rights 
to their home in return for cash. New mortgage companies were 
sprouting up knowing that there was a ready secondary market for 
any mortgages they could persuade people to take. Low income 
house owners were particularly welcome as they could be charged 
a higher level of interest. It seemed a win-win situation. People 
could now afford houses, or raise money from their existing house. 
Mortgage companies could take their fee and sell on their loans. 
Banks could take their fee and sell on the securitised mortgage to 
investors who were hungry for higher returns. Of course there 
were risks, but these were being dealt with by risk assessment 
mechanisms, insurances and, in the last resort, the collateral of 
house value. Risk assessment for traditional mortgage lending 
was through careful scrutiny of the borrower. The new way of 
assessing creditworthiness was not carried out at the level of the 
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individual mortgage borrower, but through statistical calculations 
and profiling. Measures were used such as age, location or type 
of property. The security for the lenders was through another 
innovation, Credit Default Swaps (CDS). For a fee, banks and 
institutions would guarantee the securitised loans against default. 
The swaps tended to be private unregulated ‘over-the-counter’ 
arrangements between financial institutions.
There were massive flaws in this system. House-buyers were 
able to raise loans easily even with low incomes. Information given 
when taking out a mortgage, including ability to pay, was not 
verified. This led to the notorious NINJA loans: no income no job 
no questions asked. The reason for such a casual approach was 
that those issuing the mortgage intended to sell on the debt very 
quickly. This meant there was little incentive to minimise risk by 
more careful scrutiny. Also, very dubious methods were used to 
pressure people into taking out mortgages, mainly in the form of 
deals that seemed very good but only lasted for a short time. For 
US house owners used to a fixed rate mortgage, it was natural to 
assume that the original rate of payment would continue. These 
problems were ignored because any risk would be swiftly passed 
on from house buyers who might have problems paying, through 
mortgage issuers who would sell on the loan, to investors who 
would be covered by an insurance against default. The claim was 
that everyone benefitted as the risk was spread widely. However 
as it turned out, spreading risk widely did not mean that risk 
could be avoided, rather it spread to all lenders and investors, 
contaminating the whole lending process (Brummer 2008:42).
The problems in the subprime market emerged as the boom 
in US house prices started to slow from 2004 onwards. When 
prices started to turn downwards in 2006, it became clear that 
the subprime mortgage market was particularly shaky. Defaults 
on mortgages within the first three months were virtually unheard 
of but they were starting to happen. The main reason for this was 
the dramatic increase in the sale of mortgages to poorer families. 
As national mortgage agency executives later admitted, they knew 
about problems relating to subprime loans from 2004 but were 
under pressure from the US government to provide more homes 
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for low income families. As defaults began to grow, the problem 
could no longer be ignored and hundreds of mortgage companies 
started to go out of business (Phillips 2008:8–9).
As mortgages started to default, the primary fallback position 
for the lender also disappeared: the value of the houses themselves. 
A core assumption of the house price boom was that house prices 
had conquered gravity and wouldn’t fall. Even this may not have 
triggered a general crisis in the financial system, if it were not for 
the way the mortgage securities had been packaged and sold. The 
innovative way of raising money through securitising and selling 
loans had seemed to offer almost unlimited sources of funding 
for the banks and profitable investment for investors. What 
undermined the system was the process of ‘slicing and dicing’ 
the packages of mortgages. Mortgage backed securities had been 
bundled into collatoralised debt obligations (CDOs) and sold 
to a range of investors at different levels of interest and priority 
for payment in the event of default. As these investments were 
guaranteed against non-payment through the swap mechanism 
they seemed to be secure. Also as the mortgage market was 
generally seen as a safe area for investment, MBSs were given the 
triple A status by the rating agencies that institutional investors 
needed. Since World War II, mortgage lending, particularly in 
the US, had been very stable with no history of major defaults. 
This, together with a rising housing market, made even subprime 
mortgages look like good investments. While this might have 
been true in the early stages of the securitisation revolution, the 
viability of many of the later MBSs issued was very doubtful, 
given the associated problems of poor risk assessment and high 
pressure sale of dubious mortgages.
Rising defaults and falling house prices began to cast doubt 
upon the whole mechanism of securitisation. For institutional 
investors at least, the investment was supposed to be safe, but 
the value even of their first tranche securities collapsed, because 
no-one knew who held the defaulting mortgages. Rather than 
spreading risk through mortgage-based securities, it seemed as if 
investors were going to have to share incalculable risk because any 
of the ‘structured investment’ packages could be contaminated 
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by risky debt. In 2008 up to $900 billion could be locked into 
such CDOs (Blackburn 2008:96). Throughout 2007 and 2008 
the losses in the subprime sector spread to the wider housing 
market in both the US and the UK. In the US, commentators such 
as Professor Nouriel Roubini predicted an overall fall in house 
prices of 40–45 per cent. By early 2009 UK house prices had fallen 
by around a sixth and housing sales were down by 70 per cent. 
Despite interest rates plunging to almost zero the housing market 
was effectively dead in both the US and the UK.
The subprime crisis became a crisis for the banks when they 
could no longer sell on their securitised packages or price their 
credit-related assets. There was a two-fold problem. First, they 
had made loans that would now have to sit on their balance sheets 
because they could not sell them. Second, many of those loans 
could be defaulting. The whole securitised system had been a 
merry-go-round of buying and selling debts and risks. Regulated 
and non-bank financial institutions were, at the same time, 
buyers and sellers of securities and guarantors of risk. Through 
mechanisms such as credit default swaps there had been an 
attempt to spread risk, but this made it even harder to see where 
the actual risk among the ‘counter-parties’ lay. The problem was 
that what looked like a well-balanced hedge system was really 
everyone taking in everyone else’s washing and using the same 
soap packet. As the price of assets could not be gauged, investors 
in the money markets such as sovereign wealth funds, hedge funds, 
pension funds or companies seeking to make money on their 
cash flows fled the market. Equally the interbank lending market, 
which should have been the most established and safest, closed 
down. The London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) is the basis 
upon which banks lend to each other in the short term. When 
this stopped functioning in August 2007 it signalled that even the 
most established institutions did not trust each other. In particular, 
they would not accept credit-based securities as collateral for 
loans. As the optimism and trust that had underpinned the whole 
securitised and financialised system melted away, the whole edifice 
of collateralised finance collapsed, resulting in what was quickly 
labelled the credit crunch (Brummer 2008, Mason 2009, Morris 
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2008, Pym and Kochan 2008, Turner 2008, Tett 2009). Lending 
institutions, saddled with unknown levels of risk, refused to offer 
any more credit in any direction.
northern rock
One very visible sign of the credit crunch was the run on 
Northern Rock bank in the UK (Brummer 2008, Walters 2008). 
This was the first run on a UK bank since 1866. Northern 
Rock, a demutualised former building society, had been seen 
as a leader in the UK mortgage field, particularly for first time 
buyers. In the first six months of 2007 it had increased its share 
of the mortgage market by over 50 per cent and was issuing 
one in five of all UK mortgages. It was also helping to spread 
home ownership by offering not only 100 per cent mortgages, 
but 125 per cent ‘Together’ mortgages that formed a quarter of 
its loan book. Northern Rock was also one of the lenders most 
engaged in raising funds through securitisation, making it one of 
the most highly leveraged banks in Europe. It had adopted this 
model because it did not have an extensive branch network to 
attract savings. Unlike building societies such as the Nationwide 
with 700 branches that could balance 75 per cent of its loans by 
savings, Northern Rock could only cover around a quarter (£24 
billion savings as against loans of around £100 billion). Adam 
Applegarth, the Chief Executive of Northern Rock, had been 
lauded for enthusiastically embracing the new way of raising 
funds. To aid the securitisation process, Northern Rock had set 
up Granite, a special purpose investment vehicle, as a separate 
trust based in the Channel Islands. Granite sold bundles of 
mortgages, nearly 30 per cent of which were ‘Together’ loans. 
This model worked well until the market for these securities 
began to dry up in the summer of 2007 as the subprime crisis 
started to bite.
The trigger for the run on Northern Rock on 14 September 
2007 was a media report that it had needed to go to the Bank of 
England to borrow extra funds because it could not raise money 
from other banks. The run began on a Friday and although the 
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government and Bank of England issued generalised assurances 
over the weekend, the run continued with Northern Rock paying 
out around a billion pounds a day. The possibility of the collapse 
of Northern Rock meant that around 6,000 employees were faced 
with the loss of their jobs, thousands of savers with the loss of 
their savings above the banking system’s compensation scheme 
guarantee level of £35,000 (subsequently raised to £50,000) 
and shareholders with a collapse of their shares, many of whom 
were original members of the Northern Rock Building Society. 
Northern Rock was also an important organisation for the north 
east of England where it was based. As well as providing local 
employment, 5 per cent of Northern Rock’s pre-tax profits were 
put into a foundation that funded a wide range of social, sporting 
and cultural activities in the region.
By Monday 17 September, facing continued queues outside the 
bank and rumbles about the viability of other banks and building 
societies, the treasury guaranteed all deposits currently in place. 
Although the bank regulators had issued reassurances over the 
weekend, savers were only satisfied when a clear statement of 
support was made by the Chancellor, Alastair Darling, himself. 
The run could only be stopped when the government gave its 
full backing to all Northern Rock savers, and thereby implicitly 
(although certainly not at that time explicitly) to all savers 
throughout the banking system. Mervyn King, the Governor of 
the Bank of England, was initially reluctant to bail out the bank. 
In a letter to the Parliamentary Treasury Select Committee on 
Wednesday 12 September 2007 he argued the principle that to 
provide funds to supplement the ailing financial market would 
encourage ‘moral hazard’, that is, it would encourage even more 
risky behaviour in the future. He also argued against cutting 
interest rates as this ‘penalizes those financial institutions that 
sat out the dance, encourages herd behaviour and increases the 
intensity of future crises’. A week later his hand was forced and 
resources were made available, £10 billion to the whole banking 
sector, of which Northern Rock borrowed £8 billion. This was 
only the beginning of what would eventually become a flood of 
financial support to the banking sector.
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In the next few months, with the Directors and Chief Executive 
of Northern Rock resigning, or being pushed, the government 
started a search for private bidders to no avail. In February 2008 
Northern Rock was nationalised. By this time it was worth £380 
million compared with its peak value of £5 billion. Share prices 
which had peaked at £12 were worth only 90p. There was great 
concern that a nationalised bank would have a competitive 
advantage and over the next few months Northern Rock was 
careful not to undercut other banks and building societies. Even 
so, by September 2008 it had repaid half of its government loans. 
However by 2009 as the crisis worsened, far from running down 
its business the state-run Northern Rock was being asked by the 
government to increase its lending to support desperate home 
owners and businesses.
Although the financial innovations on which the Northern 
Rock business model, and that of many other banks, had been 
based had severe weaknesses, the new method of raising bank 
funds was not questioned by the UK Financial Services Agency 
which was responsible for regulating and monitoring bank 
activity. For failing to spot the flaws in the new practices, the 
UK Treasury Select Committee declared the Financial Services 
Authority guilty of a ‘systematic failure of duty’. The tripartite 
regulatory system that Gordon Brown as Chancellor had set up 
was also widely questioned. However the UK regulatory failure 
was shared with regulatory authorities in Europe and America. 
Lord Turner, Chair of the FSA, later admitted that his organisation 
had missed systemic risk because they were concentrating on 
individual organisations, rather than getting the wider picture. 
People had tried to raise the alarm. One former risk manager with 
HBoS (Halifax Bank of Scotland) claimed he had been sacked for 
warning of undue risk. The following furore led to the ex-head of 
HBoS, Sir James Crosby, resigning as Deputy Chair of the FSA.
What was clear was that states could not stand by and watch 
their banks fail. The legislation that went through the British 
parliament to nationalise Northern Rock was not specific 
and could allow the government to nationalise other banks if 
necessary. As bank lending collapsed, the US Federal Reserve 
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Board and the European Central Banks made substantial 
loans to their banking sectors, around $300 billion in the first 
instance, to increase liquidity. This was to be the beginning of 
many attempts by governments and central banks to replenish 
the money available to the banks and encourage them to start 
lending again. Over the next 18 months a range of measures were 
implemented. These included loans to create liquidity, funds for 
the purchase of problematic securities, insurance for new and old 
debt, funds for recapitalisation and nationalisation. Like the UK, 
the US increased deposit insurance, from $100,000 to $250,000.
As the months went by it was clear that despite huge sums 
of money and insurances being made available to them in 
various ways, the banks were unwilling to commit themselves 
to any further lending. In Britain mortgages were only available 
to purchasers with large deposits and at high rates compared 
with the rock bottom base rate. The low base rate was actually 
reducing money supply as many people with ‘tracker’ mortgages 
that tracked national interest rates were eagerly paying off their 
loans, £8 billion was repaid in the last quarter of 2008 alone. 
Between August 2007 and August 2008 central banks pumped 
upwards of $650 billion liquidity into their banking systems. The 
problem with bad debts and uncertainty about ‘toxic’ assets was 
compounded by a collapse in the value of bank shares. January 
2008 saw the biggest global stock markets fall since 9/11 with 
banks as big losers.
As 2008 progressed it became clear that pumping liquidity into 
the banks wasn’t working and that capital values were getting 
dangerously low threatening solvency.
Financial crisis
While the run on Northern Rock was spectacular evidence of the 
crisis, investment banks were already well aware of the oncoming 
problems. By early 2007 doubts were being raised about the value 
of the securitised packages and by the summer funds that had 
been heavily investing in them started to fail. Bear Stearns, a 
large US investment bank with substantial exposure to MBSs, 
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saw two funds fail and many Wall Street banks faced substantial 
losses. In Europe three German banks were facing mortgage-based 
losses and the French bank BNP Paribas had to suspend three 
investment funds (Brummer 2008:57–60). Bear Stearns alone had 
total exposure to bad debts of over $200 billion (Mason 2009:8). 
By March 2008 it was clear that Bear Stearns could not recover 
from its problems and its shares that once traded at $170 were 
near to worthless. As technically the Federal Reserve could not 
bail out an investment bank, JP Morgan Chase was given $30 
billion to buy it. This was an important turning point in the crisis 
as the Federal Reserve, by supporting an investment bank, had 
stepped beyond the regulated banking system and was directly 
supporting the financial markets.
In July 2008 the US had faced a further crisis when the national 
mortgage agencies Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac lost more than 
half their value on the stock market and faced losses of $14 billion 
as mortgage defaults rose. By the end of 2008 Freddie Mac shares 
had fallen 77 per cent. The then US Treasury Secretary Henry 
(Hank) Paulson moved quickly to pledge unlimited government 
backing including the purchase of equity, which Paulson 
described as ‘conservatorship’ rather than nationalisation. This 
acknowledged what many commentators had argued: that the 
private status of these organisations was a ‘necessary fiction’ as 
they could never be allowed to fail (Brummer 2008:19–20). Fannie 
Mae, originally a government agency, had been privatised by 
Lyndon Johnson in 1968 so that the government books would 
look better given the high cost of the Vietnam War.
September 2008 was another critical turning point when the 
more than 150-year-old US investment bank Lehman Brothers, 
with 25,000 employees, was allowed to fail. Lehman had been 
heavily involved in the credit derivative market and in 2007 was 
leveraged at $29 to each dollar invested (Tett 2009:172). Tett 
illustrates the escalation of crises in the financial sector. In 1978 
when LTCM had failed it could be rescued for under $4 billion. 
The hole in Lehman’s books could be anywhere from $30 to 
$60 billion (Tett 2009:272). The collapse also brought down 
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long-established money market funds. Soros sees the collapse of 
Lehman as very significant. Investment funds are supposed not 
to lose their original capital invested, but one of the oldest and 
most established funds ‘broke the buck’ (2008:312).
Letting Lehman fail was an attempt to let the market take its 
course. According to neo-classical economic theory the market is 
a self-correcting mechanism that will heal itself. Far from a self-
correcting response, there was a massive loss of confidence in the 
banking system generally, so much so that, as Mason argues, it 
came close to ‘meltdown’ (2009:1–7). The Lehman failure sent 
the financial system into a tail-spin. None of the investment banks 
survived the crisis, with Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley 
applying to change their status from investment banks to bank 
holding companies and thereby come under state regulation and 
support. Merrill Lynch, which had sold a total of $52 billion 
CDOs in 2006, topping the league, (Tett 2009:158) was taken 
over by Bank of America with government support. However, by 
January 2009 Bank of America was itself looking for government 
loans. The corporations that had dabbled in finance to great 
profit also found themselves in difficulties. In December 2008 the 
General Motors Acceptance Company, General Motor’s finance 
arm, facing losses of $8 billion, registered as a bank holding 
company to access government funding. The state was having to 
support all sectors of the financial system from regulated banks, 
to investment banks, to finance companies.
Only days after letting Lehman fail, the US Treasury was forced 
to take 80 per cent ownership of one of the world’s biggest credit 
insurers, AIG (American International Group), investing up to 
$175 billion by April 2009. AIG had assets of $1 trillion but 
at least a third of this was insurance on worthless debt (Mason 
2009:13). Loan insurance was one of the largest credit derivative 
markets. The International Swaps and Derivatives Association 
estimated the total credit default market in 2008 was worth $55 
trillion, roughly equivalent to world output. As the market was 
unregulated there were anomalies such as there being many more 
CDSs than the bonds and trades they insured. Creating CDSs 
provided a good income for financial institutions as long as the 
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risk of failure was low. What the market now faced was major 
defaults and the possibility of paying several insurances on each 
loan. Hedge funds, as ever the carrion crows of finance, were 
busily buying up CDSs cheaply in the hope that they could make 
a full cost claim as loans failed.
Problems in the credit insurance market threatened a major 
aspect of US public sector finance, ‘monoline’ insurance. 
Monoline insurers guaranteed billions of dollars of local and 
municipal bonds, a very common form of public funding in the 
US. When these organisations strayed into insuring mortgage 
backed securities, their viability was threatened. The traditional 
monoline market was very safe with many institutional investors. 
If defaulting loans meant that monocline credit ratings were 
downgraded institutional investors would have to withdraw. A 
crisis in the monolines would therefore make it very difficult for 
US local authorities to raise funds through issuing bonds. Central 
to the credit insurance market was the reliability of the credit 
rating agencies. Institutional investors, in particular, required 
investments to have the key Triple A rating. As the crisis evolved, 
the independence of the rating agencies was being questioned as 
they were paid by the issuers of credit-based securities to carry 
out the ratings. As part of the fall out, Standard and Poor’s 
and Moody’s were called before the US Senate’s Securities and 
Exchange Commission to answer accusations of a conflict of 
interests and that they had been asleep at the wheel.
As the crisis escalated, estimates of total potential losses grew. 
In July 2008 the IMF Global Financial Stability Report thought 
they could reach $1trillion. Morris changed the title of his book 
between printings from The Trillion Dollar Meltdown to The 
Two Trillion Dollar Meltdown (2008). By 2009 Gillian Tett was 
reporting estimates of total losses of up to four trillion dollars 
(2009:ix). The failure of Lehman Brothers had been catastrophic 
for the banks because it led to a major collapse in banking shares, 
threatening insolvency (Langley 2010). Another collapse in bank 
shares followed in January 2009, reflecting a series of very poor 
bank results for 2008. By the end of January 2009 many banks 
in Britain and the US had lost up to 90 per cent of their value, 
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including Citigroup in the US and Bradford and Bingley, Royal 
Bank of Scotland (RBS) and Halifax Bank of Scotland (HBoS) in 
the UK. Citigroup, which was worth $250 billion in 2007, saw its 
value collapse to $21 billion in 2008 (Mason 2009:51). Much of 
this volatility was blamed on hedge funds ‘shorting’ bank shares, 
that is, selling shares they do not own in the hope of buying 
them more cheaply later. The US and UK governments were so 
concerned about bank shares being shorted during the crisis that 
for a time they banned all short trade. Later it was resumed, but 
speculators buying a substantial number of shares had to declare 
what they were doing.
The combination of collapsing capital values and assets in 
the form of outstanding loans turning toxic meant that banks 
no longer had sufficient secure assets to match their liabilities. 
Banks tried to rebalance their businesses by getting rid of their 
bad debts and raising more capital and deposits. According to 
an IMF Global Financial Stability Report, banks had written 
off $400 billion of bad debts by July 2008. Throughout 2008 
banks continued to write off, or write down, their assets: UBS and 
Citigroup wrote down $19 billion each and Merrill Lynch $17 
billion (Mason 2009:104). Nouriel Roubini has calculated that 
global bank write-offs could reach $2 trillion out of $10 trillion 
toxic assets (in Mason 2009:106).
To try to rescue their dire financial position several banks 
launched rights issues or raised new loans. This worked for a short 
time in the early stages of the crisis. In Britain the Royal Bank 
of Scotland successfully raised new equity of £12 billion despite 
what was later revealed to be its dire financial position. A request 
for £4 billion by HBoS failed badly and Bradford and Bingley 
had to withdraw a rights issue following a near 50 per cent drop 
in share price. Barclays successfully raised more than £11 billion 
from sovereign wealth funds and private investors in the Middle 
East and Asia. Even so, Barclays lost 70 per cent of its share value 
between October 2008 and January 2009. US banks also looked 
for support from sovereign wealth funds. Sovereign wealth funds 
are cash funds held in major reserve currencies in oil-exporting 
or export trading countries. Although they belong to the national 
Mellor 01 text   121 23/02/2010   15:07
122  The FuTure oF Money
government, they are invested as commercial funds. Holders of 
large funds are China, Singapore and the Middle East. The total 
held in sovereign wealth funds in 2007 was around $3 trillion 
(Tett 2009:245) and it is expected to rise considerably in future 
years. Several banks received injections of capital from these 
sources including Merrill Lynch, Citigroup, UBS and Morgan 
Stanley. The intervention of sovereign wealth funds muddies the 
waters between public and private involvement in the banking 
system. It raises a question as to whether countries will be held 
liable for the activities of their banking system if sovereign wealth 
funds lose substantial amounts of money in the banking debacle 
(Gowan 2009:28).
The Public to the rescue: saving the Banks
As bank shares collapsed and the toxic debt problem showed no 
sign of abating, state support started to shift towards partial or 
total nationalisation. In Britain, September 2008 saw the collapse 
and nationalisation of the demutualised building society Bradford 
and Bingley, which had been very exposed to the buy-to-let market. 
Its savings arm was bought by the Spanish bank Santander which 
had earlier bought two other former building societies, Alliance 
and Leicester and Abbey National. Santander had largely escaped 
the subprime crisis because of tough Spanish regulations on off 
balance sheet activities. The British government also took majority 
ownership of the Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) for £20 billion, 
invested £17 billion in Halifax Bank of Scotland (HBoS) and 
arranged for the latter to be bought by Lloyds TSB. Despite the 
fact that the new £30 billion bank would be 43 per cent owned 
by the government with nearly 28 per cent of UK mortgages and 
one-third of its current accounts, few of the concerns about unfair 
competition raised at the time of the Northern Rock nationalisa-
tion were made. By the time the formal changeover took place in 
January 2009, a further collapse in shares meant the combined 
company was only worth £10 billion equivalent to HBoS’s £10 
billion losses in 2008.
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State support for banks was also taking place in the US, with 
the government taking a large stake in Citigroup and injecting 
capital to support several other banks. At times the US and UK 
governments were putting in more capital than the banks were 
worth. The Swiss Banking giant UBS faced huge losses and 
needed state support, as did Fortis in the Benelux countries. The 
staid Rhineland German banks did not escape. The German 
government had to make substantial provisions for toxic debt 
and took stakes in its second largest bank, Commerzbank, and 
the big mortgage lender Hypo Real Estate. Even Deutsche Bank 
made a loss of nearly €4 billion in 2008, its first loss in 50 years. 
Being a state run bank did not help. The state owned regional 
bank, Bayern Landesbanken, suffered substantial losses. Nor did 
building societies escape: in Britain several had to be taken over or 
merged including the Derbyshire, Cheshire and the Dunfermline in 
Scotland, which collapsed due to exposure to commercial loans.
The problems for the banks became even clearer when they 
posted their 2008 results early in 2009. In Britain, the bailed 
out bank RBS had made a loss of more than £24 billion, the 
biggest in British corporate history. Most of this loss resulted from 
involvement in a disastrous £47 billion takeover of the Dutch bank 
ABN Amro at the top of the market in October 2007. This deal 
went ahead even after Northern Rock had collapsed. The market 
response to this result was a share price collapse to 11p at one 
point, making the company worth around £4.5 billion, requiring 
further government support, taking its stake to nearly 70 per 
cent. Once the scale of the loss became known, there was public 
revulsion at the fact that the boss of RBS at the time of the crisis 
had voluntarily left the bank with a full pension of over £700,000 
a year. Under intense pressure he later offered to give up part of the 
pension. The fact that such a huge payment was not questioned at 
the time is a sign of the cosy relationship between civil servants, 
government and senior financial executives. It seemed as if financial 
executives had a divine right to receive lavish financial rewards, 
win or lose. Widespread public anger was not helped by the RBS 
putting £325 billion into the government’s toxic debt insurance 
scheme. As the bank could not pay the premium for this insurance, 
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or the 10 per cent it would have to pay towards any debts written 
off, it looked as if the government stake in the business might need 
to go up to 80 or 90 per cent. Another part nationalised bank, 
Lloyds/HBoS, indicated £260 billion of troubled assets might need 
to go into the government debt insurance scheme.
By January 2009 total bank bailouts and potential costs in the 
UK were at least £600 billion, more than 100 per cent of the UK 
budget before the crisis began. Projected actual expenditure could 
be up to £200 billion according to the IMF (Tett 2009:288). Total 
bank liabilities resting with the public could total £3 trillion, more 
than twice GDP, with more pessimistic estimates going up to £5 
trillion. It has been estimated by New York Professor Nouriel 
Roubini that losses in the US financial system could reach $3.6 
trillion before the crisis ends. Banks swallowed up the billions of 
dollars, pounds and euros and yet the credit crunch still continued. 
Despite large inputs of public money, banks were reluctant to 
lend because of the level of toxic debt they carried. Governments 
tried to help this process by buying up or insuring this debt. The 
UK government insurance scheme offered to guarantee 90 per 
cent of all bad debts, with banks meeting the first 10 per cent 
of failures. The aim was to make banks feel more secure about 
this debt and therefore more willing to lend again to desperate 
businesses and households. The danger was that banks, far from 
being more willing to lend to new borrowers or support their 
existing borrowers, would use the facility to close down accounts, 
thus putting firms relying on regular bank credit out of business.
Sir James Crosby, former head of HBoS, commissioned by 
the British government to report on the housing crisis, saw no 
end to the liquidity crisis. One-third of the bonds relating to the 
securitised products that had been issued were up for renewal by 
2010 and there was no likelihood of ready funds forthcoming. 
The credit creation gap was huge. For example, the UK bank 
HBoS had been borrowing £1.78 for every £1 deposited (Mason 
2009:15). Northern Rock had borrowed £3 to every £1. Highly 
leveraged investment banks and hedge funds were looking at 
ratios of 30:1 and higher. Government action through the banking 
system had failed to work because the activities of the banks 
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could not be separated from the rest of the financial sector, 
particularly the shadow banking system linked to the money 
markets. Non-banks were issuing credit and regulated banks 
were engaged in speculative trading. The BBC’s Robert Peston 
has estimated that governments around the world have committed 
around $14.5 trillion to support the world’s banks and Mason 
agrees that a ‘conservative estimate’ could be up to $15 trillion, 
with $8.5 trillion of that in the US and €2.7 trillion in Europe 
(Mason 2009:53).
Despite the large amounts of liquidity and recapitalisation and, 
in many cases, reasonably healthy reserves, banks were still not 
willing to lend. The credit mechanisms of privatised finance were 
no longer working. Profitability within the financial sector had 
been enhanced by leverage. Borrowed money had boosted returns 
on the much smaller amount of invested capital. The search for 
returns had sought out more and more risky financial assets. Like 
any speculative pyramid it depends on continued liquidity. As 
Chuck Prince, then Chair and CEO of Citigroup, once famously 
put it, ‘When the music stops in terms of liquidity, things will be 
complicated. But as long as the music is playing, you’ve got to get 
up and dance. We’re still dancing.’ (Langley 2010).
economic crisis
By the end of 2008 it was clear that the catastrophic activities 
of speculative financial dancers was finally impacting on the 
productive economy, which had seemed for a time to be able 
to ride out the storm. The productive and trading sectors had 
begun to run out of money. The UK faced a wave of company 
collapses in November 2008 including Woolworths, MFI, Adams, 
Findus and JRB. The US formally went into recession at the end 
of 2008 and in early 2009 saw a drop in the US price index for 
the first time in 50 years. The automobile industry was in crisis 
and despite substantial government support General Motors filed 
for bankruptcy in June 2009. Unemployment around the world 
rose sharply and the OECD was predicting a sharp fall in world 
trade. Given the way that debt had fuelled economic growth, 
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global economies now faced the danger of debt deflation that 
Irving Fisher identified in 1933. Outstanding debt would demand 
that assets be sold, driving prices down and so making the debt 
even higher in relation to remaining assets. From a peak of $63 
trillion in 2007 world stock markets lost half their value in the 
crash (Mason 2009:53).
The huge floods of money in the financial markets had led to 
the commitments of the financial sector being much bigger than 
the GDP in many countries. If the ‘Chartalist’ theory of money 
is correct and money is only a token that rests on the ultimate 
viability of the taxation basis of the economy in which it sits, 
then most national economies were bankrupt. The Royal Bank 
of Scotland with its £1.8 trillion balance sheet could outstrip UK 
GDP and the total of UK banks’ balance sheets could top nearly 
£5 trillion. The first country to be affected systemically by the 
crisis was Iceland, which had for some time been considered a 
small jewel of prosperity. With a population of around 300,000, 
Icelandic banks had gone on a major international borrowing 
and investment spree offering very good interest rates to attract 
inward investment. As the banking crisis escalated, it became clear 
that the banking system had liabilities that were around ten times 
the GDP of the country.
In October 2008 Landsbanki, parent of the online bank Icesave, 
a hitherto ‘best buy’ investment which had attracted many 
British people, local authorities, organisations and charities, was 
nationalised and put into receivership. This was followed by the 
other two main banks Kaupthing and Glitnir. The impact on the 
national economy was evidenced in the collapse of the krona. 
Interest rates rose to nearly 30 per cent and Iceland was forced to 
go to the IMF for an emergency loan. The perils of the free flow 
of money and international financial systems were clear when 
the UK government had to lend Iceland the money to reimburse 
UK savers in Icelandic banks in order to maintain confidence in 
its own banking system. Because Iceland had always had high 
interest rates many Icelandic people had borrowed to buy houses 
and cars in other currencies, often encouraged by Icelandic banks 
themselves. Now those loans had almost doubled in value. Similar 
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problems were experienced in Eastern European countries such 
as Hungary, where reputedly up to 90 per cent of mortgages were 
in external currencies (mainly Swiss francs and Japanese yen).
Ireland was another economic star that fell to Earth. By early 
2009 the banking system was in crisis and the government was 
forced to guarantee all of its banks’ deposits, a commitment worth 
double its GDP. Countries in trouble were facing having their 
government’s credit status downgraded with ramifications for the 
cost of raising loans and debt insurance. Even Britain was facing a 
possible write-down in its credit rating and the impact of the crisis 
on the British national economy was clear. At the end of 2008 
the pound tumbled by 25 per cent against the euro and fell back 
very sharply against the dollar, from a high of around $2 to $1.4.
During late 2008, and certainly by the beginning of 2009, 
it was clear that putting money or capital into the banks was 
not enough. Money was needed in the economy as a whole. 
Governments around the world dropped all pretensions of 
the independence of markets and started to pump money into 
their financial sectors and the wider economy. This was done 
through a combination of fiscal stimulus (government tax and 
expenditure) and the obscurely named ‘quantitative easing’. This 
is a euphemism for the government reclaiming the role of money 
creation. In March 2009 Ben Bernanke, head of the Federal 
Reserve, announced what he called a ‘credit easing’ of $1 trillion 
by buying $300 billion of US Treasury bonds and $700 billion of 
mortgage securities from Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae. By 2009 
the UK had made £200 billion available through quantitative 
easing. On election, Barack Obama had announced a stimulus 
package worth $800 billion. This was on top of Paulson’s $700 
billion TARP (Troubled Assets Relief Programme) and Treasury 
Secretary Tom Geithner’s proposed $1 trillion financial rescue 
package. As a result of the crisis, the UK and US budgets had 
doubled. Interest rates dropped to 0.5 per cent in the UK and 
0.25 per cent in the US, the lowest in history.
Quantitative easing can operate in a number of ways. 
Government can buy corporate bonds from the markets to help 
businesses get ready cash. The government can also buy its own 
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debt back, again giving cash to the holder. The central bank can 
also release money to the treasury by purchasing long term treasury 
bills, that is, providing the government directly with money. This 
is direct money creation, a measure used by Roosevelt in the Great 
Depression. The fact that the announcement of the quantitative 
easing proposals produced a bounce in the stock market shows 
that capitalism has no problems with printing money when it can 
benefit. The danger in quantitative easing through the financial 
sector (the UK approach) is that the money will just go to the 
same people who have contributed to the financial collapse. Direct 
lending to productive companies or supporting mortgage debt at 
the level of the household could produce much more immediate 
results. There are many constructive ways in which new money 
can be issued and these will be discussed in the final chapter.
Despite all the efforts by states to restart their economies and 
their financial systems, success is not inevitable. Japan has tried 
a range of measures since its crash in the early 1990s. It has had 
interest rates near 0 per cent since 2001. This only fed a ‘carry’ 
trade where speculators borrowed in yen to invest in countries 
with higher interest rates. Recapitalisation of banks with trillions 
of yen to cover bad debts has not worked. Fiscal stimulus has led 
to public debt of 150 per cent of GDP and quantitative easing 
has been tried without notable positive success since 2001–02. 
Japan has tried cash payments to all households, loans for people 
between jobs, tax cuts for home-owners, support for banks 
and credits for small business, all to little avail. This may be a 
combination of the overhang of debt and property asset deflation 
Japan experienced and the fact that its economy is still export 
dependent. Mason argues that the measures tried in Japan, while 
not bringing positive results, may have stopped things from being 
worse (Mason 2009:47). Japan also shows that a country can 
survive without a constant growth dynamic and its degree of 
inequality is much less than the Anglo–American economies. It 
may, however, be evidence that a market-oriented economy is no 
longer a viable way forward for late industrial economies.
In April 2009 a G20 Summit was held in London to try to get 
a co-ordinated response to the global financial crisis. It offered no 
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fundamental reforms of the banking system or the financial sector, 
but it did establish the basis for international co-operation and 
regulation. It proposed to upgrade the Financial Stability Forum 
established in 1999 by the Bank of International Settlements to 
become a Financial Stability Board to monitor risk and provide 
early warning reporting to the G20, the IMF and central bank 
governors. Financial institutions, instruments and markets were to 
be subject to tighter regulation and accountability standards. Pay 
and bonuses should reflect risk. All banks would need to increase 
their reserves, including foreign currency, and be counter-cyclical, 
that is increase reserves in good times with possible borrowing 
restrictions in boom conditions. Hedge funds and private equity 
companies should be regulated and be more transparent about 
leverage, strategy and risk. Credit derivatives should be traded 
formally with tighter rules for credit rating agencies. There 
would be an end to secrecy in tax havens. It remains to be seen 
if governments have the political will or power to impose these 
reforms. The IMF was a major winner because its funding was 
tripled. However it remains to be seen if the IMF drops its strategy 
of imposing structural adjustment programmes on the countries 
it supports, that is, demanding public sector cuts and opening the 
economy to global finance. Evidence of its demands on Hungary 
during the crisis is not hopeful. The European and US stranglehold 
on IMF and WTO appointments was also broken. One area of 
disappointment was that despite paying lip service to the idea 
of a ‘fair and sustainable world economy’, green issues barely 
figured. Instead there was a commitment to complete the Doha 
round of trade talks indicating that none of the anti-globalisation 
arguments had been taken on board.
By the end of 2009 the world economy was still facing decline, 
with unemployment rising. Public spending was coming under 
pressure following the huge outlays on support for the financial 
sector. Despite the damage that had been done there were no 
radical proposals to overhaul the banking and financial systems. 
It seemed that business as usual was likely to be the outcome. 
US President Obama’s stimulus package was attacked because it 
planned to cap executive pay in bailout banks to $500,000. In 
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anticipation, state supported banks were trying desperately to 
pay back government loans so that they could retain their high 
levels of pay and bonuses. AIG insisted on paying $165 million 
in bonuses even after having received a $175 billion bailout. The 
bonus culture, which many people saw as the main driver for 
excessive risk, seemed to be returning. Even the new head of the 
nationalised UK bank RBS negotiated a deal worth up to £10 
million tied to share value. RBS also had the accolade of posting 
the world’s worst banking loss in dollars in 2008 ($59 billion) 
followed by Citigroup with $53 billion. Other banks which had 
weathered the storm such as Goldman Sachs, were looking to pay 
large bonuses. One of the main justifications for the high levels 
of pay and bonuses was staff recruitment and retention. It seems 
as if the remaining parts of the financial sector were hoping to 
recruit or retain the person with the magic touch that could make 
the good times roll again. If any lessons had been learned, they 
were rapidly being forgotten. The lessons that should have been 
learned will be discussed in the next chapter.
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we have experienced a comprehensive failure of the banking system at 
all levels. The banks have failed to govern themselves effectively; senior 
managers failed to understand the investments being made in their name; 
risk management and due diligence was seemingly ignored; and the 
non-executive directors, often eminent and hugely experienced individuals, 
failed in the proper scrutiny of the banks’ activities. The regulatory system 
has also failed in its duty…This failure extends to the so-called shadow 
banking system which is now disintegrating before our eyes…after the 
extraordinary self-induced implosion of the financial system, the future of 
the market system now rests in the hands of governments. The politicians 
are the only show in town. 
John McFall, chair of the uK Treasury select committee 
writing in a newspaper article (Guardian 9 January 2009)
In August 2009 writing in the same newspaper Paul Krugman 
agreed that it was only the return of ‘big government’ that 
had rescued western economies from depression arguing that 
President Obama’s stimulus package had saved around a million 
jobs (Guardian 11 August 2009). Governments had not made 
the 1930’s mistake of slashing public expenditure and cutting 
back money supply. Quantitative easing (government issuing 
new money) and other measures equivalent to nearly 15 per cent 
of GDP in the US and nearly 9 per cent in the UK had been 
authorised, although the IMF was doubtful about the outcome 
of the stimulus (Financial Times 12 August 2008). One problem 
was that the American term ‘credit easing’ rather than quantitative 
easing was more accurate. Most of the measures were aimed at 
getting bank credit rolling again and this, banks seemed very 
131
Mellor 01 text   131 23/02/2010   15:07
132  The FuTure oF Money
reluctant to do. Governments had poured money into their 
respective banking systems, but rather than being lent to local 
industry or householders, much of this has moved across borders 
as banks and financial institutions tried to settle their international 
commitments (Panitch and Konings 2009:82). Frustration at 
the failure to re-open credit lines to businesses and households 
produced the notable headline for an article by Philip Stevens of 
the Financial Times: ‘Shoot the Bankers, nationalise the banks’ 
(20 January 2009). The credit crunch had revealed the dilemma 
of attempting to finance a productive economy through capitalist 
finance. As capitalist businesses, banks were facing conflicting 
demands. They were being asked to cleanse their balance sheets 
and recapitalise while offering services such as essential loans 
to the industry and the public. The conflict between finance 
and productive capital became clear as leaders of industry and 
commerce demanded more government action to get the financial 
system and the wider economy moving again.
Gary Dymski sees the financial crisis in the US as resulting from 
‘greed and overreach by globe-spanning financial firms’ (2007:1). 
The new methods of banking that seemed to allow bank lending 
to expand without limit or risk coincided with the emergence of 
a highly profitable, but highly risky, subprime housing market. 
The US’s huge current account deficit had created a huge inflow 
of investment in government debt and into what seemed like a 
cast iron investment, mortgage backed securities and other debt 
related securities: ‘for one shining moment lasting several years…
participants in, and analysts of, subprime markets imagined 
that they were reinventing banking by creating and refining the 
mechanisms of structured finance’ (Dymski 2007:16).
Like Cable (2009), Willem Buiter, also saw the financial crisis 
as a ‘perfect storm’ linking the new methods of securitisation, 
failures of rating agencies, excessive leverage, poor regulation, dis-
intermediation (the emergence of new financial interconnections), 
poor liquidity management by the central banks and the recycling 
of global money through the entry of high-saving countries such 
as China into global trade (2009a). Ann Pettifor notes that since 
2001 low income countries have been net lenders to high income 
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countries while debt at all levels has become the ‘prize legacy’ of 
globalization (Pettifor 2006:53). This has accompanied ‘anarchy 
in the international financial system’ which ‘parades as prosperity 
and freedom’ (Pettifor 2006:146). It was inevitable that all debt 
would ‘hit the buffers of human tolerance or the limits of the 
ecosystem’ (Pettifor 2006:82).
Drawing on Fernand Braudel and Paul Kennedy, Phillips sees 
financialisation and indebtedness as a sign of imperial decline: 
‘financialisation has a long record of being an unhealthy late stage 
in the trajectory of previous leading world economic powers’ 
(2008:viii). The financial machine had only one fuel, money 
itself. When no more money was forthcoming it collapsed. Even 
before the crisis, debt was becoming less and less effective in 
contributing to GDP. In the US in the 1970s for every $1 of 
debt there was 60 cents addition to GDP, by the early 2000s this 
had slumped to 20 cents (Foster and Magdoff 2009:74). Once 
the crisis had started, it was clear that every country that had 
embraced ‘marketisation, deregulation and securitised finance’ 
would get ‘burned’ (Mason 2009:39).
why did It happen?
Central to the crisis were a debt-driven housing bubble and a 
bloated financial market searching for profit without taking 
account of underlying risk. As one Wall Street interviewee put it, 
‘Everyone was looking for yield. You could do almost anything 
you could dream of and people would buy it’ (Tett 2009:35–6). 
Debt-fuelled investment ‘leverage’ was everywhere. Estimates 
vary, but according to Tett, in 2007 Lehman was leveraged at 
29 times its actual financial resources, Merrill Lynch at x32, 
Goldman Sachs at x25, and Morgan Stanley and Bear Stearns at 
x33 (Tett 2009:172–3). Not only did banks issue huge amounts 
of credit, they were also borrowers and traders in credit. The 
financial system was a monster that was feeding itself as banks and 
non-banks lent and borrowed heavily and traded on the margin. 
Even building societies were trading in debt. Credit issue became a 
highly profitable business as private individuals were encouraged 
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to ‘max out’ their credit cards or ‘release’ the inflated value of 
their houses. As Blackburn argues, ‘financialisation encourages 
households to behave like businesses, businesses to behave like 
banks, and banks to behave like hedge funds’ (2008:100). The 
result was hyperinflation in the financial and housing sectors 
(euphemistically described as capital growth) that quickly turned 
to bust as the huge pyramid of debt-related instruments built 
on the shaky foundations of financially vulnerable households 
collapsed. As a result, two to three million householders or their 
tenants are predicted to lose their homes (Blackburn 2008:98). As 
Japan had already shown, an over-indebted society, particularly 
in the context of a property boom, can leave such an overhang of 
debt that the whole economic structure grinds to a halt. Even then, 
despite economic collapse and the huge input of public funds, 
the reality of Wall Street socialism was denied. As the remaining 
private banks got up off their knees, the billions of public money 
that had saved them from the ‘discipline’ of the market were 
ignored. Banks such as Goldman Sachs were promising huge 
bonuses and even the rescued bank Merrill Lynch, which had 
posted losses of $27.6 billion in 2008, still sought to pay out $3.6 
billion in bonuses. The danger was, as Gillian Tett has argued, that 
all the new liquidity provided by the state was likely to build up 
into another financial bubble (Financial Times 7 August 2009).
As capitalism goes through boom and bust cycles, there is a 
tendency for bank regulators to be ‘behind the curve’, that is, 
allowing bubbles to emerge by behaving pro-cyclically. Restricting 
money through high interest rates in reaction to inflationary 
threats may cause, or enhance, a slow down. Reacting to more 
depressed times by letting interest rates fall could stimulate a 
speculative surge. In the US Greenspan was widely criticised for 
holding interest rates too low for too long in the boom, while in 
Britain Mervyn King was criticised for not lowering them fast 
enough as the recession loomed. However the fact that Britain 
and the US were not co-ordinated in their approach, but both 
suffered similar effects in the crisis, indicates that interest rates 
are not effective instruments to control a runaway financial 
system. Equally, blame was put on the British tripartite scheme 
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of bank regulation, but again other economies suffered with 
different regulation regimes. Basically, the financial system was 
out of control, much of it beyond the remit of regulators. Huge 
amounts of bank credit were being created which added to the 
floods of money already in circulation. States were in retreat, 
aided by the ideology of the Washington consensus: liberalisation, 
privatisation and deregulation. As Larry Elliot and Dan Atkinson 
argue, democratically elected governments had, over the past three 
decades, ceded control of the world economy to an elite of ‘New 
Olympians’ who promoted a freebooting, super-rich, globalised, 
unregulated capitalism (2008:5).
Given the history of financial crises in various parts of the world 
and the stream of bubbles that emerged in property, commodities 
and the dotcom boom, it is hard to understand why governments 
and the financial sector were so complacent about the stability of 
the financial system. Gillian Tett records Jerry Corrigan, a former 
president of the New York Federal Reserve, saying ‘we knew 
that risk was mispriced but we did not see what was coming! I 
don’t think anyone really did’ (Tett 2009:265–6). Tett records 
that very few politicians or commentators showed any interest in 
the growing credit markets. The whole area was considered too 
technical and boring. At the same time the finance world showed 
a lack of any interest in wider social matters which, for Tett, 
‘cuts to the very heart of what has gone wrong’ (Tett 2009:298). 
Financiers developed a ‘silo mentality’ and, locked in their little 
silos ‘freed from external scrutiny, financiers could do almost 
anything they wished’ (Tett 2009:299). For Tett, the impact on 
ordinary families of the silo mentality of financiers and the failures 
of the regulators ‘is a damning indictment of how twenty-first-
century Western society works’ (Tett 2009:300).
Larry Elliot and Dan Atkinson see the regulatory failures as 
resulting from an almost religious ‘blind faith’ in capitalist markets 
(2008). The widespread complacency prior to the crisis appeared 
to be based on the assumption that the privatised financial sector 
had found the secret of permanent growth and prosperity. Despite 
tax avoidance, governments were getting considerable income 
from financial activities. In the UK there was a marked reluctance 
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to tackle salaries and bonuses in the City on the grounds that 
the financial sector had paid £250 billion in tax since 2000. This 
ignores the risk to the public sector of up to £1,000 billion, with 
a substantial part of that being real expenditure that the financial 
sector has cost.
Those in the financial sector were mostly young people, mainly 
men, who had little sense of history and marvelled at their own 
cleverness. Those who were older were little wiser. The ideology 
of global financialised capitalism swept all before it. It was 
assumed that the speculators, rather than the credit system, were 
the creators of the wealth that seemed to be pouring out of the 
financial centres. Even those who were aware that the crisis was 
coming were unwilling to spell out the threats in case it triggered 
the crisis. Banks had been in serious trouble before, sometimes 
for years at a time, but as the public were not generally aware of 
this, there was no panic and the cracks were papered over (Wray 
2009:12). Even when warnings were given, the timing of the 
actual crisis could not be predicted. Alan Greenspan warned of 
‘irrational exuberance’ in the mid 1990s, but the dotcom crash 
did not happen until 1999/2000 and the financial crash was more 
than ten years later. While the particular timing of a crash may 
be difficult to predict, it is not as if there is no evidence of what 
can happen when financial systems get out of control.
capitalist Finance Ignores history
In times of boom capitalism learns no lessons from history. The 
2009 economic crash is eerily reminiscent of the Great Crash of 
1929. That, too, saw a housing and new technology boom fuelled 
by consumer credit. Ordinary people became tempted by financial 
speculation with talk of a new economic era in which anyone, 
everyone, could get rich. Three million new entrants fuelled five 
years of stock market growth ending with a doubling of its value 
in 1928. Bankers’ close links with the Republican politicians in 
power led to a laissez faire approach to the financial markets. 
As now, there was financial innovation and a huge amount of 
investment ‘on the margin’, that is, only putting down a small part 
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of the share value. At the height of the speculative surge, almost 
half of the money borrowed was used to buy stocks and shares. 
No one believed the market would fall, and everyone wanted a 
piece of the action.
In both 1929 and 2007–08 speculative borrowing led to a 
financial crisis and a credit crunch. Companies went out of 
business because they couldn’t get loans for working capital. 
In 1929 this led to years of depression. One major difference 
in 2007–08 was the immediate response of government and 
regulators who had learned the lessons of the 1930s when 
thousands of banks failed. The Great Depression produced major 
political changes in the post-war period, which saw strict banking 
and financial regulation in the US including the setting up of 
the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Glass Steagall Act, 
federal bank deposit insurance (FDIC) and the mortgage agency 
Fannie Mae. As the twentieth century progressed bank regulation 
was gradually undermined and finally formally overturned in the 
resurgence of market fundamentalism in the late twentieth century. 
The post-Depression period saw a major involvement by the US 
state in economic reconstruction. The Reconstruction Finance 
Corporation set up in 1932 invested nearly $4 trillion at today’s 
prices and was shut down in 1946 because it was so successful it 
was deemed un-American (Blackburn 2008:102–3). Foster and 
Magdoff see finance capital as having been temporarily defeated 
by the Great Depression with growth capacity being taken over 
by the state and the military-industrial complex (2009:83). This 
did not defeat capitalism itself, which rebuilt its productive base 
with the support of the state. Then in the 1970s and 1980s finance 
capitalism began again to spread its wings and once more spiralled 
out of control (2009:72).
The problem with financialised capitalism is that there is no 
means of ending the process of accumulation except by a crash. In 
the productive economy goods and services are paid for and used, 
so that people need to purchase them again and again. However, 
money invested in money just carries on accumulating. Value piles 
up in assets that are truly ‘fictitious’ in the sense that they have 
no tangible basis. Financialised capital can only realise a profit if 
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someone buys the ever appreciating asset. As a result, financial 
markets must suck in all possible sources of money and credit. 
Saul describes inflation as the ‘vaporisation of money’ where ‘vast 
sums of money entered into the market place and just as quickly 
seemed to evaporate’ (2005:140–1). Inflation in financial markets 
does not immediately look like evaporation. It seems as if the 
balloon is swelling ever larger to the benefit of all, until the crash 
when, like air out of a balloon, money disappears. In the stage 
of speculative finance capitalism, there is little to distinguish it 
from gambling (de Goede 2005:50). It is ‘casino capitalism’ where 
financial institutions gamble, ultimately backed by public money 
(Strange 1998:6). With unlimited opportunity to create credit, 
the privatised western banking systems kept the party going for 
a very long time. However, as Minsky had predicted, capitalism 
would fall victim to its financial instability.
The Instability of capitalism
Hyman Minsky has been described as ‘the most prolific and 
original theorist of financial instability’ (Nesvetailova 2007:57). 
For Minsky, capitalism is inherently unstable and subject to 
credit-driven booms. At such times, capitalist financial systems 
will expand credit facilities despite all regulatory efforts to contain 
them. Following Keynes, Minsky argued that capitalist markets 
are not efficient and are subject to crisis through a systemic 
fragility. This is because financial opportunities shift and change 
and the viability of debt changes with them. Minsky identifies 
three stages in credit finance: hedge, speculative and Ponzi. For 
Minsky, hedge finance is relatively secure in that the investment 
for which the debt is raised is assumed to be profitable enough to 
earn sufficient return to repay the debt with interest. Speculative 
finance is less certain. The interest may be covered but there is 
not necessarily enough money to repay the capital. Ponzi is where 
the investment does not generate enough money to pay either the 
debt or the interest. In the case of housing for example, the hedge 
stage is when house prices are steady or rising against incomes. 
The speculative stage is when people are taking out interest only 
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mortgages in the hope that future price rises or their improved 
financial circumstances will clear the principal debt. Ponzi is where 
prices are falling and/or there is insufficient money to pay any of 
the mortgage debt and both mortgage and interest can only be 
fuelled by taking on more debt.
Minsky’s case is that there is always the potential for instability, 
particularly in periods of stability. In stable times confidence 
builds up and the financial system becomes more relaxed about 
the ability of borrowers to repay debt. If this coincides with the 
beginning of a bubble, speculators call forth all means of credit to 
join the race. Financial innovation occurs and regulators cannot 
keep pace with the new ways of issuing credit. Bubbles can emerge 
for many reasons and, once they begin, it is hard to stop the 
credit driven price rises that lead from speculation to Ponzi as 
the crisis looms (Kindleberger 1996). Speaking at a conference 
celebrating Minsky’s ideas, McCulley argues that capitalism is 
intensely pro-cyclical (2008). The reality of financial markets is 
that while it is conventional wisdom to buy low and sell high, in 
practice markets do the exact opposite. No-one can believe that 
the good times (or the bad times) will end. When prices are high 
everyone wants to grab some of the profits. When prices collapse, 
potential investors are concerned that they will drop lower. As 
prices ratchet up, speculative surges lead from investments where 
the debt ratio to asset is low enough for both interest and loan 
to be easily repaid to a stage where debts are so high in relation 
to the asset that not even the interest can be paid. At each stage, 
the money invested drives up asset prices which encourages more 
risky behaviour until there are no new investors and the market 
turns down.
The Illusions of Financialisation
Phillips summarises the late twentieth and early twenty-first 
century as an era of:
Bullnomics, the pied-piping of america toward a misleading financial 
ideology (the efficiency and reliability of markets) buttressed by a spectrum 
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of dubious thinkers, doctrines, and enablers: monetarist economists with 
their dismissal of government; economic-deregulation enthusiasts; the 
gurus of the efficient Market hypothesis, with its validation of speculators, 
corporate raiders, assets shuffling, debt and derivative instruments. 
(2008:72–73)
He goes on:
My summation…that american financial capitalism…cavalierly ventured 
a multiple gamble; first financializing a hitherto more diversified us 
economy; second, using massive quantities of debt and leverage to do so; 
third, following up a stock market bubble with an even larger housing and 
mortgage credit bubble; fourth, roughly quadrupling us credit-market debt 
between 1987–2007…and fifth consummating these events with a mixed 
performance of dishonesty, incompetence and quantitative negligence. 
(Phillips 2008:207)
Like Panitch and Konings, Gowan argues that there was collusion 
between the regulators and the investment banks in the ‘new Wall 
Street system’ (2009:20). While financial sector debt rose from 
21 per cent of GDP in 1980 to 116 per cent in 2007, there was 
a ‘global campaign to the effect that the US boom was not the 
result of debt-fed growth aided by highly destructive trends in the 
financial system, but of American free market institutions’. It was 
a ‘bluff, buttressed by some creative national accounting practices’ 
(Gowan 2009:25–26). Gowan claims that neither Greenspan nor 
Bernanke swallowed the efficient markets thesis. Both knew that 
the financial system was unstable and could give rise to bubbles. 
However, they were ready to ride the boom because of the huge 
amounts of ‘wealth’ it created on the ground and their confidence 
that the system they administered could cope with the crash. The 
clear implication of this is that the capitalist money system and 
the state are part of the same financial system. The financial crisis 
has exposed the social and political underpinnings of the financial 
system. The public and private sectors are intertwined. There is 
no such thing as a free market economy, there is a private sector 
supported by the public through the state. In stable times this 
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relationship is less obvious, but a capitalist crisis, particularly a 
financial crisis, reveals the limitations of unregulated speculation.
Financialised capitalism has rested on the elastic creation of 
credit, but far from credit expansion proclaiming the dominance 
of speculative finance capital, it has exposed its weaknesses. It 
has shown that financial asset investment is always a pyramid 
scheme, money invested in money, whose value will collapse as 
soon as there are no new investors. Capitalist financial markets are 
as vulnerable as the productive capitalist market to the dilemma 
of class exploitation. Capitalism is a system built on inequality 
where the owners and controllers of the means of sustenance, 
production and money can command the labour and resources of 
others. Marx focused on the exploitation of workers in physical 
production and the primitive accumulation of primary assets 
such as land. However, power also comes from the ownership 
and control of money. States had power through their ability to 
issue currency and tax it back in. Capitalism has similar power 
through its control of financial resources. If people want to eat 
they have to earn money. If they cannot earn enough money they 
have to borrow from the same system that denies them food or 
sufficient wages.
Marx pointed to the contradiction of productive capitalism. 
If workers are not paid the full value of what they produce they 
do not have the money to buy the products made. Eventually 
the market for goods will run out and profit can no longer be 
realised through the money system. The same thing has happened 
with financialised capitalism. The financial sector has created 
huge differences of wealth. It sucks away money from other 
economic activities and the mass of the people can only hope for 
a trickle down of economic activity through the consumption 
of the champagne-swigging traders and increasing numbers of 
billionaires. Wider consumption is helped by debt, but again this is 
limited. Eventually people can borrow no more. It is not without 
irony that financialised capitalism fell because of its exploitation 
of the very poor. As capitalism runs out of a market for its goods, 
services or investments, all that is left is the poor. In the case 
of financialised capital this was the subprime householder. The 
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subprime borrowers did not cause capitalism to fail, the cause was 
its own contradictions. But in this instance they were the trigger; 
and in that sense the poor did destroy financialised capitalism.
Financialised capitalism also misunderstood the conditions 
of its own existence. In the illusion that money was a neutral 
representation of the wealth of the market, capitalism roamed 
across the world seeking out the most lucrative base for low wage 
production, speculated on currencies and borrowed from low 
interest countries to invest in countries offering higher interest. In 
the process the financial sector grew like Topsy. The derivatives 
market alone was worth more than ten times world production. 
Financial institutions operated far and wide, well beyond their 
home base. This led to major problems about who should 
supervise their activities: the authorities in the home base, or the 
authorities in the branch countries? In escaping regulation and 
supervision, particularly in tax havens, the financialised money 
system was undermining its ultimate means of support. It was still 
a system generated by private trade and commercial borrowing 
and people still socially trusted its money, particularly the hard 
currencies. However, deregulated money had escaped from any 
source of legitimisation through public authority. It was also 
providing relatively little tax revenue to support public money. 
Failure to understand the real basis of the money system in the 
public authority of the state led banks and financial speculators 
to think that they were the source of money security. This led the 
sector to expand to such an extent that the amounts of money 
at risk threatened the solvency of countries. The only authority 
that could step in then was the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) with its limited resources, given the scale of the problem. 
The IMF also has a pro-capitalist finance ideology that demands 
nation states should cut public expenditure and open themselves 
up to more of the same by allowing the free movement of capital. 
During its crisis there was popular protest in Iceland that the 
population should be expected to repay Holland and Britain for 
loans to cover the activities of Icelandic banks in those countries. 
The argument was that the banks were private organisations and 
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there is no reason why the Icelandic public should be deemed 
responsible for private sector activities.
what should happen now?
The most immediate response is more regulation, but how and 
on what basis? Is it enough to tackle pay and bonuses or to make 
banks hold more capital reserves? Should long term investors be 
given more power to scrutinise? Should bank directors be trained? 
Should there be new accounting methods, particularly for risk 
management? Should rating agencies, hedge funds and private 
equity companies be regulated? How far should the shadow 
banking system be regulated? Should credit derivatives and 
asset-based securities be formalised? Should banks be separated by 
function, or only allowed to grow to a particular size? What should 
happen to transnational banks; who should regulate them? Should 
banks be allowed to trade on their own account (proprietary 
trading)? How could the viability of the whole financial system be 
secured? How can bubbles be prevented? The main ideas floated 
on both sides of the Atlantic are for smaller, more manageable 
banks, formal trading for the derivative markets, getting banks to 
build reserves in the good times and macro-prudential regulation 
by the authorities to secure the viability of the whole money 
system. Blackburn bluntly demands that the Basle II approach to 
bank self-regulation of risk should be ‘struck down’ (2009:104). 
George Soros supports the need for tighter regulation, particularly 
higher marginal calls (how much needs to be put down to speculate 
on a share or other security) and minimum capital requirements 
against leverage, but wants to avoid ‘regulatory overkill’ (2008a).
When the British Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, expressed 
his anger at banks failing to lend despite receiving huge amounts 
of government support, he railed at the ‘irresponsible mistakes 
of a few bankers’. However, the problem was much greater than 
a few mistakes by individuals. As George Soros has remarked 
‘the crisis was generated by the financial system itself’ (Soros 
2008a:312). Soros is an interesting poacher turned gamekeeper. 
He decries Thatcher and Reagan’s unleashing of market forces and 
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the fundamentalism of the Efficient Markets thesis. In his latest 
book, he argues that there has been a ‘super-bubble’ building in 
post-war capitalism that would inevitably collapse (2008b:81). 
Soros’s main argument is that markets are not self-regulating 
but behave ‘reflexively’, that is, unpredictably. Therefore crisis is 
endemic to the financial system. It is certainly true that isolated 
features cannot be singled out. Although the structure of pay 
and bonuses has been regularly highlighted, Tony Jackson of 
the Financial Times notes that the failed US insurer AIG had 
long-term incentives for its staff and 30 per cent of Lehman 
Brothers and Bear Stearns were owned by employees. This does 
not mean that the high levels of pay and bonuses were justified 
and in August 2009 13 business school professors wrote to the 
Guardian newspaper calling for a windfall tax on bonuses to 
help cover the shortfall in public finances caused by the crash 
(12 August 2009).
For Willem Buiter, Professor of European Political Economy at 
the London School of Economics, a major lesson that could be 
learned from this ‘spectacular example of market failure’ is the 
centrality of the role of the state in the maintenance of financial 
stability. The financial system needs to be put back as a servant 
of the ‘real economy’, not its master. He sees the crisis as a ‘great 
definancialisation’ or a ‘great deleverage’ with the result that 
much of the financial system is effectively destroyed or exists in 
a state of ‘subsidized limbo’. Buiter envisages a return to privatised 
banking but with strong regulation. He would like to see an 
EU-wide regulatory and fiscal authority and an end to universal 
banks. Buiter is concerned that this might lead to state overreach 
but sees this as preferable to under-regulation in the short term. 
However, he does not see this as a crisis for capitalism but only 
for ‘financial capitalism’ (2009b). In a later blog Buiter argues that 
the proposals for reform do nothing to remove the government’s 
role as a backstop for banks. This reduces the cost to banks of 
ensuring against risk and allows them to grow excessively large 
in terms of balance sheets and leverage. Even though the financial 
sector accounts for only 8 per cent of GDP in the UK, its potential 
impact is very high as has been seen. Buiter’s answer is to remove 
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the guarantee that underpins banks. No public money should be 
put into banks unless all creditors are converted into shareholders 
and thus threatened by bank collapse. Banks are not only too 
large, but they are hard to regulate and tax because they operate 
across borders. The problem now is that banks operate interna-
tionally but still have a national backup (Buiter 2009c).
Strong support for at least temporary nationalisation has come 
from economists such as Paul Krugman, Joseph Stiglitz, Willem 
Buiter and Nouriel Roubini. This is supported by John McFall, 
Chair of the UK Treasury Select Committee, who has called for the 
establishment of a state bank to deliver government lending targets 
and who notes that after World War II the Labour government, 
led by Attlee, directed bank lending (Guardian 9 January 2009). 
Professor Nouriel Roubini, of the Stern Business School at the 
University of New York, wants bad banks set up to take on the 
toxic assets and temporary nationalisation of troubled banks. 
He argues that this will be cheaper and better than governments 
supporting ‘zombie’ banks. Joseph Stiglitz writing in the Herald 
Tribune (2 April 2009) agrees that hurling billions of public money 
at banks is far worse than nationalising, as it is privatising gains 
while socialising losses. He sees this also applying to the setting 
up of a ‘bad bank’ that would relieve the private sector of its bad 
assets. There is also the difficulty of the price that the state would 
pay for those assets. Roubini argues that after the banks have 
been ‘cleaned up’ they should be returned to the private sector. 
He points out this has already been achieved for one of the early 
failures, California-based Indymac. He also calls for financial 
help for the wider economy particularly for mortgage-holders 
(CNNMoney 2009). Even before the crisis, Roubini countered 
Greenspan’s argument that there was no case for a federal reserve 
response to asset bubbles such as dotcom, the important thing was 
to deal with the aftermath of bursting bubbles. Roubini argued 
that central banks need to be even handed and respond to the 
rise of bubbles, as well as the collapse, otherwise there will be 
distorted and perverse incentives, economic imbalance and a low 
savings rate (2006:105).
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Many of the suggestions for the future of banking envisage 
the continuation of privatised finance but with better regulation. 
A major aim is to make banks small enough to fail, or to 
insulate consumer retail banking from investment finance. It is 
questionable whether a banking system based on the pursuit of 
profit could ever separate retail banking services from speculative 
investment. It was pressure from retail banks that saw Glass 
Steagall repealed. Northern Rock did not have an investment 
arm, yet was still brought down through its trading connections 
to the investment sector. Lehman was not a retail bank, but its 
collapse impacted on high street banks. The privatised financial 
system is one network. The financial collapse was not a failure 
of cheats, rogues and Gordon Gekkos who, like his character 
from the 1987 film ‘Wall Street’, declared that greed was good; it 
was the systematic failure of a capitalist money system driven by 
the search for profit. As Minsky argued, finance capitalism will 
always search for innovative ways of raising credit to speculate. 
McCulley agrees that it is difficult to separate the ‘real’ banking 
system from the shadow banking system. The US state tried to 
step back and let Lehman fail, but within days had to rescue 
AIG. McCulley argues that since the rescue of Bear Stearns, the 
whole shadow banking system has come under the state’s liquidity 
umbrella (2008). Mason also argues that the collapse of Lehman 
was a ‘harbinger of the changing power balance in the world-from 
banks to states’ (Mason 2009:3). However, this also meant that 
‘moral hazard is back on an unthinkable and explicit scale’ if every 
money-market investor and every bank knows it will be rescued 
by the state. As Mason points out, the whole testosterone driven 
mayhem on the trading floors was always a con, ‘there was always 
a safety net. The giants of the financial system could gamble, lose 
everything, and yet walk away solvent’ (Mason 2009:21).
The privatised issue of credit money through the banking 
system has led to speculation on a massive scale which has now 
fallen on state authority to rescue. The state has not been able 
to let the market take its course and ‘cleanse’ itself, as it has 
proved impossible to separate out pure speculation from people’s 
personal savings, particularly those institutionalised through 
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pensions and other long term investment. The financialisation of 
substantial numbers of the general public has muddied the waters 
of financialised capitalism. The public is therefore implicated in 
two ways, both as financialised savers and investors and as tax 
payers. Although banks had been subject to light touch regulation, 
they were still a regulated financial sector. They were linked to 
the government through the central bank and it was clear that 
governments could not let their banks fail. However, as the failure 
of the liquidity mechanisms showed, the problems in the banking 
system were much deeper than the failure of money and credit to 
circulate. Banks weren’t just suffering a problem of liquidity, they 
were effectively insolvent despite their reserves.
Claude Hillinger puts forward an approach that would see the 
state guarantee all bank deposits while letting the private or public 
companies running the banks fail (2008:308). Soros argues against 
this, pointing out that peripheral countries have suffered very 
badly when stronger economies have guaranteed their deposits 
as savings have flooded from the periphery towards the centre. As 
a result, peripheral countries have had to keep their interest rates 
very high (Soros 2008a:313). Soros’s criticism assumes that money 
would still be able to flow freely around the world and that reform 
would only take place in one country. Hillinger’s proposal is a 
way forward that governments have implicitly or explicitly taken. 
All savings have been guaranteed, even where there are deposit 
insurance limits. The question is what happens after the banks fail? 
The logic would be a national savings system and a national bank. 
There would be unlimited moral hazard if profit seeking banks 
were able to continue with a 100 per cent deposit guarantee, even 
if the punishment for misbehaviour would be company failure.
McCulley points to a structural problem facing the banking 
system. Like Keynes’ paradox of thrift, where the economy does 
not function if everyone saves, in the present situation the whole 
economy cannot de-lever at the same time. Keynes’ solution was 
to run deficits using public money and for McCulley the solution 
to de-levering is the same: use the sovereign’s (i.e. the state’s) 
balance sheet. If the private sector wants to shrink, a depression 
can only be avoided if someone takes up the slack and that has to 
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be the state’s money creation role. As McCulley points out, ‘that 
someone is the guy who owns a printing press and is allowed to 
print legal tender and who gets his ink for free. That happens to 
be, in a most direct sense, my dear friend Ben Bernanke. But in 
a broader sense, it’s the sovereign’ (McCulley 2008). As Gowan 
argues, it is an illusion to think that regulation can replace the 
centrality of the state to the stability of a financial system. The 
globalised financial system is inherently unstable because the state 
cannot play its underpinning role through ‘tax-raising capacity 
and currency printing presses’ (Gowan 2009:23).
Another illusion of the capitalist financial sector is that 
credit-driven capitalism is compatible with the delivery of banking 
services to the mass of the population. As discussed in Chapter 
2, banking is an inherently unstable system. The essence of all 
deposit-based banking is to ‘borrow’ short and lend long, thus 
always threatening problems of liquidity or solvency. The only 
immediate safeguard is the amount of reserves a bank holds and 
these can be as low as 0.1 per cent as D’Arista pointed out (2008). 
The level of reserves becomes even more important if the bank 
has itself borrowed in order to lend. In a profit-driven banking 
system, the aim must be to hold as little reserve as possible because 
it is ‘dead money’ earning no profit, and to maximise loans, or 
to engage in financial activities that bring in a profit. However, 
even a high level of reserve, such as 10–12 per cent, would be 
of little use in a crisis. For a crisis the only effective reserve for 
deposits, as government action has shown, is 100 per cent. This 
would undermine the key factor in the growth and expansion 
of economies under the modern banking system, the absence of 
any direct link between deposits and lending. Borrowing short 
and lending long, together with the fractional reserve system, has 
been the whole basis of the money creation system of capitalism. 
Such an illogical system always threatened crises of liquidity, or in 
the case of the current crisis, insolvency. To completely eliminate 
‘fresh air’ lending and to directly tie savers to borrowers would 
dramatically slow down the economy.
In the search for profit, the more lending or other forms of 
financial activity a bank engages in, the more likely it is that it will 
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lose money and not be able to meet its liabilities (that is pay back 
the bank’s own borrowings, honour agreed loans to customers 
or give people back their savings). The aim of the Glass Steagall 
legislation was to separate the savings of depositors from the 
more risky operations of the financial markets. It is this barrier 
that the deregulated financial system broke down. Banks started 
to get involved in financial speculation, not only as a lender to 
speculators, but speculating with their own reserves. All of this 
followed the logic of the search for profit. In the good times banks 
produced good returns and rode high in the stock market. The 
financial spiral twisted around as institutional investors started 
to see banks as a safe investment. Shareholders wanted to see 
higher dividends and capital growth and this drove the banks to 
take more risks. The clear lesson is that securing people’s savings 
is not compatible with operating as a profit-driven business. As 
banking systems are inherently unstable and the services they 
give are vital for economic functioning, ‘public ownership of the 
credit and banking system is rational and, indeed, necessary along 
with democratic control’ (Gowan 2009:2). Blackburn offers a 
compromise where states should be allocated shares in banks 
to compensate for their financial contribution. Banks would 
also make an allocation to a social fund (Blackburn 2008:102). 
However, this assumes that banks still retain their money 
creating powers.
It is the money creation power of banks that is the essential 
question. As Pettifor argues, ‘the invention of bank money – 
money that did not depend on existing economic activity, but 
created economic activity – meant that borrowers could end 
their dependency on those who were already rich…bank money 
widened and democratized the allocation of credit’ (Pettifor 
2006:67). However, if the logic of loans follows the capitalist 
notion of profit, the democratic potential of money will be 
lost, and this is what has happened. Pettifor sees banking as a 
‘parasitic sector’ charging interest on loans meaning that further 
new money must be found, either by increased productive or 
commercial activity, or by someone else taking out new debt 
(2006:19). However, it is the public and democratic nature of 
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money that is the most important issue: ‘because it is created by 
society, money is actually the property of society…and should 
not therefore be appropriated by banks as their sole property’ 
(Pettifor 2006:176). Pettifor’s solution is free government money, 
cheap commercial money and regulated credit creation. Parenteau 
(2008) has argued that there are only three ways forward from 
the current ‘age of financialisation’. One is to continue to live in 
a ‘Ponzi Nation’, that is, to let the current under-regulated system 
operate and accept that problems of fraud and speculation will 
occur. The second approach is to impose a regulation system that 
is ‘Glass–Steagall on Stilts’. The third is to look at wider reforms 
of the financial system. It would be a tragedy if public money was 
used to put the capitalist Humpty Dumpty back together again.
conclusion
The financial crisis presents an historic moment to put forward 
radical alternatives. The need for state intervention has exposed 
the contradictions of financialised capitalism and its reliance on 
‘Wall Street socialism’. A pivotal point was the rescue of the US 
investment bank, Bear Stearns; the state was not only bailing 
out commercial banks, but finance capital as well. This clearly 
exposed the fact that the failure to exercise democratic control 
over money issue has meant the benefits of the money system 
have been privatised, while the risks have been socialised. Those 
who lend and borrow the money that is created out of ‘nowhere’ 
are using a social and public resource for private gain. They are 
creating claims upon society that are ultimately guaranteed only 
by society itself, but this is being used for private profit, not public 
benefit. Financial speculators are not being entrepreneurial by 
‘making’ money, they are using money to create more money in a 
cycle that must end in failure as there is no value-creating source 
other than the money system itself. This is the moment to ask if 
another way is possible. Can the money system be organised in 
such a way that it does not revert to financial speculation? Can a 
money system be devised that can meet the provisioning needs of 
human societies in a flexible way that does not encourage capital 
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accumulation, the exploitation of people or the degradation of the 
environment? The financial crisis has created an historic moment 
when ‘those who want to impose social justice and sustainability 
on globalised capitalism have a once-in-a lifetime chance’ (Mason 
2009:x). The next chapter will discuss ways in which that chance 
might be taken.




The history of the emergence of modern money has seen shifting 
control between public authorities and the capitalist market. 
While many states were dependent upon loans from capitalist 
bankers and financiers, until the latter part of the twentieth 
century most states still regulated, and even directed, the private 
banking sector, controlled the cross border movement of money 
and issued notes and coin. The globalisation of finance and the 
shift away from the use of notes and coin to debt-based money 
issue, led to dominance of the money system by a profit-driven 
banking and financial sector. Under the banner of neo-liberalism, 
money issue and circulation was put almost exclusively under 
the control of capitalist market forces through substantial bank 
deregulation and the growth of a large unregulated financial 
sector. As old-fashioned banking and mutual societies floundered, 
there emerged a panoply of financial activities that drew high 
street banks and non-bank financial agencies into an unholy 
alliance of credit creation and speculation. The state was ‘rolled 
back’ together with mutualism and any possibility of recognising 
money as public or social.
The era of market fundamentalism was led by the Anglo–
American economies with the enthusiastic support of their states. 
The financial markets appeared to be a source of unlimited wealth 
with public expenditure and tax-raising seen as an imposition 
on the capitalist ‘wealth creators’. State regulation of the money 
system was reduced to merely a concern with inflation, certainly in 
Britain. This meant that as the crisis arose the British monitoring 
authorities were looking the wrong way. The financial crisis has 
152
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shown how fragile the money system is under the control of 
profit-driven market forces. The failure of one of the free market’s 
core mechanisms, the elastic creation of money as debt, revealed 
the shallow nature of private control and the ultimate reliance 
of the whole structure of financialised capital on the financial 
capacity of the state. The strutting claims of the economic 
superiority of the capitalist market with all its social, economic 
and environmental destructiveness, was seen to be a charade. If the 
destructiveness of privatised money is not to recur it is important 
to open a debate about the future of money and how it can be 
used in more socially and ecologically sustainable ways.
Far from being a natural and neutral adjunct to the market, 
money has proved to be a profoundly social and political 
institution. As such, the way money is issued, circulated and 
controlled should be subject to critical analysis. A discussion of 
the future of money must not only draw lessons from the latest 
financial crisis, but from the structure of the financial system as a 
whole. This includes the way that money is defined and operates 
within the economy and the ownership and control of the money 
system in its various levels and manifestations. Failure to do this 
will mean returning to some version of business as usual, until the 
next crisis. The opportunity to develop a money system that can 
help human societies achieve a more socially just and ecologically 
sustainable form of provisioning will be missed. This does not 
mean starting from scratch. It is already clear that the money 
system is a purely social phenomenon with no ‘natural’ basis 
for valuing human activities. Nor can money systems operate 
autonomously or spontaneously: they are essentially social and 
public, requiring prior systems of trust and authority. Money 
does not create society, society creates money. What is important 
is how money is owned and controlled. Like conventional 
economists, most radical economists have seen the role of money 
as marginal to their analysis. Conventional economics, taking its 
ideological framework from capitalist domination of production 
and exchange, ignored the social and political underpinnings of 
money and tied its analysis of the origins and function of money 
to the market system. This ignored the public responsibility and 
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public interest inherent in the issue and circulation of money. 
As argued in Chapter 1, all money is a credit or claim on the 
resources or output of human societies. The control of money 
issue and circulation, therefore, has implications for everyone 
connected to that money system. Money is a social phenomenon 
and a public resource, but, with the collusion of the state, it has 
been harnessed for the benefit of a privileged few.
creating a socially Just ‘sufficiency’ economy
A major criticism of the debt-based capitalist system is that it 
demands continual expansion. People are urged to constantly 
produce, consume and borrow in order to create profit (Lawson 
2009). From a green perspective ‘sustainability requires a 
money supply system that can run satisfactorily if growth stops’ 
(Douthwaite 1999:27). The economic system should be able to 
provision human society on an equitable basis without destructive 
growth. Central to this would be the ideas of sufficiency and 
social justice. Sufficiency would mean providing enough goods 
and services to maintain a good quality of life. Social justice 
would mean that the money system would need to ensure that 
economic priorities would be determined in the interests of the 
most vulnerable members of the community. A key development 
in the emergence of capitalism was the erection of the barrier of 
private property between humans and their means of sustenance. 
At first this was policed by force and tradition, but money and 
waged labour have proved to be a much more flexible means 
of accumulation of wealth for those who own the means of 
production and sustenance, particularly when they could control 
the issue and circulation of money as well (Hutchinson et al. 
2002:70).
For those who do not have direct access to resources or money, 
the only means of sustaining themselves is to sell their labour. In 
order to consume, money must be earned. Those employed are 
expected to be grateful to the owners of resources and money for 
the gift of employment. As well as leading to exploitation and 
inequality, waged labour for profit creates a destructive distance 
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between the work people do and their immediate needs. The 
provisioning of necessities and public services has to piggy-back 
on profit-driven activities, extracting reluctantly paid taxes or 
other contributions to public welfare. Provisioning in a capitalist 
economy based on waged labour is a two-step rather than a 
one-step process. Work is not undertaken directly for social benefit 
but to maximise profit, that is, to enable capital accumulation. 
Inequality of access to money means that economic demand is 
biased towards the wealthy and discretionary expenditure. It is 
geared to meeting the wants of the rich, not the needs of the 
poor. There is no mechanism for society as a whole to express 
its needs on an egalitarian basis, or to allow for sufficiency-
based provisioning.
From a green perspective, the growth dynamic of capitalism is 
destructive of the natural world. Its drive endlessly to invest capital 
in new ventures produces social and environmental consequences 
that demand a different type of economics (Scott Cato 2009). 
Green economists argue that nature is a ‘real-real’ economy with 
physical and biological limits that extends far beyond the market 
notion of the ‘real’ economy. The ‘growth as progress’ dynamic 
of the capitalist model must eventually push up against the 
capacity of the environment to sustain human activity (Kallis et 
al. 2009:16–18). O’Connor sees this as a ‘second contradiction’ 
for capitalism. The first is the traditional Marxian problem 
of economic crisis, the second is that capitalism’s activities 
are destroying the social and environmental conditions of its 
own existence (1996). As Perelman warns, while ‘the financial 
system can bail out a Long Term Capital Management for a 
few billion dollars… nobody knows how to recover depleted 
energy sources or to rescue devastated environments on a global 
scale’ (2003:93).
Green economics is a broad church that runs from market 
solutions to the small scale Buddhist economics of Schumacher’s 
‘right livelihood’ (1973:44). Market oriented proposals seek to 
temper the ‘bottom line’ of financial profitability through measures 
such as environmental accounting, assessments and audits to 
various proposals for green taxes or tradable pollution permits. 
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The example of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme indicates 
that the market system is not a suitable medium for addressing 
environmental problems. A generous number of tradable carbon 
credits were issued just before the recession began. These were 
cashed in by firms who felt they didn’t need them, which forced 
down the price of carbon, making alternative energy schemes 
seem very expensive. The alternative to carbon trading could be 
a steep carbon tax or regulation and restriction of use. However, 
within a global capitalist economy a more restrictive solution 
might only produce a ‘race to the bottom’ as production shifted 
to countries with the lowest tax and least regulation. For Joan 
Martinez-Alier, a leading ecological economist, the values of a 
profit-driven market system are incommensurable with the values 
of ecological sustainability (1987). This view was shared by the 
early twentieth-century Scottish scientist Frederick Soddy. He saw 
people as so besotted with token-money and the virtual wealth of 
paper money that they did not pay attention to the real damage 
and poverty that surrounded them. His particular concern was 
the exploitation of fossil fuel. As all human activities depended 
upon energy there would be future impoverishment when supplies 
ran out (Merricks 1996). The question of the balance between 
ecology and economy was reinvigorated in the early 1970s by 
Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen (1971) and Herman Daly (1973) 
and launched the search for an alternative ecological economics.
Despite the limitations of a market response to environmental 
problems, there is halting mainstream recognition that the green 
warnings are real, particularly in terms of climate change. The idea 
of a ‘Green New Deal’ producing jobs through green technology 
and environmental protection has been put forward on both 
sides of the Atlantic. An independent Sustainable Development 
Commission, set up by the UK government, produced a report 
that challenged the link between prosperity and growth in 2009. 
The report rejected a capitalist market solution to inequality 
and ecological sustainability as simplistic, ‘assumptions that 
capitalism’s propensity for efficiency will allow us to stabilise the 
climate and protect against resource scarcity are nothing short of 
delusional’ (Jackson 2009:7). The report sees the financial crisis as 
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largely triggered by the growth imperative as continued expansion 
of credit was deliberately courted as an essential mechanism to 
stimulate consumption and growth. The period of financialisation, 
far from spreading prosperity, markedly increased inequality while 
wealth ‘trickled up to the lucky few’ (Jackson 2009:6). Growth, 
in any case, is unsustainable. To enable the global population to 
live at the level of the OECD countries, the global economy would 
need to be 40 times larger by the end of the century.
The report is ambivalent about the idea of a Keynesian stimulus 
through a Green New Deal. While seeing it as an ‘eminently 
sensible’ response to the economic crisis, it does not solve the 
overall problem if economies then return to business as usual. 
The report praises Herman Daly’s work on the notion of a ‘steady 
state economy’ which would conserve physical resources, but 
points out that there is no viable macroeconomic model to achieve 
this. It concludes by calling for an economics that abandons the 
presumption of growth in material consumption as the basis 
of economic stability. What is needed is an economics that is 
‘ecologically and socially literate, ending the folly of separating 
economy from society and environment’ (Jackson 2009:10). It 
remains to be seen how far the British or American economies will 
embrace the Green New Deal, let alone an alternative economics.
The report is not right in saying there is no macroeconomics 
based on integrating economy, society and environment. Certainly 
there is not one in the mainstream, but ideas are emerging through 
heterodox frameworks. One is ecofeminist political economy, 
which sees gender as the key to the separation of the economy from 
society and the environment (Mellor 2009, Perkins and Kuiper 
2005, Hutchinson et al. 2002). Ecofeminist political economy 
argues that women’s work and lives form the missing link between 
economy and nature. The capitalist market is disembodied and 
disembedded, carved out of the totality of human existence 
within the natural world. Seeing the capitalist market as socially 
disembedded is not new, it was argued by Polanyi (1944), but 
ecofeminists see it as more materially disembedded from the 
human body and the natural world. This is because it is not just 
capitalism that puts a monetary boundary around the activities 
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that it sees as profitable, patriarchy puts a monetary boundary 
around what work is considered worthy of payment. Much of 
women’s work and lives lies outside these boundaries as unpaid 
or low paid work. What is important about this excluded or 
marginalised work is that it is the work of the body in relation 
to human frailty and the human life cycle; work that is concerned 
with the young, the old, the sick, the unhappy, that is, care in its 
broadest sense.
The exclusion from money value of domestic and communal 
work around human mental and physical existence is akin to 
the way capitalist patriarchy externalises the natural world. The 
resilience of the natural world, like caring work, is treated as a 
free resource. This does not imply an essential difference between 
men and women. Many women hold privileged positions within 
the money-framed economy, while men can be involved in unpaid 
care or community work. The mechanism is a material one, the 
money-framed economy can operate as it does because it can 
exploit the unpaid, or underpaid, caring work that is mainly 
done by women, together with the resources of the natural world. 
Ignoring or marginalising the needs of the human body with 
its frailties enables the illusion of an independently functioning 
‘Economic Man’ (Mellor 1997). ‘His’ money-based life ignores the 
embodied-ness of human life and the embedded-ness of humanity 
in the natural environment. ‘Economic Man’ is not young or old, 
sick or unhappy and does not have pressing domestic demands 
that cannot be ignored or put off. Thus, the artificial boundary of 
human activities that is called the ‘economy’ fails to acknowledge 
its true resource base and the parasitical way it is sustained by 
systems of unpaid social labour and the resources and resilience of 
the natural environment (Bennholdt-Thomsen and Mies 1999:31, 
Hutchinson et al. 2002:180). As a result these are exploited and 
damaged. It is the fragility of human existence that is the link to 
the fragility of the natural environment. This fragility is what lies 
beyond the boundary of the money economy.
Ecofeminist political economy challenges the exploitative 
boundaries of the economy as defined by capitalist patriarchy (Mies 
1999:37). It seeks to create a provisioning system that can meet 
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human needs and enhance human potential without destroying 
the life of the planet. A provisioning economy would start from the 
embodiment and embedded-ness of human lives, human well-being 
and the vitality of the natural world. Such an emphasis would 
mean that patterns of work and consumption would be sensitive 
to the human life cycle and the replenishing needs of the planet. 
The provisioning of necessary goods and services would be the 
main focus of the economy and the activities of production and 
exchange would be fully integrated with the dynamics of the 
body and the environment. A money system for such an economy 
would need to embrace this wider notion of provisioning. It would 
need to enable the building of a non-gendered, egalitarian and 
ecologically sustainable provisioning economy. It would therefore 
need to prioritise these needs and this work in the issue of money. 
Money would be brought back from the capitalist market and 
re-united with its social and public base.
Given that money emerges by fiat, out of ‘fresh air’, whether it 
takes the form of metal, paper or a sight bank account, it is not 
created by the mental or manual labour of any particular group in 
society. It is brought into being through a combination of private, 
public and social acts. Far from reflecting the labour of the actual 
issuer, money is produced as a claim for resources and labour. 
There is no reason why these claims should be harnessed for 
the personal benefit of the issuer. As something that is produced 
without specific labour, the social resource of money is akin to 
a natural resource. Like natural resources, money can be seen as 
subject to individual property rights or as a Commons, that is, 
something that is not owned by any individual or group, but is a 
‘Common Wealth’, for the benefit of all (Large 2010). Commons 
resources are those which should ‘belong’ to the people as a whole, 
and in the case of the natural environment to the non-human 
world as well. If they are ‘used’ at all Commons resources 
should be for the benefit of all. Capitalism has been built on the 
privatisation of Commons resources (Scott Cato 2006:156–7). 
Land and other resources have been expropriated or enclosed 
by private ownership through the expulsion of inhabitants, 
or the removal of their rights to use previously common land. 
Mellor 01 text   159 23/02/2010   15:07
160  The FuTure oF Money
Historically this grab of assets was often achieved by force, but 
money is even more effective. Privately ‘enclosed’ money is used to 
buy resources and productive assets in the same way that colonists 
bought Manhattan for strings of beads (wampum was valued 
money in the area at the time). Privatisation of the social resource 
of money is central to capitalism; if a provisioning sufficiency 
economy is to be achieved, money must be reclaimed for the 
benefit of the people as a whole. It must be reclaimed as public 
money and brought under democratic control. This is not such an 
impossible task as it seems, given that the privatisation of money 
is an illusion anyway.
The Public Foundations of Private Money
The analysis of money presented in this book has shown that 
the privatisation of money is an illusion, as the only mechanism 
that can guarantee the security of the money system is the public 
authority of the state. Money also represents mechanisms of social 
trust. However, through the dominance of capitalist neo-liberal 
ideology the operation of the money system has been privatised. 
The market driven ‘democratisation’ of finance has presented 
the capitalist market as the people’s friend and the public sector 
as the enemy. There is very little popular support for the public 
sector, read as the state, and its expenditure, as people have been 
encouraged to think that the state is a drain on the ‘real’ economy 
and the money in their pockets. However, this ‘real’ economy only 
represents the profit driven interests of the patriarchal capitalist 
market. Debt-driven finance lives off the promise of the continued 
future circulation of money which ultimately needs the backing 
of the state and its taxation mechanisms. Despite the fact that 
the money system depends on social trust and public authority, 
the most important power of money, the ability to create it, has 
been given away to the private sector. The first step, therefore, 
must be to reclaim money creation for the Commons, for the 
people as a whole (Harmer 1999, Daly 1999, Douthwaite 1999, 
Robertson 1998, Rowbotham 1998, Robertson and Bunzl 2003, 
Huber and Robertson 1999, Scott Cato 2009). As Bernard Lietaer 
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has argued, ‘money is too important to be left only to bankers 
and economists’ (preface to Douthwaite 1999:6–7).
To remove its capacity to create money would be to destroy 
the basis of the modern banking system. As has been argued, the 
principle of borrowing short and lending long means that all loans 
are an act of money creation. To the extent that they operate on 
the same principle, all mutual savings and loans organisations are 
also creating money. However, for those under strict regulation or 
democratic control, there are limits to the amount of loans that 
can be issued or the use to which they can be put. Financialised 
capitalism exposed the unlimited powers of money creation held 
by the commercial banks and showed the way in which it could 
be abused for the benefit of a very rich minority while drowning 
much of the rest of society in debt. If money creation was returned 
to the public to determine, commercial banks would no longer be 
able to create new credit. Instead, they would adopt the role that 
they are commonly assumed to hold, as credit-broking financial 
intermediaries. Money invested could not be withdrawn until 
sufficient debt was repaid. People who lent their money would 
know it was at risk. Leverage would also be much more difficult 
to obtain with no mechanism of money creation. The economy 
would have to operate on much more steady state principles, as 
the debt dynamic for growth would be truncated.
Public responsibility for securing the financial system has been 
made transparent during the financial crisis and this has enabled 
the case for returning money creation to the public to move closer 
to the mainstream. In January 2009 US Congressman Dennis 
Kucinich put forward the case for monetary reform arguing that 
with 10 million Americans already out of work and heading for 12 
million, the time had come for Congress to reclaim control of the 
money system. The retort by supporters of the capitalist market 
will be that the state would be inefficient in allocating money. 
Given the extraordinary behaviour of the financial markets, it 
would seem the efficient market thesis has no credibility in this 
regard. However, this will not be widely understood unless radical 
thinkers take the problem of Wall Street socialism seriously. It is 
not just a case of emergency support for the financial system. The 
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public always stands in support of its legal tender. As became clear 
in the financial crisis, public support is not limited to regulated 
banks: it extends to the whole of private finance. This was shown 
when the US state stepped in to support Bear Stearns and was 
demonstrated even more forcefully when the state’s failure to 
support Lehman nearly brought down the whole banking system. 
No matter what firewalls are put up, it is not possible to separate 
profit-driven financial institutions, or the ebbs and flows of profit-
seeking finance, from high street deposits. While the money 
system remains the creature of capitalist finance, the public will 
be responsible for its survival. Wall Street socialism is therefore 
not an aberration: it is how the money system is constructed. The 
notion of private finance is a sham. Privatised money exists by 
courtesy of the state and the wider public who hosts it.
The principle must be that if the public, via the state, stands 
guarantee for the capitalist financial system, then that system 
must be in public hands. Under neo-liberal ideology the notion 
of the state has been almost entirely separated from the notion of 
the public good. However it is important not to just reverse the 
neo-liberal argument: private bad, public good. States have been 
major promoters of privatised finance. Public authorities would 
not necessarily use money wisely, unless they were subject to 
democratically-based mandates and public scrutiny. If money is to 
be democratised, the priorities of the state need to be determined 
by the wider public. Public authorities must be clear that their 
loyalties must rest with the public as a whole. For this to happen it 
must be made clear that the capitalist sector has no mechanism for 
ensuring the public good. Its aim of wealth creation is not for the 
benefit of the public, but is at the expense of the public, nationally 
and internationally. It is driven by the need to make profit in 
whatever way possible. The capitalist market has globally brought 
goods and services to the billion or so better off, but cannot 
provision the world’s people on a socially just or ecologically 
sustainable basis. Individual capitalists may also indulge in 
philanthropy but there are at least two problems with this. First, 
they are directly or indirectly using the privatised capacity for 
debt-based money creation to fuel their financial accumulation, 
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money which could have been issued by the public for public 
good. Second, the priorities for philanthropic expenditure reflect 
the whim of the donor, not the democratically identified needs 
of the people.
A great deal of waste and unnecessary production and 
consumption would be avoided if public services could be paid 
for directly through money issue. Rather than debt-based money 
being created and circulated through the market, money creation 
could be achieved through the provision of socially necessary 
work and then flow outward towards the market. At present, 
given that money is issued largely into the private sector, it 
has to be taxed back out again (with difficulty) for public use. 
Socially-issued money would go the other way round, prioritising 
democratically determined socially relevant expenditure with the 
commercial economy having to earn the money into its sector 
through carrying out socially relevant and ecologically sustainable 
activities. Beneficial expenditure would have first call on money 
issue with the capitalist market (to the extent it continued to exist) 
offering goods and services to attract that money as it circulated. 
In such a system, people would have much more opportunity 
to work in areas that directly affected their lives. The two-step 
economy of alienated work would become a one-step integration 
of work and needs. The vital question is, how would the one-step 
economy operate? Richard Douthwaite, in his analysis of the 
‘ecology of money’, argues that there are three ways in which 
money can be created, through commercial activities, through 
public authority and through socially generated money (1999:11).
socially Produced Money
There are broadly two ways in which social money can be created: 
through the issue and circulation of a local currency or through 
an accounting system based on membership of a trading group. 
Social money systems tend to be locally based with the aim of 
building a local economy. The best known examples of schemes 
that rely on membership and accounting, rather than a tangible 
currency, are LETS (Local Exchange Trading Systems) devised 
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by a Canadian, Michael Linton, in the early 1980s. LETS are 
membership organisations where people carry out tasks or trade 
with each other with a record of debits and credits kept in a 
notional currency of account (Raddon 2003, North 2007). The 
alternative is to issue a local currency. A well-recorded example 
is in the small university town of Ithaca in New York state. 
Currency notes, ‘Ithaca Hours’, are denominated by time, from 
quarter-hour to two-hour, valued at the national average hourly 
rate. The ‘Ithaca Hours’ are issued as loans or grants to charities, 
or payments to those who advertise in the movements’ directory, 
and are accepted by many local businesses. The founder was 
inspired by the example of the British co-operative pioneer Robert 
Owen’s National Equitable Labour Exchange scheme of 1832–34 
(Raddon 2003:13). Another well-known and widespread example 
is the Time Dollar system devised by Edgar Cahn, a US Professor 
and Civil Rights Lawyer. Time dollars are earned by giving a timed 
service to another person, but there is no money equivalence. In 
Japan Hureai Kippu (caring relationship tickets) are used for care 
of the elderly (Douthwaite 1999:5). Care-givers can accumulate 
health care credits for their own use, or they can transfer their 
credit to others, for example to obtain care for relatives living in 
another part of the country.
Alternative or complementary currencies often emerge in times 
of economic stress, most notably in the 1930s. In 1932, Michael 
Unterguggenberger the mayor of Worgl in Austria, facing the 
unemployment of one-third of his small town, issued around 
10,000 schillings in scrip notes (scrip is privately-issued money 
that does not qualify as legal tender). Following the principles of 
Silvio Gesell (1862–1930) the scrip was subject to demurrage, that 
is, to maintain its value it had to be stamped for a small fee each 
month, an encouragement to spend it quickly. The money was 
used to pay the wages of city employees and for public works. It 
was also accepted in payment of local taxes. The scrip money was 
a great success, circulating much more quickly than the national 
currency and unemployment fell by 25 per cent (Douthwaite and 
Wagman 1999:97). Douthwaite and Wagman see the issue of 
‘auxiliary currencies’ as ‘an important step in the democratisa-
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tion of money creation’ (1999:6). This was a view shared by the 
Austrian government who declared the scheme illegal. The US 
government in the 1930s also closed down several hundred similar 
money systems, fearing that the US monetary system was being 
‘democratised out of its hands’ (1999:100).
Local money systems are favoured by green activists and 
economists as a means of building a local economy (Scott Cato 
2006:131–2). As Woodin and Lucas argue, local money systems 
can boost resilience in local economies. They can promote 
economic solidarity, provide alternative liquidity, supply low cost 
finance to local businesses and retain wealth within the local area 
(2004:195). There are, however, limitations to local money or 
trading systems. Mostly they are very small particularly if, like 
LETS, they work on face-to-face interactions with records kept of 
each interaction. North, in a wide ranging survey of local trading 
systems, comes to some pessimistic conclusions. To claims that 
non-capitalist local markets can be organised he points out that 
‘advocates of alternative practices ignore the extent to which such 
practices have been tried before, always ending in shipwreck’ 
(North 2007:174). His case is that such schemes cannot escape 
the capitalist market. Money creation itself is not enough. Access 
to basic resources is needed and this requires access to mainstream 
money. A local money system can only harness those resources 
and activities it controls (North 2007:178). It is not the creation 
of money that is important but the breadth of its recognition. In 
the absence of public authority, social money can only rely on the 
trust and fairness of the people within the system. People who 
promote the idea of local money often see local currencies as 
one among many, ranging from the local to the global. Richard 
Douthwaite sees room for four currencies: national, international, 
local and a special currency for savings (1999:53).
While social money initiatives are often small scale, they can 
provide the flexibility to allow communities to explore alternative 
ways of provisioning their needs and structuring their lives. They 
offer ‘glimmers of spaces beyond or outside capitalism’ (Gibson-
Graham 1996:88). The British consumer co-operative movement 
shows that large scale organisation enabling widespread economic 
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change can emerge from small local initiatives (Mellor et al. 
1988:15–17). Starting from a group of weavers in Rochdale in 
1844, putting aside sixpence a week to collectively buy a bag of 
flour to sell among themselves, it grew within a generation to a 
‘cradle to grave’ supply chain for the working class of Britain. 
Consumer co-operatives met the needs of a substantial part of 
the British working class population by the post-war period with 
shops, factories, farms and funeral parlours. In the twenty-first 
century it remains the country’s biggest farmer. Its bank, insurance 
society and building society (now independent as the Nationwide) 
flourish. It did not launch a new currency, but it was an alternative 
production and trading system that dominated working class 
provisioning until the private sector used its financial muscle to 
enter the food market and launch the wider consumer society.
In complex societies it is clear that a public money system is 
needed to enable production and exchange. People need to be 
issued with ‘credit’ to start the process. This does not necessarily 
have to be issued as debt. Money could be issued directly to 
launch the production process, particularly if goods and services 
were to be provided on a not-for-profit basis. If production and 
consumption is to be as close to sufficiency as possible, people 
should be able to directly produce the goods and services they 
need. At present money creation is fed through a profit-driven 
capitalist market whose aim is not to provision society, but to 
create a profit. Capitalism has harnessed the production of money 
to feed its own accumulation of wealth. It is a system driven by 
consumption and growth. It can never be the basis of a sufficiency 
society, or one that is economically just. The aim must be to 
redirect the money system so that people can collectively provision 
themselves within ecological constraints.
Making Money Public 
One of the problems the state has faced as the modern money 
system developed was that it became indebted to the commercial 
sector. In giving away its money creation capacity, as bank 
debt took over from note and coin issue, the need to borrow 
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money became even more pressing. As capitalist ideology moved 
heavily against the public sector having any money creation 
capacity, the only sources of money for the state were unpopular: 
taxes and borrowing. Even when the British state did engage 
in quantitative easing, that is, money creation, the opposition 
and media commentators generally persisted in referring to the 
problem of debt that was being foisted on future generations. No 
distinction appeared to be made between government borrowing 
and money creation.
If money issue was returned to public control, it could be used 
directly by the state and local authorities for necessary public 
expenditure social benefit. However making money creation 
public need not mean making it subject to state control. Money 
could be issued in various ways. Publicly-issued credit could be 
made available to co-operatives, mutuals or other types of social 
businesses or to carefully regulated private businesses to deliver 
public goods. Alternatively, a citizen’s income could be provided 
which would emerge into the economy as a demand for goods and 
services (Lord 1999). As a universal payment, a citizen’s income 
would remove the stigma of being ‘on benefit’ and could support 
more creative work, education or community activity, as well as 
providing an income for those doing unpaid caring work. The 
level of such an income could also be enhanced to help balance 
an economy. For example, extra payments could be paid to people 
who live or settle in under-populated regions or paid to support 
populations with particular difficulties, or people who undertake 
particular tasks such as caring.
Public money issue could also be openly used for social incomes 
such as pensions. As Wray points out, this is what happens now 
through the social security system: ‘let us stop pretending, and 
recognise Social Security promises for what they are – that is, 
commitments by a sovereign government to credit bank accounts 
on schedule’ (2009:16).
To avoid politicians using money creation in their own interests, 
as bankers have done, Huber and Robertson suggest that the 
level of new money issue should be determined by monetary 
authorities, operationally independent as the Bank of England 
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now is, but accountable to elected governments for achieving 
their published, democratically approved monetary objectives 
(2000:15). The monetary authorities would give the new money 
they create to the government as public revenue to be spent into 
circulation for public purposes under an accepted democratic 
budgetary procedure.
The most important change must be democratic input into 
economic priorities. It may be questioned whether people would 
be able to make detailed democratic decisions on financial matters. 
It would not be envisaged that the public would engage in detailed 
decision-making. The most important thing would be to indicate 
provisioning priorities that the financial system would follow. This 
is the basis of participatory budgeting (Nylen 2003) most notably 
in Porto Alegre in Brazil, but copied elsewhere (Albert 2003:15). 
People already make decisions every day about economic priorities 
as they spend or borrow money. However, they do not make them 
collectively and there is great inequality in who influences the 
direction of economic expenditure. There is no reason why the 
‘hidden hand’ of the market should be seen as more rational than 
conscious deliberations about overall priorities in the allocation 
of economic capacity through money issue.
Democratic control of money creation would enable change 
and flexibility based on social and public priorities within the 
economy. This flexibility could create a steady state provisioning 
system through a careful linking of monetary and fiscal policies. 
As Galbraith has pointed out, fiscal policy can be used to manage 
excess demand as well as falling demand (1975:306–7). Tax could 
be used to regulate activities such as resource use, to redistribute 
wealth or to regulate money supply if it got out of hand. The 
importance of a steady state money system is that money issue 
would be determined by popular demand in the same way that 
private demand creates money now. If much of the money issued 
went directly to public provisioning as investment income for 
goods and service providers, or to individuals as a basic income, it 
would be hard for a state to divert this money to less appropriate 
expenditure such as armaments or warfare.
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The main source of income for any remaining profit-based 
companies would be contracts from the public or communal 
sectors or the provision of goods and services to those sectors. 
This is the basis on which many commercial companies already 
operate. This would, arguably, provide a much more secure source 
of income than the ebb and flow of the market sector. As Minsky 
argued, government spending is more sustainable for the private 
sector because it is based on income rather than debt (Wray 
2009:9). To have the money system driven from democratically 
controlled priorities would completely turn around the present 
economic drivers. It would not be the search for profit that would 
drive production, but social need and social priorities. Commercial 
firms would need to orient themselves to those priorities if they 
wished to apply for contracts. They would, however, still need 
credit to start the production process. This could come from the 
public sector as a prepayment for the contract or service. It could 
come from long term private investment, preferably as equity. 
Shares could be traded, but they would be subject to taxation 
and would have to be held for a period of time between buying 
and selling. Speculative investments that did not involve the direct 
production of goods and services for public benefit would be 
treated as gambling and taxed heavily, or even be proscribed. No 
private investments would be publicly guaranteed.
Given the way that the money creation system has been abused 
for private gain there is also a very strong case for a windfall tax 
on money wealth. Those people who have amassed huge incomes 
from manipulating money should be seen as profiteers and treated 
accordingly.
Banking the People’s Money
What emerges from the analysis of money and banking presented 
in this book is that modern banking is an act of money creation 
which the state must guarantee if the savings of the public are to 
be secured. Debt-driven money issue through the banking system 
also drives economic growth which is not sustainable in economic 
or ecological terms. The present banking system is therefore 
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undemocratic and unsustainable. The public has the responsibil-
ity for the security of the banking system, but does not gain the 
benefit. Two of the mainstream solutions to the financial crisis 
are better regulation and the separation of high street savings 
from speculative finance. The first aims to regulate high street 
banks more strictly. The second would instigate ‘narrow banking’, 
separating off traditional banking services (Strange 1998:174). 
These solutions are linked. Regulation is about imposing rules 
on banks where public savings are at risk. Whether the banks are 
formally separated or not, it is argued that there must be firewalls 
between speculative activities and high street banking services. 
However, as long as both aspects of banking remain within the 
commercial sector, these solutions will fail as they have done in 
the past. It has proved impossible to separate the two sides of 
commercial banking. The end result has been that the public has 
had to back both the high street and the speculative aspects of 
capitalist finance.
As described in Chapter 3, the financialisation of the banking 
system has led people to confuse savings with capital and this has 
been largely a result of how the banks have been seen to operate. 
The assumption is that banks take in personal deposits and invest 
them for profit. Even if this were the case, such a model of banking 
is no longer practicable as there are insufficient bank deposits 
to provide enough liquidity to sustain profit (Langley 2010). 
Traditional ‘narrow’ banks also did not provide a broad-based 
public service because they were exclusionary in not offering 
services to the poor. The way that current banking is structured 
means that taking deposits enables money creation which, as we 
have seen, becomes a liability of the state. This creates unlimited 
‘moral hazard’ as risky behaviour will always be underpinned by 
public rescue. The only safe way to separate high street banking 
from risk and speculation is to have no commercial involvement 
in the delivery of public banking services.
One of the mainstream solutions put forward has been to 
create smaller commercial banks that could be allowed to fail. 
This is the wrong argument. Banking that involves the creation 
of money should not be constructed on a commercial basis, 
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therefore there is no case for failure. Public banking should be 
run on a not-for-profit basis through organisations such as the 
post office or on a mutual basis as the old building societies and 
savings banks did. Banks offering services to the public could be 
municipal, national, regional or based on specific sectors such as 
housing or agriculture. All of these types of organisations already 
exist, or have existed in the past. They would provide secure 
savings, safe lending and money transfer services. As not-for-profit 
organisations would not have to pay dividends to shareholders, 
there would be no incentive to expand activities beyond what is 
necessary for sustainable provisioning. If the aim was to achieve 
a steady state economy interest would not be paid on saving 
deposits, although they could be inflation-proofed through some 
kind of national savings scheme.
No profit-based financial organisations would be able to take 
in savings deposits. Any money invested in for-profit financial 
organisations would be clearly linked to loans or other assets 
and only repaid when sufficient money had been returned. Any 
banking system issuing loans based on deposits returnable on 
demand will always be an exercise in money creation. Given the 
abuse of money creation by the private sector, no organisation 
that is given the capacity to issue money should be run for private 
profit. Only not-for-profit organisations should be able to create 
loans under the supervision of a monetary authority. Joseph Huber 
and James Robertson argue that national governments could 
reclaim the issue of money from the privatised banking system 
very easily by simply declaring all electronic sight accounts as legal 
tender (1999:20). As with notes and coin, it would be illegal for 
anyone other than the state, or another organisation representing 
the public interest, to create new loan-based sight accounts. Such 
a move would only be acknowledging the status quo, as all bank 
sight accounts can be ‘cashed’ at any time and are, in practice, 
subject to state guarantee.
Not-for-profit banks as deposit taking institutions would be 
creating money through loans, but such loans would be for social 
benefit, determined by publicly determined priorities. From a 
steady state perspective it would be important that loans were 
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made interest free wherever possible and where appropriate as 
money could be issued as debt-free grants. Ideally, new money 
should be spent into circulation on socially responsible and 
sustainable projects. One possibility is to set up a revolving loan, 
or reinvestment fund. There are many examples of this within 
the co-operative and community finance movement (Affleck and 
Mellor 2003).These are funds that are usually set up by grant 
and then issued as loans for social benefit or to develop social or 
co-operative enterprises. As loans are repaid new ones are made. 
The level of lending or grant issued could vary: for example, a 
bank in a poorer area could make a higher proportion of grants 
than loans. Publicly generated money could also be distributed 
through democratically-based specialist banks. These could be 
geographic (local, regional, national) or specialist (health, arts, 
environment, housing). Non-commercial banks are not immune 
from risky or illegal activity as the US savings and loans crisis 
and the failure of building societies in the UK shows. However, 
these organisations were operating within a wider speculative 
climate. In a steady state economy the wider climate would not 
be conducive to speculative activity.
A major problem in establishing a steady state economy and 
reclaiming money as a public resource would be the nature of 
the global financial system. Such a solution would be hard to 
implement in one country: the campaign would therefore need 
to be taken to the global level.
International Money
Central to the neo-liberal global financial system has been the free 
flow of money. As the Bretton Woods system unravelled, capitalist 
finance slipped the boundaries of national economies and spread 
its tentacles around the globe. National currencies subject to 
market forces proved a field day for speculators, while creating 
severe economic problems for the countries concerned. Globalised 
production was able to play off hard currencies against soft 
currencies to maximise profits. A ‘hard’ reserve currency country, 
like the US, was able to flood the world with dollars, drawing in 
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goods and services from around the world. As Graham Turner 
argues, the financial collapse was largely caused by globalised 
production. As western capital moved offshore to cheap labour 
areas and production declined in the home economies, the classic 
problem of the failure to realise profit emerged. There was plenty 
of surplus value in the goods as they were re-imported for sale, but 
a limit to purchasing power. Neither the workforce in the producer 
countries nor the consumers in the old industrial countries had 
sufficient money to buy the products. This meant that countries 
like the US ran huge deficits while western consumers bridged the 
gap with debt. As the deficits and profits were recycled, the excess 
money got sucked into inflationary investment cycles including 
house price rises: ‘the sharp rise in house prices was the logical 
outcome of Western companies aggressively cutting labour costs 
by shifting jobs abroad’ (Turner 2008:61).
Rawi Abdelal reminds us that globalised production and the 
free movement of capital is relatively recent, largely stemming 
from the 1980s (2007:213). He argues that globalised finance 
as an orthodoxy peaked in the late 1990s and the case for 
reform is being discussed in many quarters. As he points out, 
‘the globalization of finance is neither inexorable nor inevitable’; 
however, while people accept the orthodoxy ‘we may not recognise 
the inherent fragility of the underpinnings of a world that allows 
such extraordinary mobility of capital’ (Abdelal 2007:223). 
Democratic control of currency and banking can only take place 
within a sphere of public authority. In the absence of a global 
democratic forum the most immediately feasible level is the nation 
state, although for green economists it would be better to align 
money systems with ecological systems such as bioregions (Scott 
Cato 2009 150–151). Whatever the level, any decisions made 
locally will be overwhelmed if currencies cannot be insulated 
from each other. Global inequality will also persist if currencies 
such as the dollar or the euro continue to dominate. Jane D’Arista 
suggests that one way around this problem would be to enable all 
countries to make transnational payments in their own currency 
(2004:202). This would remove the need for countries to earn 
money from a stronger currency before being able to trade inter-
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nationally, but it would not remove the opportunity to speculate 
between currencies. Nor would it eliminate the inequalities 
between countries.
Another solution would be to put a barrier between national 
currencies, that is, to have a currency of account at the global 
level. The answer that Keynes proposed was a global money 
system. Keynes warned that free trade, flexible exchange rates 
and free movement of capital was incompatible with maintaining 
full employment. Keynes wanted countries to interact via a buffer 
mechanism, the bancor (bank gold) (Scott Cato 2009:77). This 
would be a flexible international payments system which would 
also have a mechanism to balance world trade whereby surplus 
economies would compensate debtor economies. This part of the 
Bretton Woods discussion was never implemented, instead there 
was a gold exchange rate mechanism based around the dollar.
Huber and Robertson call for an international currency issued 
by an independent international authority. This would be given to 
the UN to spend into circulation to help finance its own operations, 
but could also be given proportionately to national governments 
as a redistributive measure, a form of international ‘basic income’ 
(2000:56). Bernard Lietaer advocates a global currency linked 
to land (2001:249) while Richard Douthwaite suggests it should 
be an EBCU, an energy-backed currency unit (1999:57). More 
recently, Davidson has argued for an International Monetary 
Clearing Unit (IMCU) which would insulate economies from each 
other (Davidson 2008:300–305). Only central banks would be 
able to access the units and exchange them with other central 
banks. This means that currencies could be insulated from each 
other, eliminating the opportunity for currency speculation and 
the inequality created by ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ currencies. It would 
also enable governments to monitor payments for illegal activities 
or tax evasion. Another possibility that would help remove the 
inequalities between countries would be to value a global currency 
on some equivalent to average income so that there would be 
parity in relation to labour costs. This would remove the benefit 
of production in low wage countries and encourage production 
at the point of use.
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conclusion
The most important lesson from the crisis of capitalist finance is 
that there is an alternative (Mellor 2006). Many of the ideas set 
out above are feasible and sensible. Key elements already exist. 
Money is a public resource and a public responsibility that has 
been harnessed for private profit. The public nature of money 
has been clearly demonstrated in the financial crisis. The total 
irresponsibility and blatant incompetence of speculative capitalism 
has also been revealed, as well as its fragility. Capitalist finance 
has proved itself to be an unworthy steward of national wealth. It 
has abused and dissipated it. Contrary to capitalist propaganda, 
money is not made by wealth creators in the private sector. It is 
created through the banking system and then expropriated by a 
minority for private profit. There is no justification for allowing 
the benefits arising from the creation of a country’s money 
supply to be appropriated by greed and self-interest. If money 
is ultimately the responsibility of the public, its ownership and 
control should be given back to the public. Money is a public 
resource that should be used to provision human societies on 
the basis of social justice, well-being and environmental respon-
sibility. A steady state economy would be possible if the money 
system was not driven by the demands of debt-based money, 
financial accumulation and profit-driven growth. Money should 
be reclaimed and democratised for the benefit of the whole of 
society and the natural world. It is the people’s money: give it 
back to the people.




BIS Bank for International Settlements
CDOs Collatoralised Debt Obligations
CDS Credit Default Swaps
EBCU Energy-Backed Currency Unit
FSA Financial Services Authority
GDP Gross Domestic Product
HBoS Halifax Bank of Scotland
IMF International Monetary Fund
LETS Local Exchange Trading Systems
LIBOR London Interbank Offered Rate
LTCM Long Term Capital Management
MBS Mortgage Backed Securities
NINJA No Income, No Job, No Assets
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development 
PFI Private Finance Initiative
SARS Suspicious Activity Reports
SIVs Structured Investment Vehicles
TARP Troubled Asset Relief Programme
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